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The economics literature has witnessed an explosion of laboratory experiments in 
the past 20 years.  Many of these experiments have focused on topics that are central to 
the field of labor economics, including how workers respond to various forms of 
compensation, and the economics of discrimination, arbitration, bargaining, and 
matching.  In this chapter we survey the contributions of laboratory experiments to our 
understanding of these questions.   
 
We begin our review with a discussion of methodological issues:  First, we pose 
the general question of why (and more importantly when) a labor economist might want 
to conduct a laboratory experiment:  What types of questions, if any, are laboratory 
experiments best suited to answer?  How do laboratory experiments compare to field 
experiments?  Next, once one has decided to conduct a laboratory experiment, how 
should it be designed?  Here we review the main methodological decisions an 
experimenter typically needs to make, and the advantages and disadvantages of the 
various choices.   
 
The second half of our review turns its attention to the substantive issues in labor 
economics that have been addressed using laboratory experiments. While these are wide-
ranging, we focus our review on the set of issues that have generated probably the largest 
volume of experimental papers in labor economics:  the effects of compensation policies 
on the supply of effort by workers.  We do this in two parts.  The first uses ‘traditional’ 
principal-agent theory as a theoretical lens to derive predictions regarding the effects of 
incentives, and tests these predictions in the lab.  Many are confirmed; at the same time a 
number of robust ‘anomalies’, such as apparent gift exchange, also appear.  The second 
part focuses specifically on the use of experiments and the development of new 
theoretical models of social preferences to understand these anomalies.   Finally, we also 
provide brief guides to the laboratory literature on a number of other labor-related topics, 




I. Why Laboratory Experiments? 
 
  Why should labor economists care about laboratory experiments?  After all, there 
are plenty of field data available for empirical tests.  In addition, there have been a 
number of objections to lab experiments concerning issues such as a lack of realism 
(external validity), demand effects, and selection effects.  Indeed, the laboratory is an 
artificial environment.  On the other hand, lab experiments have some important 
advantages over other approaches; we begin this section with a discussion of these 
advantages, then move on to critiques and responses.     2
 
1. Advantages of Laboratory Experiments 
 
  Most practitioners of lab experiments would probably agree that a key advantage 
is the ability to control conditions more tightly than in any other context.  For example, 
testing theory is a basic component of both the physical and social sciences, and the 
scientific method relies upon explicit tests of theory.  While empirical data are indeed 
rich and abundant, they reflect a variety of environmental factors; disentangling these 
factors is difficult if not impossible.   
 
Falk and Fehr (2003) provide the concrete example of testing tournament theory 
(e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981), where contestants should in equilibrium choose effort 
levels to equate marginal effort with marginal gain.  Since a direct empirical test of this 
theory must take into account “the number of workers who compete for the prize, the 
effort cost functions of the workers, the exact level of the prize, and the production level 
including the nature of the error term” (p. 400), such a test seems impossible with 
traditional empirical data.
1  However, all of these factors can be controlled (and 
systematically varied) in a laboratory experiment.  In this manner, it is also feasible to 
study the impact of specific institutional arrangements on behavior by systematically 
varying them. 
 
Of course, the same argument can be made regarding the effects of workers’ 
outside options, minimum wages, sick pay, discrimination, etc.  As another example, the 
gift-exchange game (an experimental model of Akerlof 1982) tests for a positive 
relationship between wages and effort; as this is a critical assumption of efficiency-wage 
theories (as discussed for example in Akerlof 1984 and Akerlof and Yellen 1986), it is 
useful to test it; however, it is quite difficult to do so with standard field data.  In general, 
the laboratory offers superior control, which make it possible to identify causal 
relationships.  In field data, variables are often determined endogenously and usually it is 
only possible to identify correlation.  Finally, if one has doubts concerning data reported 
in a laboratory experiment, one can readily replicate the experiment (particularly when a 
standard subject pool is used).
2  
  
One of the greatest strengths of lab experiments is the ability to take a specific 
theoretical model (say of behavior under a specific group incentive scheme, with no 
communication between players and one-shot interaction), where theory says exactly 
what, say, the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium should be, and have real agents play exactly 
that game with real monetary consequences.  One can then compare the predictions of the 
model to what happens; if the theory is rejected it is then relatively easy to test competing 
explanations (e.g. inequity aversion, ‘reciprocity’, loss aversion, framing) for the 
rejection.  One way to think about a lab experiment is as a first link in a longer chain 
running from theory to actual interactions in real firms.  A distinct role of lab experiments 
                                                 
1 Furthermore, Falk and Fehr (2003) point out that other factors such as communication, peer pressure, and 
whether the interaction is one-shot or repeated may well affect behavior and are unlikely to be known to a 
researcher using field data. 
2 See Charness (forthcoming) for more discussion regarding replicability.   3
applies to situations where ‘standard’ game theory doesn’t give us crisp predictions, as in 
games with multiple equilibria.  Important examples include production in teams with 
complementarities among the agents’ efforts (Brandts and Cooper 2007), where the 
multiple equilibria are due to coordination problems, and repeated principal-agent 
interactions (e.g. Brown, Falk and Fehr 2004) where the folk theorem can generate an 
infinity of equilibria.  In these cases, experiments provide information on how people 
behave in situations where existing theory provides little or no guide to what should 
happen. 
 
The theory of mechanism design often provides suggestions for a number of 
mechanisms that are predicted to yield socially-efficient outcomes, or sometimes for a 
number of alternative mechanisms that are all predicted to be equivalent (for example, it 
is well known that a properly-designed tournament should be able to exactly mimic an 
efficient individual piece rate).  Lab experiments however can be used to show that 
mechanisms/institutions that work in theory don’t always do so in practice, even under 
conditions designed to be ideal for the institution.  Also, institutions that are predicted to 
yield identical results may not do so.  In fact, the use of lab experiments to ‘pre-test’ 
proposed allocation mechanisms before implementing them in the real world already has 
an established history (see Plott 1987 for some examples).  The same is true of lab 
experiments in at least two labor contexts:  the design of matching mechanisms in 
professional labor markets (e.g. McKinney, Niederle and Roth 2005) and the design of 
arbitration mechanisms for public-sector union bargaining (e.g. Deck, Farmer and Zeng 
2007).     
 
A sometimes-overlooked advantage of lab experiments is their low cost, 
especially compared to field experiments and survey data collection:  competing 
explanations can often be tested or distinguished quickly and inexpensively with a 
modest number of sessions.  In this sense, dropping laboratory experiments from our 
toolkit would be a little like dropping animal studies from cancer research:  while results 
from animal studies do not always apply to humans, the ability to test many hypotheses 
cheaply under carefully controlled conditions provides an indispensable tool for the 
development of models that work in the real world. 
 
Another comparative advantage of lab experiments is in the study of phenomena 
that are hard to measure in the field because they are illegal or face disapproval, such as 
acts of sabotage, discrimination, and spite.  It is also relatively easy to measure agents’ 
beliefs in the lab, using monetary incentives.  This is important in view of the role played 
by beliefs in many game-theoretic models.  Belief data from experiments has been central 
in the development of new behavioral theory such as guilt aversion (see Charness and 
Dufwenberg 2006, Battigali and Dufwenberg 2007, 2009). 
 
Finally, lab experiments offer unique opportunities to researchers who are 
interested in the form of strategies used by agents in solving dynamic problems (or 
playing dynamic games).  An illustrative example here is the classic problem of search 
from a fixed wage distribution, which is often used by labor economists to model 
individual workers’ unemployment spells.  Theory has strong predictions here –that the   4
optimal strategy has a reservation wage property--, but it is difficult to test this prediction 
from field data (whether experimental or not) because strategies need to be inferred from 
choice histories.  In contrast, the lab makes it easier to elicit subjects’ strategies more 
directly in a number of ways, including asking subjects to describe their strategy (Hey 
1982), observing subjects’ use of information boards (Sonnemans 1998), and forcing 
subjects to play the game using the strategy method (Sonnemans 1998, Brown, Flinn and 
Schotter forthcoming). This approach has identified some interesting deviations between 
actual and predicted strategies (for example, subjects seem to condition their acceptance 
behavior on factors like their total earnings to date, which is not optimal) that researchers 
are now attempting to understand using a variety of behavioral approaches.   
 
 
2. Objections to laboratory experiments and some responses 
 
The most common objection to the data obtained through laboratory experiments 
is that they have nothing to do with the field environment (no external validity).  In 
principle, this is a serious objection, of course.  It comprises a number of facets, such as 
the fact the participants are usually undergraduate students, who typically have little 
experience in labor markets (particularly as firms), the issue that the stakes are low, and 
the fact that “labor task” is often simple the choice of how much money to assign to 
another party.  One might also be concerned that participants are affected by the mere 
fact that they are being observed (Hawthorne effects). 
 
  There are at least two main responses to these objections.  First, as pointed out by 
Falk and Heckman (2009), “for the purpose of testing theories, [representative evidence] 
is not a problem because most economic models derive predictions that are independent 
of assumptions concerning participant pools (p. 537).  Of course, it seems better to have a 
richer variation than is provided by undergraduate students, the most convenient source 
of participants for experiments conducted by academic researchers.
3  The second 
response involves the use of more “real-world” participants, allowing for agent self-
selection in the lab, less artificial tasks, and higher stakes.   
 
Laboratory experiments have been conducted on soldiers (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, 
Weichbold, and Gächter 1998), Costa Rican coffee-plantation CEOs (Fehr and List 
2003), Chinese central planners (Cooper, Kagel, Lo and Gu 1999), professional 
arbitrators (Farber and Bazerman 1986), Ghanaian manufacturing workers (Barr and 
Serneels 2007), Japanese shrimp fishermen (Carpenter and Seki forthcoming), and 
employees at large French firms (Charness and Villeval 2009), among others.
4  In fact, 
the performance by student participants is often fairly closely matched in such 
experiments.  In addition, many if not most field experiments on incentive effects focus 
                                                 
3 Note that it is also inexpensive to use undergraduate participants, who also tend to be fairly intelligent (in 
fact, evidence suggests that the undergraduates who participate in experiments are more capable than the 
average); this is a nice combination for the experimenter. 
4 In the latter study, a mobile laboratory was taken to the workplaces of two French firms, where older 
(over the age of 50) and younger workers (under the age of 30) were tested in three experimental 
environments.   5
on highly specific industries or occupations, such as windshield repairers (Lazear 2000), 
tree planters (Shearer 2004), fruit pickers (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul 2005), and 
bicycle messengers (Fehr and Goette 2007).
5  Virtually all of these seem likely to be a 
more highly-selected population than college students as a group, who can reasonably be 
considered to be representative of the college-educated labor force.   Therefore, if the 
goal is to identify general principles that apply broadly to a large population of workers, 
college students might be a more attractive choice than workers in a single, narrowly-
defined occupation or industry. 
 
A second approach to the ‘representativeness’ issue is to mimic, in the lab, the 
same sorts of self-selection that generate different subpopulations in the real world.  
Clearly, such selection can be important, for example, if altruistic workers tend to self-
select into cooperative work environments (such as teams), or risk-loving (or 
overconfident) workers self-select into highly competitive work environments.  Persons 
in jobs that frequently require them to make ‘tough’ decisions such as cutting workers’ 
pay or firing them (i.e. managers) might have highly selected social preferences indeed, 
so that laboratory experiments that randomly assign college students to represent 
‘principals’ may provide a particularly poor guide to the decisions of real managers.  To 
some extent, however, laboratory experiments can allow for such self selection and even 
shed important light on how it works.  Interesting examples of this approach in a non-
labor-market context include Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2006), and Della Vigna, 
List and Malmendier (2009), who allow experimental subjects to self-select out of a 
situation where they are ‘expected’ to be altruistic.  In a labor market context, Eriksson, 
Teyssier and Villeval (2009) show that allowing risk-averse subjects to self-select out of 
tournaments improves tournament performance.  A series of interesting experiments  
beginning with Gneezy, Niederle and Vesterlund (2003) show that women tend to self-
select out of tournaments.  A key advantage of the lab in addressing these self-selection 
questions is the opportunity to directly measure, and control for, confounding factors 
such as the agent’s ability at the task, her perception of her own and others’ abilities, loss 
aversion, and risk aversion.   
 
Concerning the objection that the labor task is abstract and artificial, there has 
been an increasing trend in “real-effort” experiments, in which tasks have included 
proofreading (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992), solving puzzles (Rütstrom and Williams 
2000), mazes (e.g., Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini  (2003), anagrams (Charness and 
Villeval 2009), complex optimization problems (van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden 
2001), simple clerical tasks (Falk and Ichino 2006, Carpenter et al., forthcoming) and 
cracking walnuts (Fahr and Irlenbusch 2002). 
 
Regarding the issue of small stakes, laboratory experiments have been conducted 
in locations where the stakes translated into more than a month’s earnings (e.g., Fehr and 
Tougareva 1995, Slonim and Roth 1998), with evidence that fairness considerations still 
                                                 
5 A similar comment applies to ‘natural experiment’ studies of the effects of changes in compensation 
policy, which have focused on stadium vendors (Oettinger 1999), Continental Airlines employees (Knez 
and Simester 2001), textile workers (Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan 2003), steel minimill workers 
(Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007), and taxi drivers (Crawford and Meng 2008).   6
seem to apply.
6  Furthermore, it is not obvious whether stakes involving larger sums of 
money or the small stakes that apply to decisions people make on a daily basis are more 
relevant for economic purposes.  It is also the case that large stakes do not necessarily 
lead to fewer mistakes, as in shown by Ariely, Gneezy, Loewentein, and Mazar (2008).  
Finally, it is possible that participants behave differently due to scrutiny (Levitt and List 
2007).  As discussed by Falk and Heckman (2009), in many laboratory experiments 
involving more complex decisions, this is likely to be only a minor problem.
7  And of 
course scrutiny can be present in the field as well, as workers are often monitored.  In any 
event, scrutiny can be eliminated (or systematically varied); some experimenters use 
double-blind techniques, where payments are placed in envelopes by monitors who have 
not observed the experiment, so that participants understand that the experimenter cannot 
know their choices. 
 
Thus, many of the objections raised against laboratory experiments are either red 
herrings or can be met by taking the laboratory to the field, using ‘real’ people (of course, 
students are real people as well, and they respond to the financial incentives provided), 
real-effort tasks, and varying the stakes.
8  So, while there are certainly issues in taking the 
results of laboratory experiments to the field environment, these can be ameliorated.  The 
real value of laboratory experiments is in the enhanced opportunities for, and lower cost 
of carefully-controlled variation, as is required for causal knowledge rather than simple 
correlation.  This control extends to environmental features such as institutions, payoff 
parameters, participant pools, the nature of the interaction among the participants (e.g., 
anonymity versus face-to-face; one-shot versus repeated), and even the level of scrutiny.  
To quote Falk and Heckman (2009): “Laboratory experiments are very powerful 
whenever tight control … is essential. … Tight control … also allows replicability of 
results, which is generally more difficult with field data” (p. 537).  If one wishes to 
perform careful tests of theory, laboratory experiments are particularly useful. 
Of course, none of the comments above should be taken to imply that laboratory 
techniques are intrinsically superior to standard empirical data or field experiments.  We 
discuss this issue in some detail in the next subsection. 
 
3. Laboratory experiments and field experiments 
  
Is a hammer a better tool than a screwdriver (or vice versa)?  Sometimes one 
needs a hammer and sometimes one needs a screwdriver.  They are different tools, suited 
for different purposes.  Claiming superiority for one tool over the other seems misplaced.  
This principle also applies to research methods, as each method has its own strengths and 
weaknesses.  The idea is not a new one; Runkel and McGrath (1972) identify eight 
research strategies (including field studies, field experiments, and laboratory 
                                                 
6 It is also worth mentioning that Bewley (1999) finds evidence of fairness considerations in his interviews 
of business people and that Krueger and Mas (2004) find evidence of negative reciprocity amongst 
Firestone workers and Mas (2008) shows that police performance suffers after unfavorable arbitration 
decisions. 
7 They also observe that “reanalysis of the original Hawthorne data [see Jones 1992] shows that no 
Hawthorne effect was present in the Hawthorne study” (p. 537). 
8 A comprehensive study by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) indicates that in many cases whether or not a 
laboratory participant is given financial incentives has little effect on behavior.   7
experiments), which they categorize along the two dimensions of obtrusive-unobtrusive 
research operations and universal-particular behavior.  They state: “We cannot emphasize 
too strongly our belief that none of these strategies has any natural or scientific claim to 
greater respect from researchers than any other” (p. 89).
9 
  
This brings us to the current debate about the value of field experiments compared 
to the value of laboratory experiments.  List (2008) and Levitt and List (2009) extol the 
value of field experiments, often mentioning the notion that these are a useful bridge 
between naturally-occurring environments and laboratory experiments.  Levitt and List 
(2007) provide a criticism of laboratory experiments, pointing out factors that are 
beneficial in field experiments, while pointing out a number of factors that make the 
interpretation of data in laboratory experiments problematic.  Their main issue is the 
degree to which “the insights gained in the lab can be extrapolated to the world beyond” 
(p. 153); this is also known as external validity.  They mention five factors (p. 154) that 
can influence behavior in the lab; in our view, the three most relevant of these involve the 
nature and extent of scrutiny (on which the greatest emphasis is placed in the paper), the 
context in which the decision is embedded, and the stakes of the game.   
  
Falk and Heckman (2009) provide a response to these comments, and strongly 
emphasize the value of laboratory experiments.  The thrust of their argument is that the 
controlled variation possible in laboratory experiments facilitates tests of theory, causal 
effects, and treatment effects.
10  To a certain extent, field experiments also can provide 
fairly good control of the environment, although rarely to the level attainable with 
laboratory experiments.
11  Falk and Heckman address the notion that the conditions in 
field experiments are more “realistic”; for example, they point out how it is unclear 
whether undergraduate students are less representative of the overall population than 
sports-card traders in their natural setting.
12   
 
A number of arguments regarding scrutiny are mentioned above.  Indeed, there is 
no doubt that the mere act of scrutiny can affect behavior.
13  However, since there is also 
scrutiny in field environments and since the sense of scrutiny and the associated 
possibility of ‘demand effects’ (where the participant acts in a manner that he or she 
                                                 
9 We are indebted to Keith Murnighan for this information.  For more detail, see the discussion in 
Murnighan (2010). 
10 They state: “This control allows for the testing of precise predictions derived from game-theoretic 
models”  (p. 636). 
11 Indeed, Levitt and List (2009) discuss some of the limitations of field experiments, such as the 
difficulties with some forms of replication, and the fact that “they sometimes cannot be used to distinguish 
between alternative theories because the experimenter exerts less control than in the lab” (p. 1414). 
12 Holt (2007) points out that field experiments are particularly valuable when social context is critically 
important.  However, he cautions: Although field experiments can induce a more realistic social context 
and environment, the cost is often a partial loss of control over incentives, over measurement of behavior, 
or over the ability to replicate under identical conditions” (p. 14).  Regarding the independence of 
observations, he writes: “To the extent that social context and target demographics are important in a field 
experiment, each field experiment is in some sense like a data point that is specific to that combination of 
subjects and context unless appropriate random selection of subjects is employed” (p. 14). 
13 Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) provide one example, as they find that the presence of an 
audience of peers with a common interest can lead to more aggressive behavior in experimental games)   8
believes reflects the experimenter’s desired outcome) can be nearly eliminated,
14 this 
concern seems somewhat overstated.  The notion that social preferences can be crowded 
out by large financial incentives is hardly new, as it is a feature of the Rabin (1993) 
model.  Nevertheless, as Falk and Heckman point out, many real-life decisions involve 
small stakes, so that it is not clear that one requires larger stakes in order to provide 
incentives that are meaningful enough to match the relevant field environment. 
  
Despite the divergent views expressed in these articles and others, it is worth 
noting that there is indeed common ground.  For example, in both Levitt and List (2007) 
and Falk and Heckman (2009), the authors discuss how one needs a model or theory to 
transport findings to new populations or environments, whether these data originate in 
laboratory experiments or field experiments.  These articles also appear to agree that the 
controlled variation in the laboratory is better for careful tests of theory.  Both state that 
there are shortcomings in both laboratory and field experiments, but that each can provide 
useful insights.  In fact, both camps apparently agree that both forms of experimentation 
(as well as hybrids) can be combined to yield a better understand of the phenomena 
involved.  One interesting point is that two of the key players in the debate (Falk and 
List) have used and continue to use both laboratory and field experiments in their 
research.
15  In a certain sense, one wonders what the shouting is about. 
  
Our own view is that laboratory experiments are best at testing theory and 
identifying treatment effects, and they can also provide useful qualitative insights.  
However, any assumption that the quantitative levels of behavior observed in the 
laboratory apply to naturally-occurring settings must be carefully considered, as the 
laboratory is only a model of the field environment and cannot include many details that 
may influence behavior.
16  Field experiments, for their part, offer promise in areas that 
are not readily susceptible to laboratory experimentation and generally involve a greater 
range of personal and demographic characteristics.  Field experiments are especially 
valuable to the extent that they can capture more realistic behavior (particularly in 
settings where the participants are unaware that there is an ongoing experiment).  That 
said, a similar level of care needs to be taken in applying quantitative estimates from 
                                                 
14 Echoing the discussion on p. 4, the standard policy in the experimental laboratory at the University of 
Amsterdam is to separate the payment of experimental participants from any observation of behavior, by 
having non-experimenters place payments in envelopes that are then passed out by the experimenter.  
Given that this is standard procedure, experienced participants know to expect this and are not particularly 
suspicious about it being utilized in any specific experiment.  List, Berrens, Bohara, and Kerkvleit (2004) 
use another approach, in which a “randomized response” means that the experimenter cannot ascertain 
whether a participant made a pro-social choice. 
15 Both authors of this chapter have also used both methods in their research. 
16 An example from the games in Charness and Rabin (2002) may provide a useful illustration.  In one 
treatment, a participant unilaterally made a choice between (Other, Own) payoffs of (750,375) or 
(400,400); in a second treatment, the other paired participant first faced a choice between payoffs of 
(550,550) or passing the choice to the second participant, who would once again face a choice between 
(Other, Own) payoffs of (750,375) or (400,400).  In the first treatment, roughly half of the population chose 
to sacrifice 25 units, selecting (750,375); however, only 10% did so in the second treatment.  The 
comparison of the two treatments qualitatively shows a strong effect, which indicates that a form of 
negative reciprocity is present.  Nevertheless one would be naive to conclude that these quantitative levels 
would also be observed in the outside world.   9
some highly selected field populations (fruit pickers, bicycle messengers, tree planters, 
school children) to other field populations.  These research methodologies are 
complements, not substitutes.  One should use the most appropriate tool or tools for the 
job at hand. 
 
 
II:  Issues in Designing Laboratory Experiments 
 
  Suppose you have decided that a laboratory experiment is a fruitful way to 
address a research question.  This section reviews some of the main design questions the 
investigator typically needs to address.  We do this in two stages:  first, we consider 
general issues that arise in almost all laboratory experiments, not necessarily restricted to 
questions in labor economics.  Second, we focus specifically on the design of  ‘supply of 
effort’ experiments, which constitute the main focus of our review of the substantive 
research.   
 
1. General Design Questions  
 
The first and most basic question is how closely to try to match the field 
environment.  This will depend to a substantial degree on whether one is testing theory, 
one is trying to isolate a treatment effect, or one is trying for realism in an effort to draw 
conclusions about the effect of policy changes in a specific environment.
17  While one 
should be fairly insistent that the details of the design deal correctly with the issues 
involved with a test of theory, one cannot expect the experimental design to precisely 
match the field environment.  There are typically trade-offs between parsimony and 
richness.  A general rule is to err on the side of simplicity, but to include the central 
elements of the question at issue.  It is fundamental that the participants understand the 
task at hand, and this varies inversely with the degree of complexity.   
 
Regarding the issue of comprehension, a choice variable is the degree of 
examples (or even actual coaching) that will be provided.  Experimental practice has to 
some extent evolved over the years.  In earlier times, it was customary to provide neither 
examples nor test questions, out of concern that giving examples could introduce bias or 
demand effects.  However, this policy runs the serious risk that participants will fail to 
understand some important aspects of the task.  It has become nearly standard practice to 
at least ask participants questions about what outcome would prevail in the event of 
various combinations of choices; it is also customary to provide examples in the 
instructions.  Of course there is always the possibility that some bias may be introduced 
due to this process.  Nevertheless, one can minimize this possibility by going over every 
contingency; if this is not feasible due to the presence of a large number of contingencies, 
                                                 
17 Regarding the latter case, one example comes from industry.  Hewlett-Packard was interested in the 
consequences of changing their minimum-advertised-price policy.  Rather than use a costly test market, 
laboratory experiments were conducted; it this situation, it was critical to match their retailer environment 
as closely as possible.  As another example, if firms in the experiment are losing money, it is difficult to 
argue that the observed behavior will persist over time in the field.   10
one can select ‘representative’ contingencies.  Whether examples are needed will depend 
on the complexity present in the experiment.   
 
A closely-related issue is whether to use an abstract context in the instructions or 
to provide a richer context that points to the field environment in question.  In some 
experiments (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002), the researchers are careful to choose 
completely neutral terms.  The main advantage of this policy is that it may well limit 
bias.
18  On the other hand, many laboratory experiments explicitly label the subjects’ 
roles as ‘firms’ or ‘workers’ (or even more specifically as ‘high-ability workers’, etc.) 
and to label the choices as ‘wages’ or ‘effort’, etc., even though (strictly speaking) the 
experiment is simply a game with no actual work performed. As with providing 
examples, the main advantage of a richer context is that it makes it easier for subjects to 
understand the game, while the primary disadvantage is that it might bring in established 
behavior patterns/expectations from those environments.  
 
The question of context, framing and reference points is not innocuous.   
Sometimes the details of instructions given to the subjects can unwittingly cause their 
behavior to focus on certain outcomes.  One nice example of framing comes from 
Liberman, Samuels, and Ross (2004).  There are two treatments, both of which feature 
the identical prisoner’s-dilemma game.  However, in one treatment, the game is labeled 
“The Wall St. Game”, while the game is labeled  “The Community Game” in the second 
treatment.  The rate of cooperation was less than 30% in The Wall St. Game, but was 
over 70% in The Community Game.  A second example is provided by Cooper, Kagel, 
Lo and Gu (1999), who find that providing context for Chinese central planners in a lab 
experiment improved their understanding of the game; however this had no effect on the 
students in other sessions of the experiment.  More recently, Levitt, List and Reilly 
(2009) present evidence suggesting that even professionals (such as world-class poker 
players who are skilled randomizers in the field) have difficulty transferring those skills 
to the unfamiliar context of the laboratory.
19   
  
Another important design question concerns whether an experiment features 
multiple periods or not.  In our view, the first question the investigator needs to ask here 
is whether the real-world situation they are interested in understanding most closely 
resembles (a) repeated interactions between the same decision-makers over a long and 
indefinite horizon, (b) repeated interactions with a clear end date, or (c) one-shot 
interactions.  Case (a) can be mimicked in the lab by having the same subjects interact 
repeatedly with the last period of the experiment unknown to the subjects
20; case (b) is 
straightforward to implement; case (c) can be implemented either by having a single 
period, or by randomly re-matching subjects between multiple periods (i.e. a “strangers” 
                                                 
18 However, it is quite possible that people bring their own (uncontrolled) personal experience or habits 
with them to the experiment, so that a neutral context may not achieved the desired effect. 
19 However, note that Palacios-Huertas and Volij (2009) find that professional soccer players (at least in the 
aggregate) play a mixed strategy that corresponds remarkably closely to the equilibrium predictions in the 
O’Neill game, where there are four choices for each of two players, but there is no pure-strategy 
equilibrium. 
20 Specific approaches include rolling of a die after each period with some continuation rule or having a 
pre-set ending that is not divulged to the participants.     11
design).  If the experimenter is interested in one-shot interactions, having only one period 
is in a sense the cleanest design, but it is also the most expensive approach to gathering 
experimental data.  It can also be problematic if agents need some experience to actually 
understand the game they are playing.  This leads most investigators interested in one-
shot interactions (where the predictions of theory are usually the sharpest) to implement 
multiple periods with re-matching.  Interestingly, even though ‘standard’ game theory 
predicts no repeated-game effects under these conditions
21, behavior sometimes 
resembles the predictions of one-shot models more closely in the last few rounds.  
 
“Partners” designs where agents are matched for the duration of the session are, of 
course, expected to yield repeated-game effects; the predicted effects of repeated 
interaction typically differ dramatically between finitely- and infinitely-repeated games 
(with the “folk theorem” applying to the latter case).  In the latter case, experiments are 
less useful in testing theory than in providing some idea of what tends to happen when 
‘standard’ theory has little predictive power.  A related design question is whether people 
are always in the same role or whether this can change from period to period.  There is 
disagreement concerning which approach facilitates learning, but role change permits the 
experimenter to compare an individual’s behavior across the various roles.  
  
This leads us to the question of whether to use a ‘within-subjects’ design or a 
‘between-subjects’ design.  Labor economists’ experience with field data where there is 
typically substantial nonrandom heterogeneity disposes them towards research designs 
with subject fixed effects; in the laboratory, this requires administering both the 
treatment(s) and the control situation to the same subjects.  Experimenters are 
accustomed to having (both observable and unobserved) heterogeneity handled by 
randomization, but are highly sensitive to framing and sequencing effects.  Thus one’s 
behavior under one condition may be influenced by his exposure to other conditions 
(something that is usually ruled out by assumption in fixed-effects econometric models).  
Thus, many experimenters tend to prefer ‘between-subjects’ designs, where each subject 
is exposed to one and only one treatment.   
 
Labor economists need to be aware of this motivation for the between-subject 
approach. In some ways, a between-subjects design is cleaner and avoids sequencing 
effects (although sometimes these are a main topic of interest),
22 but it is typically less 
powerful and costlier to implement; on the other hand, a within-subjects approach tends 
to be more powerful in statistical tests, but can lead to spurious correlations.  An 
advantage of a within-subjects design is that one can control for individual differences by 
letting each person serve as their own control.  Some experiments combine both.  One 
way to incorporate both approaches is (a) to vary the order of treatments in a within-
                                                 
21 A detail that is sometimes overlooked in designs with re-matching is that, in practice, many re-matching 
schemes incorporate a positive probability that an agent will be re-matched with the same person at a later 
point in the session.  This can be important in calculating expected equilibrium behavior.  Sometimes 
investigators choose to eliminate this possibility (thus reducing the number of rounds of data that can be 
collected), or to minimize it by informing subjects that they will never be matched with the same partner in 
the next period.   
22 One can systematically vary the sequence to test for sequencing effects.   12
subject design, then (b) use only the cross-sectional data from the first treatment as a 
between-subjects experiment to test the robustness of the within-subject approach.  
 
A truly crucial issue in experimental design is the calibration of the parameters, as 
results can be very sensitive to parameter values and functional forms.  Calibration 
typically involves establishing a baseline for comparisons.  There is little ‘science’ to 
guide one to choosing parameter values; instead, this is an art that is informed by the 
experimenter’s experience.  However, one tip is to find a calibration for which the 
baseline treatment’s results leave room to move in either direction (a calibration that 
leads to a very low or very high rate in the baseline permits movement in only one 
direction).  The researcher must also consider how to justify the choice of parameter 
values and functional forms.  
 
The choice of payoff method is intimately connected to the issue of calibration.  
Incentives should be large enough to induce thoughtful and motivated behavior by the 
participants.  An additional consideration is whether to pay for each period or to pay the 
participant for only one (or several) periods randomly-chosen at the end of the session.   
It is more traditional to pay for each period, but there is a definite trend towards paying 
for only some random subset of all periods.  The latter approach avoids wealth effects 
(the amount already earned in a session: participants often have some form of income 
targets), mitigates boredom in later rounds, and avoids issues of people taking chances 
because they know that they have negative earnings (bankruptcy) at some point in the 
session and that negative earnings are uncollectible.   
 
Finally, while it is traditional to tell a responder the choice of the paired first 
mover before the response, a more economical approach involves contingent payments.  
In this ‘strategy method’ (Selten 1967), the responder states an action at each and every 
information set.  This permits the researcher to obtain an observation at every node of the 
game, which is particularly valuable when a node is reached rather infrequently.  
However, while the quantity of data is maximized, there remains the issue of the quality 
of the data.  The strategy method is quite popular, but remains controversial.  The most 
exhaustive study to date (Brandts and Charness 2009) examines many comparisons of 
results with the two methods, finding that there is generally no qualitative difference; we 
are unaware of any experiment in which a treatment effect is found using the strategy 
method that vanishes when the game is played through (‘direct response’).  In any case, 
this is an arrow in the experimentalist’s quiver and is something to consider. 
 
We close this section with a list of “fatal errors” mentioned on p. 14 of Holt 
(2007): 
1.  Inadequate or inappropriate incentives 
2.  Non-standardized instructions and procedures 
3.  Inappropriate context 
4.  Uncontrolled effects of psychological biases 
5.  An insufficient number of independent observations 
6.  Loss of control due to deception or biased terminology 
7.  The failure to provide a calibrated baseline treatment.   13
8.  The change in more than one design factor at a time. 
 
Needless to say, one should endeavor to avoid these pitfalls. 
 
 
2. Design Questions in principal-agent/effort experiments:  
 
  A first question in these experiments is whether there will be a market for 
contracts.  Most experiments simply start with firm-worker pairs that can realize some 
rents if they make an exchange and have a fixed outside option if they do not exchange.   
For many questions this is perfectly fine.  But this leaves no room for labor markets, 
which can affect and be affected by the nature of principal-agent interactions.  Early 
principal-agent experiments (e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (FKR) 1993) incorporated 
an ex ante market for labor contracts, and showed that fairness considerations in the 
principal-agent interactions caused that market to fail to clear.  More recently, Charness, 
Kuhn and Villeval (2009) have shown how causation can run the other way:  introducing 
ex post labor markets can eliminate the well-known ratchet effect in the repeated 
principal-agent problem.   
 
  If one chooses to implement a market in the laboratory, how can this be achieved?  
One approach involves a form of an auction, as in FKR, who set up a two-stage game in 
their experiment. The first stage was a one-sided oral auction in which firms made wage 
proposals, but could not choose any individual worker, as every worker could accept 
every offer.  If a worker accepted an offered wage, a binding contract ensued; people who 
were not paired at the end of three minutes received zero profits for this period.  In the 
second stage, workers chose effort anonymously (only the paired firm learned the chosen 
effort).  Other, simpler approaches to modelling agents’ outside options include simply 
manipulating the agent’s compensation if he/she chooses not to work for the principal to 
whom he/she has been assigned, or allowing an agent to receive simultaneous offers from 
more than one principal (see for example Charness, Kuhn and Villeval 2009).   
 
  As mentioned earlier, some labor experiments use some form of real effort, while 
others use a stated effort level that is simply a transfer (at some rate of exchange) from 
the agent to the principal.  An advantage of stated effort is that we know the disutility-of-
effort function and can therefore calculate exactly what the equilibrium effort levels 
should be, according to different theories.  This approach also allows the investigator to 
induce, and manipulate, differences in ability/cost of effort, separately from other 
personal characteristics (e.g. risk aversion, competitiveness, reciprocity) that might be 
correlated with it in a sample of persons.   Of course, the advantage of using real effort is 
that the task is more in line with what most people consider labor, and so might be 
considered to be a better match to the field environment.
23    
                                                 
23 A related issue is the distinction between hours of work and effort.  While ‘traditional’ labor supply 
theory is framed as a worker’s choice of hours at a fixed hourly wage, principal-agent theory and virtually 
all labor experiments are framed as a choice of effort. While in many ways the choices are isomorphic, 
there are some important distinctions; caution is required when generalizing ‘effort’ results to choices of 
hours worked.   See for example Dickinson (1999).    14
 
   A possible tactic for gathering more data is to place all participants in the role of 
agents, with the agent’s compensation scheme manipulated by the experimenter. If the 
researcher’s only interest is in the response of agents to different compensation schemes, 
one might argue that this is the simplest and and most economical design:  all subjects are 
agents, essentially working ‘for’ the experimenter by performing either a real task or 
selecting a level of ‘chosen effort’.
24   An alternative design assigns some subjects to the 
role of principals, who choose compensation policies to which agent-subjects respond.  
Some arguments in favor of the former approach are that (a) subjects might be more 
disposed to treat the experimenter (as opposed to a fellow student in the lab) like a ‘real’ 
employer, and (b) the behavior of college students acting as firms provides little insight 
into the behavior of ‘real employers’.  Also, when participants choose the pay scheme, it 
is not randomly assigned.  On the other hand, the latter approach (with subjects as 
principals) may have advantages if one is interested in social preferences towards persons 
other than the experimenter, or in the behavior of principals per se (for example if the 
subjects are experienced managers).   
 
  Additional considerations in the design of principal-agent experiments include 
whether workers can self-select among reward schemes, such as a tournament or a piece-
rate scheme (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007); whether the experimenter induces reference 
points (Abeler et al. 2009); allows communication (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, 
Brandts and Cooper 2007); allows for a monitoring/fines technology (Fehr, Klein and 
Schmidt 2009); or for some coercion of agents (Falk and Kosfeld 2006).  In the case of 
multiple agents per principal, the experimenter needs to decide whether agents can 
observe each other’s actions (Falk and Ichino 2006) or wages (Charness and Kuhn 2007), 
whether pay is based on relative performance, or whether subjects interact in teams.  All 
of these, and related questions, constitute the fabric of an extensive research agenda on 
principal-agent interactions in the lab, which we review in detail in Sections III and IV 
below. 
 
3. Reading papers involving laboratory experiments  
 
Labor economists may be at a loss in reading papers that report the results of 
laboratory experiments.  The format may well be unfamiliar, the design mysterious, and 
the statistical methods foreign.  In addition, many experimental papers seem written for 
experimental audiences, rather than the general population of economists.  Nevertheless, 
there are some pointers that can be provided for labor economists interested in gleaning 
the substance and details of experimental papers. 
 
Perhaps the most important factor in reading an experimental paper is to 
understand the experimental design.   This is not always as clear as it should be in the 
text; often, experimental referees first read the experimental instructions.  These should 
be consulted if there is any doubt concerning the exact procedures.  It is critical for the 
reader to understand the flow of information; this means knowing what the participants 
                                                 
24 Another approach is to use automated agents when there is really only one sensible response.  See for 
example Charness, Kuhn, and Villeval (2009).   15
knew and when they knew it, in terms of the stages of the experimental game or task.  
When the design is complex, there is also a concern that participants may not have 
understood the game or task involved.   
 
Once the instructions are understood, the reader should consider how well the 
experimental design constitutes an appropriate test of theory or matches the ‘ideal’ field 
environment of interest.  While one should be fairly insistent that the details of the design 
deal correctly with the issues involved with a test of theory, one cannot expect the 
experimental design to precisely match the field environment.  Still, it is important that 
the reader is persuaded of the relevance of the experiment to the field or to the theoretical 
environment.  The reader should also be alert to the issue of framing, given the 
substantial possibility that this affects behavior.  To a certain degree, framing effects may 
wash out when one compares across treatments, but this can be a delicate issue. 
 
An important issue when reading an experimental paper is the presentation and 
analysis of the data.  If one is concerned with “where the bodies buried” some degree of 
caution may be sensible.  Authors have been known to put the best face on the data (for 
example, empirical researchers may tend to report the more useful regressions), so 
readers should keep this in mind.  For example, sometimes articles emphasize (or only 
report) data from a subset of the periods; at times this can be justified and at times it is 
convenient.  Sometimes authors will pool data from treatments; this increases the number 
of observations and makes statistical tests more powerful, but this pooling must be 
justified.  In general, it has happened that experimental papers (and others) have 
interpreted their results in a favorable light.  One should consider whether these 
interpretations are justified and whether there are alternative interpretations. 
 
Regarding the issue of statistical and econometric tests, since most labor 
experiments in the laboratory feature multiple periods and interaction amongst the 
participants, one must have some approach towards determining how to treat multiple 
observations for the same individual.  Labor economists are very familiar and 
comfortable with panel-data techniques, but experimenters are less so.  Some feel that 
each session can only be considered to present one independent observation.  A less strict 
approach is to collapse each individual’s choices to an average, eliminating the issue of 
multiple observations (but not eliminating the issue of interactions during the session).  In 
either of these cases, it is common for experimenters to report non-parametric tests, and 
sometimes no regressions are reported; labor economists may be unfamiliar with these 
tests.  One workhorse is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which ranks the behavior of 
individual participants of individual sessions in each treatment and then compares the 
sums.  When within-subject data are available, the binomial test is often used; here one 
can compare changes for each individual across tasks.  If these changes go predominantly 
in one direction or the other, one can conclude statistically that the behavior is significant.   
The reader should understand how these tests (and the ones reported in the article) work.  
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III:  Testing ‘Traditional’ Principal-Agent Theory in the Lab 
 
 The question of how workers’ choices of effort and work hours respond to 
financial incentives is among the oldest questions in labor economics.  In this section we 
consider how these questions have been addressed in the laboratory; our treatment 
roughly follows the literature on principal-agent models and in personnel economics by 
beginning with the simplest forms of work incentives (a wage per hour worked or an 
individual piece rate), moving on to incentives based on relative performance 
(tournaments), incentives for teams, multitask settings, and multi-period principal-agent 
settings.  Not only does ‘traditional’ principal-agent theory serve as a useful organizing 
device for our discussion, many of its predictions are confirmed in the lab.
25   
 
That said, the experiments summarized in this section yield a number of robust 
results that are inconsistent with standard principal-agent models, including for example a 
strong apparent tendency by workers to ‘reciprocate’ generous wage offers from firms, 
even when such reciprocal behavior is costly to workers.  In Section IV we focus 
specifically on the use of experiments and the development of new theoretical models of 
social preferences to understand these ‘anomalies’, with the ultimate goal of developing a 
more general class of models that is more firmly grounded in empirical fact and might be 
dubbed behavioral principal-agent theory.    
 
 
1. The Basic Principal-Agent Problem:  One Principal, One Agent, One Task, and 
One Interaction. 
  
a) Animal Labor Supply Experiments 
  
To the best of our knowledge, the earliest economic studies of the effects of 
material incentives on labor supply in the laboratory were the animal experiments of the 
early 1980s (Battalio, Green and Kagel 1981; Battalio and Kagel 1985).
26  Much of this 
work is summarized in Kagel, Battalio and Green 1995; see also Kagel 1987 for a general 
discussion of the contribution of animal experiments to economics.  A key objective of 
these studies was to test the classic, static economic model of labor supply in which an 
agent chooses consumption (C) and leisure (L) to maximize a quasiconcave utility 
function U(C,L), subject to the constraint C = wL + G where  w is the wage rate and G 
is unearned income.  In these experiments, hungry animals expend real effort (key 
pecking for pigeons, lever presses for rats) to obtain income; the experimenters then vary 
both parameters of the budget constraint (w and G) exogenously and study the animals’ 
reactions.   
                                                 
25 For an alternative and complementary review of some of these issues, see Camerer and Weber, 
forthcoming).  
 
26 Battalio et al.’s work, in turn, has roots in an extensive literature in experimental psychology on the 
effects of reward structures and amounts on animal behavior.  See for example Ferster and Skinner (1957), 
Barofsky and Hurwicz (1968) and Kelsey and Allison (1976).  These studies commonly find backward-
bending labor supply curves as the reinforcement rate is increased, but do not relate their results to a theory 
of utility-maximization, or consider the effects of income-compensated changes in ‘wages’.       17
 
The key prediction tested by the authors is the labor supply response to an 
income-compensated wage decrease.  As predicted by the standard model, both pigeons 
and rats reduce their labor supply and consumption (Battalio, Green and Kagel 1981; 
Battalio and Kagel 1985).  The authors also study the pure income effects of declines in 
nonlabor income (G):  in virtually all cases these raised labor supply, indicating that 
leisure is a normal good.  The normality of leisure means that it is common to observe 
backward-bending labor supply curves among animal workers (see for example Table 3 
in Battalio, Green and Kagel 1981).
27    
 
Another interesting feature of the animal studies that generalizes to the plethora of 
human studies is the presence of large subject effects:  while most subjects respond to 
changes in incentives in the direction predicted by simple utility maximizing models, 
both the level of effort at any given reward and its responsiveness to incentives vary 
widely across subjects.   
 
b) Piece Rates and Effort 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the first laboratory experiment to examine labor 
supply responses to wage changes among humans that is couched in economic theory 
appeared in an accounting journal (Swenson 1988).  Swenson’s subjects supplied ‘real’ 
effort (repeatedly typing “!” then “enter” on a computer keyboard—this requires two 
hands and does not allow for continuous cursor movement).
28  Wages per character typed 
were fixed, but ‘taxed’ (this language was used in the subjects’ instructions) at rates 
ranging from 12 to 87 percent.  Total tax proceeds from the previous session were 
randomly distributed to the subjects in the following period, mimicking a balanced 
government budget but breaking most of the connection between current individual effort 
and future lump-sum income.  The primary questions addressed were how labor supply 
and total tax revenues respond to the tax rate.  Both curves were backward-bending, with 
tax revenues (i.e. the Laffer curve) peaking at the 73 percent tax rate.
29   
 
A decade later, economists Sillamaa (1999a, 1999b) and Dickinson (1999) 
conducted similar real-effort experiments.
30  Like Swenson’s, Sillamaa’s experiments 
                                                 
27 Other labor economics questions addressed by these researchers in the lab include the “welfare trap” (do 
high levels of unearned income in past treatments reduce current labor supply?), and the “cycle of poverty”:  
does deprivation raise animal subjects’ discount rates (i.e. their preference for a small immediate reward 
over a larger delayed one), thereby leading to more deprivation in the future?  Interestingly, little evidence 
of either effect was found (Kagel, Battalio, and Green 1995). 
28 Laboratory principal-agent experiments with human subjects can be divided into those where subjects are 
paid to perform an actual task (‘real-effort’) and those where effort decisions are represented by the choice 
of a decision number that imposes increasing marginal financial costs on the agent (‘chosen effort’).  
Bruggen and Strobel (2007) find little difference between the two methods in a simple gift-exchange labor 
market game.   
29 It may be worth noting that backward-bending labor supply in the context of a laboratory experiment is 
actually somewhat of a puzzle for humans, since it is extremely unlikely that earnings in such an 
experiment could generate income effects.   
30  In Sillamaa’s experiments, workers decoded numerical codes into letters;  in Dickinson’s workers 
repeatedly typed paragraphs, with a penalty for mistakes.  Sprinkle (2000) considers the effect of   18
were motivated by questions about the impact of taxation (in one case, the impact of tax 
progressivity, in the other the effect of a zero top marginal rate), though in her case taxes 
were never mentioned in the subjects’ instructions.  Sillamaa found that (a) work effort 
responds more (positively) to real wage increases in the presence of an (equivalent) linear 
than a progressive income tax, and (b) introducing a zero top marginal tax rate also 
increased effort.   
 
Like Sillamaa, Dickinson (1999) paid his subjects a piece rate, but in some 
treatments allowed his subjects to choose between two types of leisure:  on- versus off-
the-job.  This modification is noteworthy because it provides one of the few empirical 
links between the types of work decisions that are usually studied in lab (and field) 
experiments (effort) and the traditional application of labor supply theory (to hours 
worked).  Specifically, in the baseline (“intensity”) treatments, subjects were required to 
stay for the entire two-hour experimental period; thus any time not working was spent in 
the lab.  In the “combined” treatment, subjects could leave at any time during the 
experimental period.  Consistent with theory and with previous research, subjects 
increased their output in the baseline treatment, substituting on-the-job leisure for effort 
when incentives were strengthened.  In the combined treatment, many subjects responded 
to higher wages by working more quickly, but reducing their total work time by leaving 
the experiment early.  This substitution of off-the-job for on-the-job leisure is offered as a 
possible explanation for why econometric estimates of labor supply elasticities (which 
use hours worked, not effort as their measure of labor supply) are often close to zero.  
Dickinson’s analysis also points out that care must be taken in relating the results of 
laboratory labor supply experiments (where workers’ effort during a fixed work period is 
the outcome of interest) to econometric studies of labor supply (where hours worked is 
the outcome).     
 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) also studied the response of work effort to financial 
incentives; they conducted real-effort experiments in both the lab and the field, with 
similar results:  the relationship between the piece rate and effort was U-shaped, with low 
piece rates eliciting less effort than a zero piece rate.  (It may be interesting to note that 
this is exactly the opposite of the backward-bending labor supply curve in the one-period 
neoclassical model, which yields an inverted U).  The authors hypothesize that small 
levels of financial compensation (explicit incentives) may ‘crowd out’ workers’ intrinsic 
motivation to perform these tasks.
31  While this explanation may be more relevant to their 
field experiment (where the workers solicited charitable contributions) than their lab 
experiment (which had no charitable component) the phenomenon was observed in both 
settings.  Since earlier studies did not, to our knowledge, implement treatments with a 
zero piece rate, Gneezy and Rustichini’s results do not necessarily conflict with those 
findings, whether on human or animal subjects.   
                                                                                                                                                 
strengthening incentives for a considerably more complex task, spanning multiple periods and requiring 
belief revision and judgment calls.  Here, incentives again increase effort, but only after the subjects had 
been exposed to considerable feedback and experience.   
31 Psychologists provided compelling evidence that monetary incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation 
long before Gneezy and Rustichini’s paper (see Deci et al 1999 for a meta-analysis).  See also Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee (1997) for an earlier economic analysis, though not in the domain of labor economics.     19
 
In more recent real-effort experiment, Cadsby, Song and Tapon (2009) show that 
the effect of performance incentives varies with agents’ risk aversion.  In their 
experiment, 25% of subjects actually perform worse when incentives are intensified; 
further the probability of such deterioration increases with risk aversion and with 
measures of stress.  A similar result is obtained by Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein and 
Mazar (2008), who exposed subjects in the U.S. and India to incentives ranging from 
small to very large (relative to their typical levels of pay).  In many cases, very high 
rewards had a detrimental effect on performance.  Combining these results with the 
nonmonotonicity identified by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) above suggests that the 
effect of stronger incentives on performance, predicted to be monotonic by basic labor 
supply theory (at least when income effects are unimportant, which is expected for 
laboratory experiments), may in fact be highly non-monotonic.   
 
c) Selection into piece rate compensation 
 
Since Lazear’s famous Safelite study (2000) economists have realized that a 
significant share of the productivity improvements associated with piece rates can take 
the form of voluntary self-selection of higher-productivity workers into piece rate 
schemes, rather than changes in the work effort of existing workers.  Laboratory studies 
that allow for self-selection into different pay schemes abound, though many of these 
focus specifically on selection into tournaments and teams.  These studies are discussed 
later in this section.  A recent study that considers the self-selection that occurs when a 
simple piece rate is introduced is Cadsby, Song and Tapon (2007).  As in most studies, 
pay-for-performance raises productivity.  Like Lazear (2000), they also find that sorting 




    A somewhat different perspective on selection into pay-for-performance schemes 
is provided by two recent papers by Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2007, 2009) who 
conducted field experiments in a fruit-picking firm.  When a pay-for-performance 
element (based on their unit’s output) is added to managers’ compensation schedules, 
Bandiera et al (2007) find that managers are more likely to select able workers into the 
units they manage.  In their 2009 paper, the same authors show that this shift towards 
abler workers came at the expense of workers who were socially connected to the 
manager.  In both papers, the shift away from friends increased the work group’s total 
                                                 
32 Dohmen and Falk (2006) examine laboratory subjects’ voluntary self selection into several types of 
contracts (fixed pay, piece rate, tournament or revenue-sharing scheme) according to subjects’ risk 
attitudes, overconfidence, social preferences, gender and personality.  They find that most of the extra 
output generated by all three variable pay schemes is due to the selection of abler workers into them.  
Burks, Carpenter and Goette (2009) provide additional evidence on the importance of selection into pay-
for-performance by conducting a context-rich prisoner’s dilemma lab experiment on bicycle messengers 
who are employed in three types of firms:  firms using pay for performance, those using hourly wages, or 
workers’ cooperatives.  Workers in the first type of firms were the least cooperative in prisoners’ dilemma 
games.  Using data from cities where bicyle messengers were not able to choose among these firm types, 
the authors argue, however, that these differences are not due to selection, but due to workers’ (rapidly) 
adopting the norms governing cooperation in their workplace.   20
output and the manager’s compensation.  In contrast, Belot and van de Ven (2009) find in 
a field experiment with children that agents who are selected because they are friends 
increase their subsequent performance, presumably to reciprocate the favor of being 
selected.  In such cases, favoring one’s friends can be costless, or even beneficial to the 
manager and the firm.  To our knowledge, neither the role of managers nor favoritism on 
selection into pay-for-performance has been studied in the lab.   
 
d) Reciprocal Behavior 
 
Evidence on the apparent presence of reciprocal behavior in workers’ effort 
choices in economics goes back at least to the pure gift-exchange labor markets 
implemented by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993).  Labor contracts in these settings 
contained no explicit incentives; despite this, workers supplied costly effort, and supplied 
more effort the higher the (lump sum) wage the principal paid them.  We treat this ‘pure’ 
gift exchange literature in another section; here we provide one or two examples of how 
workers’ apparent concerns for reciprocity in the laboratory affect the performance of 
standard incentive contracts, such as piece rates.
33   
 
An illustrative paper in this regard is Anderhub, Gächter, and Königstein (2002), 
who study the behavior of both principals and agents where the contract specifies the 
agent’s pay as a linear function of his/her output.  (All the papers considered thus far 
study agents’ reactions to reward schedules set by the experimenter.)  Because there is no 
uncertainty, the efficient linear contract has a piece rate of 100%.  Further, because 
principals make take-it-or-leave-it contract offers to agents in this experiment, the 
intercept term of the equilibrium linear contract is predicted to extract all of the agent’s 
surplus if social preferences are absent.  As one might expect, principals and agents 
behave relatively efficiently with respect to the slope of the contract (principals choose a 
100% piece rate 30% of the time and a positive piece rate 98% of the time; agents 
optimized against this, choosing conditionally rational effort levels 87% of the time).  
Social preferences, however, clearly affected the both the principals’ choice of the 
intercept and agents’ responses to it:  agents rejected offers that split the surplus too 
unevenly, and principals made few such offers.  There was also some tendency for 
generous offers to lead to higher effort levels, though as already noted the vast majority 
of effort decisions were egoistically rational given the piece rate.   
 
While effects such as those reported above are both dramatic and common in lab 
experiments, we note that more recently, Gneezy and List (2006) have argued that 
positive reciprocity effects detected in lab experiments can wear off very quickly in the 
field; Kube, Puppe and Marechal (2006a, 2006b) in turn generate longer-term effects of 
reciprocity in the field, especially for negative reciprocity.  We discuss these questions 
further in the section on reciprocity and social preferences.   Finally, we note that, in 
addition to modifying the nature of principal-agent interactions, social preferences may 
also explain why some principal-agent relationships exist in the first place.  For example, 
                                                 
33 Our section on the role of reciprocity and social preferences in principal-agent interactions also considers 
the closely-related role of communication, especially its ability to foster trust, cooperation and guilt.  See 
for example Charness and  Dufwenberg (2006, 2009).    21
Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber (2008) report on an experiment in which principals 
can hire agents to behave selfishly on the principal’s behalf.  Delegation of decisions that 
would otherwise make the principal act directly in a selfish manner appears to yield more 
lucrative outcomes for principals.
34   
 
 
e) Reference points 
 
   An emerging issue in the study of one-on-one principal-agent relationships is the 
effect of reference points on effort provision.  Part of the inspiration for this is a lively 
debate in the non-experimental literature on the presence of reference points in daily 
labor supply decisions by agents (in particular, taxi drivers and bicycle messengers) who 
can make daily hours and effort decisions (see for example Camerer et al. 1997, Farber 
2005, Fehr and Goette 2007, Farber 2008, Crawford and Meng 2008).  One advantage of 
addressing this issue in the lab is that some possible reference points —for example, 
expected earnings in a round or session-- can not only be observed, but manipulated by 
the experimenter.  This is the approach taken by Abeler et al (2009).    
 
In Abeler et al’s experiment, subjects are paid a piece rate to perform a tedious 
task.  At the end of the period, with 50% probability they are paid their accumulated 
piece rate; otherwise they receive a fixed payment that is known in advance.  Subjects 
decide how much to work before they know whether they will receive the fixed payment 
or their accumulated piece-rate earnings.  Abeler at al find significant bunching of piece-
rate earnings at the level of the fixed payment.  Further, this spike in the earnings 
distribution moves when the fixed payment is changed.  Neither of these is consistent 
with the ‘standard’ effort-leisure choice model (unless one were to introduce fairly 
unusual forms of non-separability between income and leisure).  Instead, the authors 
argue that their results are consistent with Koszegi and Rabin’s (2006) model of 
reference-dependent preferences, where the reference point is the subject’s expected 
earnings for the experimental session (which is manipulated by the experimenter).  The 
authors take some care to ensure that subjects’ choices of ‘target’ earnings are not driven 
purely by the salience of those particular numbers in the instructions and experimental 
environment.
35   
 
f) Motivational ‘Crowding Out’ 
 
Another question addressed in the experimental literature on worker-firm 
interactions is the effect of certain ‘coercive’ features of contracts, such as minimum 
effort requirements or employee monitoring, on agents’ effort levels (and more broadly, 
on contract efficiency.).  In this regard, Frey (1993) proposed that, especially in 
environments where the principal and agent know one another personally, the principal’s 
decision to monitor the agent may be interpreted as a signal of distrust, and may reduce 
effort as a result despite obvious direct ‘disciplining’ effects of monitoring.  Falk and 
                                                 
34 See also Bartling and Fischbacher (2008) and Coffman (2009). 
35 Another possible reference point in a bilateral relationship is the terms of an ex-ante competitively 
negotiated contract between the parties.  Experimental evidence of these effects is provided in Fehr, Hart 
and Zehnder (2008), though not in a labor or principal-agent context.     22
Kosfeld (2006) test a closely related idea in the lab using a very simple game where 
agents choose effort (which costs them less than it benefits the principal), and principals’ 
only decision is whether to impose a minimum effort level on the agent.  (This is 
essentially a gift-exchange game without an initial “gift”—agents’ endowments are 
positive and principals’ are zero). If principals’ decisions to impose a minimum effort 
level had no effects on agents’ behavior, the truncated distributions of agents’ effort 
(above the imposed minimum) should be the same whether the minimum is imposed or 
not.  This is not the case: Falk and Kosfeld find “hidden costs of control” in the sense that 
the majority of agents reduce effort when firms attempt to ‘control’ their actions (though 
the effort levels of a smaller number of ‘opportunistic’ agents’ efforts were mechanically 
increased by the effort minimum).  In most treatments, these net reductions in effort were 
so substantial that principals who ‘controlled’ earned lower payoffs then those who did 
not.  In a follow-up survey, the authors asked agents the free-form question “What do you 
feel if [the principal] forces you to transfer at least [x] points?”   The most common 
response was ‘distrust’, especially among agents who reacted negatively to control.  The 
authors’ results suggest that, at least in a laboratory environment, rigid attempts to control 
agents’ behavior can ‘backfire’; the authors also provide some support for the external 
validity of their results by administering a survey eliciting students’ self-reported ‘work 
motivation’ in a variety of hypothetical work situations involving different degrees of 
employer control or trust. 
 
In a clever variation on Falk and Kosfeld’s design,  Schnedler and Vadovic (2007) 
show that control by principals does not elicit negative reactions from agents when the 
principal’s control is legitimized in two alternative ways.  In one of these, the principal 
must set a common control policy that applies not only to the agent, but also to a 
computerized ‘automaton’ agent who supplies minimum effort whenever this is allowed.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, agents ‘understand’ the principal’s decision in this case and do 
not reduce their effort when controls are imposed.  In the other, the principal is given a 
small endowment (in contrast to zero in Falk-Kosfeld), and agents are allowed to take 
from this endowment by choosing a very low effort level.  Here as well, experimental 
subjects treat control decisions that simply protect the principal’s endowment from agent 
‘pilfering’ as legitimate.  
 
Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005b) suggest an intriguing explanation of the negative 
incentive effects of paying for performance in a simple experiment where principals and 
agents first play a pure gift-exchange game, followed by a game in which principals had 
the option of offering a piece rate in addition to the fixed payment (gift).  Consistent with 
Gneezy and Rustichini, agents’ effort actually fell after a low piece rate was introduced.  
This is particularly interesting since the task performed by the agents was chosen to yield 
little or no intrinsic reward.  More importantly, effort fell even further when, in a third 
treatment, piece rates were once again disallowed.  A possible explanation is that agents’ 
perception of the implicit contract offered by principals is changed by the introduction of 
piece rates:  the presence of piece rates signals that agents are expected to behave 
egoistically; while the offer of a fixed wage signals that, as in many real-world 
employment relationships, a reasonable amount of effort is simply expected in return for 
a wage.  Certainly, Irlenbusch and Sliwka’s results suggest that studies of what appears   23
to be intrinsic motivation should pay close attention to subjects’ interpretation of the 
implicit contractual understandings that may be signaled by different pay schemes.   
 
Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007) find a similar pattern when they compare the 
performance of three types of contracts in a simple laboratory experiment.  In an 
“incentive” contract, the principal stipulates a wage w, a required effort level e*, and a 
fine f.  If the agent accepts the contract, he is ‘audited’ with exogenous probability p, and 
is forced to pay the fine if the effort he has chosen falls short of e*.  In a “bonus” 
contract, the principal announces a wage, a desired effort e* and her (unenforceable) 
intention to pay a bonus b if e ≥ e*.  Finally, a “trust” contract is pure gift exchange in 
which the principal offers a wage and simply requests effort in return).
36  For their 
parameterization, FKS find that, when principals must choose between trust and incentive 
contracts, incentive contracts performed better:  they yielded higher effort levels, higher 
payoffs for both principals and agents, and were increasingly selected by principals over 
the course of the experiment.  These results are consistent with findings of Lazear (2000) 
and others that incentives increase effort.  In contrast, however, when principals must 
choose between incentive contracts and bonus contracts
37, bonus contracts now dominate 
incentive contracts:  they constitute the overwhelming majority of contracts offered, and 
yield higher levels of effort and payoffs to principals; this result contradicts the 
predictions of contract theory with egoistic agents.  The authors explain these contrasting 
results by parameterizing Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequity aversion.  
Essentially, if the ‘fair-minded’ share of the population is neither too high nor too low, 
there are too few fair-minded persons to make trust contracts perform best, and two many 
fair-minded persons to make incentive contracts work best.  That said, the authors 
recognize that inequity-aversion is not the only possible explanation for their results; 
indeed, the likelihood that incentive contracts signal distrust (plus the fact that the authors 
constrain the enforcement technology in these contracts to make a first-best allocation 
infeasible) may also help explain this pattern of outcomes.   
 
Dickinson and Villeval (2008) also consider the effect of monitoring (the key 
element of FKR’s “incentive contract”) on work effort; their setting is a real effort 
laboratory experiment, where the task was designed to contain an element of intrinsic 
motivation.
38  Principals choose monitoring intensity, which raises the probability the 
agent is audited (and penalized via a ‘fine’ paid to the principal if his output did not 
exceed the target).  Dickinson and Villeval vary two main aspects of the environment:  in 
the “variable” treatment, the principal’s profit, as usual, depends directly on the effort 
chosen by the agent.  In the ‘fixed’ treatment it does not.  The other aspect that is varied 
is the degree of anonymity; interaction is either anonymous or preceded by five minutes 
of face-to-face interaction.  Dickinson and Villeval find that monitoring raises agents’ 
effort in the anonymous setting, as predicted in the standard agency model.  Motivational 
crowding-out is observed only when interactions are not anonymous and when the 
                                                 
36 Note that the agent’s actual effort, e, is observed by the principal ex post  in all contracts, whether the 
agent is ‘audited’ or not; auditing simply means that a punishment can be enforced if effort is short of the 
requirement.    
37 Note that the class of bonus contracts includes the ‘trust’ contract as a special case, with bonus of zero.  
38  Agents try to attain a maximum value of a non-decreasing function by costly sequential search.     24
principal’s payoff depends directly on the agent’s effort (their ‘variable’ treatment). This 
suggests that the motivational ‘crowding out’ by monitoring is not driven primarily by a 
reduction in the intrinsic rewards derived from the task, but from a form of negative 
reciprocity (punishing the principal for a lack of trust).
39  
 
g) Nonlinearities:  Targets, Fines and Bonuses 
 
While most of the experimental literature on piece rates considers simple linear 
reward schedules, and while linear contracts are theoretically sufficient to achieve 
efficiency when agents are risk neutral, it is interesting to consider the effects of 
nonlinearities in individual piece rate contracts, since these do occur in the real world.
40   
The one experimental paper we know of that focuses on this topic is Cadsby, Song and 
Tapon (2008).  The distinguishing feature of their experiment is that the task allowed 
agents to misrepresent their own performance (the number of words created in an 
anagram game).   While actual output was similar under target-based pay schemes versus 
a continuous (linear) reward scheme, the former produced significantly more cheating.  
Further, cheating is more likely under a target-based scheme the closer a participant’s 
actual production is to the target.  Since the agent’s rewards to cheating are also greatest 
in these situations, Cadsby et al.’s results are both consistent with theory and indicative of 
a possible drawback with sharp discontinuities in reward schedules.  
 
h) Peer Effects and Wage Comparisons 
 
Although ‘peer effects’ on effort can only exist when a firm employs multiple 
workers, we consider peer effects in this section because ‘pure’ peer effects refer to a 
situation where workers work, side by side, for the same firm but do not interact in any 
way (except that they observe each others’ work activity).  For example, suppose that two 
workers are each paid an individual piece rate, and there are no substitutabilities or 
complementarities in production, but can observe each other’s effort or output.  Does 
anything change?  Perhaps surprisingly, it does.  In a real-effort experiment, Falk and 
Ichino (2006) find that average output is higher.  Further, the standard deviation of output 
is lower within worker pairs than between pairs.  Essentially, low-productivity workers 
raise their output towards that of their co-worker when a co-worker is present.   One can 
imagine a number of possible explanations for this behavior, including subject 
uncertainty about the ‘true’ compensation schedule.  Similar results were found in a field 
experiment by Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009), but only when the co-workers were 
friends.  Specifically, in a situation where workers received individual piece rates and no 
appreciable production externalities existed, workers who were less able than a co-worker 
with whom they are friends increased their effort (and hence income) by 10 percent.  In 
                                                 
39 Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) provide a theoretical model of crowding out in which some audiences 
are more worth impressing than others.  In their model, the principal’s choice of monetary incentives 
signals that he/she is not work impressing.  See Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006) for closely related 
models.   
40 Of course, the voluntary bonuses studied by Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007a) are nonlinear ex post, but 
here we focus on enforceable reward schedules, announced ex ante, that contain discrete jumps. 
Incidentally, FKS 2007b adds an enforceable fine to FKS 2007a, but finds it is rarely selected by principals 
and has little effect on agents’ effort.     25
contrast to Falk and Ichino, however, Bandiera et al. also found that workers who are 




A final, related question is how workers’ effort changes when they can see each 
others’ wages.  Charness and Kuhn (2007) pose this question in a pure gift-exchange 
game in which workers knew that their productivity was different from their co-worker’s, 
but did not know the size or direction of this difference.  If between-worker equity 
concerns are important determinants of effort, we might expect that low-productivity 
workers (who tend to receive lower wages) would reduce their effort in treatments where 
they observe their co-worker’s wage than when they do not (indeed this is suggested by 
Akerlof and Yellen 1990).  Perhaps surprisingly, they do not.  Agents’ primary concern 
seems to be to reciprocate generous wage offers from the firm; the authors speculate that 
responding to wage offers made to their co-workers would likely muddy this ‘signal’ and 
is therefore avoided by workers.
42   
 
In sum, laboratory tests of the “single task/single agent” principal-agent model 
have identified the following broad empirical regularities:   
 
a) Compensated wage cuts reduce effort in animal labor supply studies.  In addition, 
leisure is normal, and uncompensated wage changes generate backward-bending labor 
supply curves (Battalio, Green and Kagel 1981; Battalio and Kagel 1985).  For both 
animals and humans, there are large individual subject effects, both in the level of effort 
supplied for a given level of incentives, and in the responsiveness of effort to incentives.  
 
b) For humans, higher piece rates raise effort (Swenson 1988, Sillamaa 1999a,b, 
Dickinson 1999).  Agent self-selection into pay-for-performance schemes reinforces 
these effects (Lazear 2000; Dohmen and Falk 2006, Cadsby et al. 2007).   
 
c) Not paying at all can yield higher effort than low pay (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).  
 
d) Effort also responds to the intercept of the worker’s compensation schedule, at least 
when generosity is seen as intentional (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993; Charness 
2004).   
 
e)  Effort decisions can be affected by at least one type of reference point that can be 
manipulated in the lab:  the subject’s expected earnings for the session (Abeler et al, 
2009).   
 
                                                 
41 Mas and Moretti (2009) also detect small effects on productivity of being observed by a more productive 
worker, in a setting where workers were not paid for performance.   
42 Maximiano, Sloof, and Sonnemans (2006) also examine gift exchange in multi-worker firms, but in their 
treatment all workers are equally productive and receive the same wage by design.  Güth et al (2001) 
consider a situation in which the principal can offer a menu of contracts to two independent agents with 
different productivities.  As in Charness and Kuhn, public observability of the co-worker’s contract induces 
the employer to compress compensation schemes.  
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f) Forcible restrictions on agents’ choice sets can reduce the efforts of agents on whom 
they are not binding (Falk and Kosfeld 2006), but not when the restrictions are seen as 
‘legitimate’ (Schnedler and Vadovic 2007).  
 
g) A decision by a principal to use piece rates can also reduce agents’ efforts; a likely 
explanation is that the introduction of piece rates changes the agents’ interpretation of the 
implicit contract for labor services (Irlenbusch and Sliwka 2005).   
 
h) A principal’s decision to monitor the agent can also reduce agents’ efforts, but only 
when the agents ‘know’ the principal (Dickinson and Villeval 2008).   
 
i) Unenforceable promises by principals to pay bonuses for ‘satisfactory’ worker 
performance can elicit surprising amounts of effort, and can outperform more objective 
mechanisms such as random monitoring combined with punishment (Fehr, Klein and 
Schmidt 2007).     
 
j) Sharp discontinuities in reward schedules induce workers to misrepresent their output 
(Cadsby et al., 2008).   
 
k) Even when there is no strategic independence between workers, workers’ efforts may 
depend on their co-workers’ efforts (Falk and Ichino 2006).  Co-workers’ wages do not 
appear to affect effort, at least in our earlier work (Charness and Kuhn 2007).     
 
 




Consider now a situation where a firm employs multiple workers, who still do not 
interact in production.  However, because the firm bases rewards, at least in part, on 
agents’ performance relative to each other, workers’ effort decisions, pay levels, and 
utilities are interdependent.  Relative performance plays a key role in a number of 
features of real-world compensation schemes, including promotions and bonuses for top-
performing workers.   Since at least Lazear and Rosen’s seminal 1981 paper, economists 
have understood that, if workers are risk neutral, pay structures which award prizes based 
only on workers’ relative performance can generate identical allocations in Nash 
equilibrium as would be achieved by optimal individual piece rates.  This may be useful 
if rank order is easier to measure than cardinal performance, or if rewards are inherently 
indivisible (some promotions might be an example).  Further, tournaments can be more 
efficient than piece rates if workers are risk averse and if their outputs are affected by a 
common shock.  These results are robust to ability differences between workers if ability 
is public information: in that case, efficient tournaments typically include handicaps for 
the abler agents.  As Carmichael (1983), among others, has pointed out, payment by 
relative performance also mitigates an incentive problem affecting the principal, namely 
the incentive to understate workers’ true outputs, or to provide suboptimal levels of 
complementary inputs after the contract has been signed.  Finally, as O’Keefe, Viscusi   27
and Zeckhauser (1984) have pointed out, contests may have an efficiency advantage if 
workers derive direct utility from competition itself.   
 
Counterbalancing the above advantages, tournaments may be less efficient than 
individual piece rates when workers’ abilities are hidden information, especially if 
workers can self-select into tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).  Also, in contrast to 
individual piece rates, tournament games in general require agents to think strategically 
about their co-workers’ effort levels to find a Nash equilibrium; this may make them less 
robust as incentive schemes.  It is also worth noting that, in general, optimal contest 
design will be different if (part of) the contest’s objective is not simply to induce effort, 
but to identify the most talented contestant (e.g. for promotion).   In this section we 
examine how tournament reward schemes work, not just theoretically, but when the 
games are played by human subjects in what has become a sizable experimental 
literature.   
 
b) Early Experiments 
 
To our knowledge the first laboratory experiment on tournament-based incentives 
was by Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987).  Bull et al. implemented tournaments between 
pairs of experimental subjects whose output was subject to independent, uniformly 
distributed productivity shocks (this guarantees a unique, pure Nash strategy equilibrium 
if the spread of the distribution is high enough), parameterized to yield identical effort 
levels to a simple piece rate.  As predicted, average effort levels were similar between the 
tournament and the piece rate, but effort variance across subject pairs was much greater 
under the tournament.
43 This suggests that, while equivalent in principle, tournaments 
may be a much less robust incentive scheme than piece rates in practice because agents 
have difficulty finding a Nash equilibrium in strategies.  Bull et al also studied 
tournaments between players with different abilities, and found that less-able agents 
systematically exerted more effort than the Nash equilibrium.   
 
Schotter and Weigelt (1992) implement a very similar laboratory protocol but 
focus in more detail on ‘uneven’ tournaments (where the participants’ abilities differ), as 
well as on ‘unfair’ tournaments (where the rules favor one identical agent over another).  
They are also interested in the effects of policies that (a) restore fairness in unfair 
tournaments (termed ‘equal opportunity laws’), or (b) give handicaps to less-able agents 
in uneven tournaments (termed ‘affirmative action laws’).  Schotter and Weigelt find (a) 
again, that mean effort levels in fair, symmetric tournaments match the Nash equilibrium; 
(b) disadvantaged contestants in unfair tournaments supply more than Nash equilibrium 
effort; (c) mean effort in uneven tournaments matched theoretical predictions, though 
largely because the less-able agents either worked too much or chose zero effort, neither 
of which was Nash behavior; (d) symmetrizing previously-unfair tournaments raised both 
agents’ effort levels; and (e) handicapping abler contestants raised total worker output 
and the principal’s profit when the ability difference between contestants was large.  It 
did so largely by eliminating drop-out behavior among the less able contestants.  The 
                                                 
43 This variance result appears quite robust.  See, for example, van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden 
(2001) for a replication.     28
authors suggest that these results might have some relevance to the effects of affirmative-
action programs in the real world.  
 
c) Selection into tournaments: 
 
The early theoretical literature on tournaments considered the question of 
selection into tournaments largely from an adverse-selection perspective.  For example, 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) predicted that, if workers have private information about their 
own ability, less-able workers will ‘contaminate’ tournaments designed for abler workers.  
Whether or not firms modify the structure of their tournaments to address this adverse 
selection problem, the resulting effort allocations will no longer be as efficient as 
individual piece rates.   
 
Experimental studies of self-selection into tournaments tend to focus on different 
questions.  For example, building on earlier market-entry experiments in Industrial 
Organization (e.g. Rapaport 1995), which tend to find surprising levels of co-ordination 
on the efficient outcome in entry decisions despite the absence of communication among 
subjects, Camerer and Lovallo (1989) designed a game in which MBA students chose 
whether to enter a ‘market’ where their success depended on performance relative to 
other entrants, and on the subjects’ own skill level (on a sample of logic puzzles or trivia 
questions about sports or current events).   Camerer and Lovallo found excessive entry, 
which appear to stem not from inaccurate forecasts of the number of entrants or other 
factors, but from the subjects’ substantial overestimates of their own ability.  Vandegrift 
et al. (2007) conduct a similar experiment, where they allow a fixed population of agents 
to choose whether to be paid an individual piece rate or to enter a pool where they receive 
a prize of fixed value for the best performance.  The task performed by workers 
(forecasting the price of a fictitious stock based on cues that correlated with the true 
price) is deliberately chosen to allow for ‘winning’ to have some intrinsic or signaling 
value.  These authors do not detect significant levels of excess entry.  In this same vein, 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) also allow subjects to self-select between a piece rate and 
a tournament; their main interest is gender differences.  They find that, at given levels of 
ability, men exhibit significantly more overconfidence in their tournament entry decisions 
than women.  We discuss this and related articles in more depth in the section on 
discrimination.   
 
More recently, Eriksson, Teyssier and Villeval (2009) replicate Bull et al.’s 
(1987) original experimental design as closely as possible, with the exception that 
subjects are allowed to choose between a tournament (where they are randomly matched 
with another player) and an individual piece rate, calibrated to yield the same levels of 
optimal effort and expected utility.  Thus, effort is a decision number and all agents are 
equally able.  Eriksson et al., however, elicit subjects’ risk aversion after the experiment.  
They find that risk-averse subjects are less likely to enter the tournament.  This has the 
additional effect of reducing the high between-subject variance of tournaments, which 
was cited by Bull et al. as a possible disadvantage of tournaments.   Mean effort was 
about one third higher in the tournament scheme; as in Lazear (2000) half of this was due   29
not to incentive effects but due to selection.  This is of particular interest here, since 
agents’ abilities in this experiment were equal by construction.     
 
d) Tournaments and Risk-Taking:  
 
Another prediction of tournament theory is that, in a tournament setting, agents 
have incentives to increase the spread of their output distribution, i.e. that increase risk.  
To our knowledge, Bronars (1986) was the first to discuss risk taking as a choice variable 
in tournaments; he argued that leading agents in sequential tournaments prefer a low risk 
strategy (to ‘lock in’ their gains, whereas their opponents choose higher risk.  Hvide 
(2002) shows that, even in a one-stage tournament, if there are no limits on risk taking, 
tournaments ‘collapse’ in the sense that, for any given prize spread, agents choose infinite 
risk and zero effort in the Nash equilibrium.  When there are limits on risk-taking, the 
Nash equilibrium is at the maximum level of risk; furthermore an exogenous reduction in 
the maximum permissible risk level raises both effort and welfare.  Finally, Hvide shows 
that contests in which agents’ performance is ranked according to its absolute distance 
from a target level, k (thus outputs in excess of k are punished) have superior efficiency 
properties in this environment.   
 
Agents’ tournament-induced preferences for risk have been studied in various 
field contexts, including stock car racing --Becker and Huselid (1992) show that drivers 
take more risks when the prize spread is large--, and investment fund managers (Brown et 
al, 1996); Chevalier and Ellison (1997).  Brown et al. find, as predicted by Bronars, that 
expected losers prefer high risks while expected winners prefer low risks.  In the lab, 
Vandegrift and Brown (2003) find that high-variance strategies are indeed attractive in 
tournaments, but primarily to agents with low capabilities performing a simple task.  
Nieken and Sliwka (2008) extend the theory of agent risk selection in tournaments to 
cases where the agents face correlated risks.  They argue that --in contrast to Bronars’ 
prediction-- leading agents, rather than ‘playing it safe’, may be forced to imitate their 
opponent’s risky strategy.  This prediction is confirmed experimentally.  A possible 
application is to the case of mutual fund managers investing in the same, or similar, risky 




Since Lazear’s important article (1989), economists have recognized that any 
compensation system based on relative worker performance rewards workers who take 
actions that reduce the measured performance of their peers, i.e. to engage in sabotage.   
Of course, sabotage is inherently difficult to study in the field, because workers may go 
to considerable lengths to conceal their acts of sabotage.  This consideration has led a 
number of authors to study sabotage in the laboratory.   
 
The first published laboratory experiment on sabotage appears to be Harbring and 
Irlenbusch (2005) who investigate sabotage in both a baseline treatment where the prizes 
are exogenously manipulated by the experimenter, and in a setting where principals in the 
experiment can choose the prize structure.  Four agents compete against each other with 
the top two receiving a ‘winner’ prize.  Investing in sabotage reduces the output of all the   30
other agents.  When the prize spread is exogenously set by the experimenter, Harbring 
and Irlenbusch find, as predicted in simple tournament models, higher prize spreads 
encourage both greater effort and more sabotage; interestingly the latter effect dominates, 
suggesting that pay compression may be an optimal strategy.  This finding does not, 
however, generalize to the case where prize spreads are selected by participants in the 
experiment, perhaps because in the authors’ design higher spreads imply a higher 
expected prize.  Now, agents appear to reciprocate more generous compensation 
packages by refraining from sabotage.  While it is not clear if this result would persist in 
designs that held the expected prize constant, the result does remind us that agents’ 
intentions to reward or punish the principal may also play a role in real-world sabotage 
decisions.
44   
   
In a 2007 article, Harbring, Irlenbusch, Kräkel, and Selten consider sabotage in a 
contest where players are heterogeneous in ability.  Three contestants play a two-stage 
“Tullock” contest where each agent selects targeted levels of sabotage aimed at each of 
the two other players. (Sabotaging other players makes it more costly for them to 
exert effort.)  All sabotage levels are then revealed, and effort choices made in the 
second stage.  In addition, players can be of two types—those with ex ante high effort 
costs (“favorites”) or ex ante low effort costs (“underdogs”); this is publicly known in 
advance.  Three treatments are implemented:  one with homogeneous contestants, one 
with two underdogs and one favorite, and one with one underdog and two favorites.  
Contrary to expectations, when there are two underdogs, they do not ‘conspire’ against 
favorites by directing their sabotage against the favorite.  In line with expectations, an 
underdog engages in less sabotage when she is playing against two favorites than one; 
this resembles the dropout behavior of less-skilled agents in Schotter and Weigelt (1992).   
Harbring et al also examine some treatments in which a saboteur’s identity is revealed to 
the other contestants; they find that retaliation occurs in future rounds and that overall 
sabotage is less common.   
 
Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) implement tournaments with two, four, or eight 
contestants, and with the share of contestants who receive the winning prize equal to 1/4, 
1/2, or 3/4.  Agents choose both their own effort and a level of sabotage that affects all 
other agents equally.  Parameters are chosen to yield identical Nash equibrium effort 
levels in all treatments.  Consistent with Nash behavior, neither tournament size nor the 
share of winning prizes has strong effects on effort, or on sabotage, though there is some 
tendency for effort to be higher when the share of winning prizes is 1/2, compared to 1/4 
or 3/4.   In a more recent paper (2009) the same authors introduce communication among 
the principal and agents.  This turns out to curb sabotage via agreements on flat prize 
structures and increased output.  
 
To our knowledge, the only paper to study sabotage in a real-effort experiment is 
Carpenter et al (forthcoming).  Sabotage in Carpenter et al.’s context takes the form of 
peers’ subjective evaluation of the quality of each others’ output.  (The task is printing 
                                                 
44 Falk, Fehr and Huffman (2008) also focus on the behavior of principals in a setting where agents can 
invest in sabotage.  They find that both sabotage and loss-aversion among agents compromise the ability of 
large prize differentials to increase effort levels; principals respond to this by choosing wage compression.   31
letters, placing them into envelopes, and handwriting addresses on envelopes.  Subjects 
also had an opportunity to miscount the number of envelopes produced by their co-
workers).  Carpenter et al. found that subjects responded to the possibility of sabotage by 
their co-workers by producing less output than when peer review was not possible.  Piece 




In all tournaments, agents have an incentive to collude against the principal:  if 
they can agree to both exert zero effort, the prize in any fair tournament will be randomly 
assigned to one of them, and they will both be better off than if they had truly ‘tried’ to 
win the prize.  Despite this feature, collusion rarely appears to occur in tournament 
experiments.
45  This may be because various features of the design, including anonymity 
and re-matching, are deliberately chosen to make collusion difficult.  To our knowledge, 
Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003) is the only laboratory experiment that addresses the issue 
of collusion.  They find (as one might expect) that the smallest (two-person) tournaments 
are the most conducive to collusion.  It would be interesting to see if greater amounts of 
collusion are observed when there is less anonymity and more opportunity for 
communication and repeated interaction among agents.




Suppose that the production process takes time during which partial information 
about the agents’ relative performance might become available.  How will this 
information affect agents’ subsequent effort decisions?  Theoretically, even with standard 
preferences, this depends on both the distribution of the randomness in the effort-output 
relationship and the shape of agents’ disutility-of-effort functions; thus Eriksson, Poulsen 
and Villeval’s (2008) recent finding that feedback has no effect is not necessarily 
surprising.
47  More recently, however, Gill and Prowse (2009) consider a case --where the 
probability of winning is linear in the difference in the agents’ efforts-- where such 
information should have no effect under standard preferences; despite this, they find that 
agents who are behind exert less effort.
48  They interpret this ‘discouragement effect’ as a 
consequence of disappointment aversion, and estimate both the level and heterogeneity of 
disappointment aversion in their sample using structural methods.   
                                                 
45 Of course, while zero effort by all agents is probably a good sign of collusion, the question of how one 
would identify collusive behavior in a tournament is an interesting one.  Clearly, individual effort can be 
below the privately-optimal level for reasons other than collusion.  
46 In an interesting field experiment, Bandiera, Imran and Rasul (2005) found that, when engaged in a 
tournament with their friends, fruit pickers moderated their output (relative to a piece rate) in apparent 
response to the negative externality their effort imposed on those co-workers. Since this behavior occurs 
only when workers can monitor others and be monitored, it seems more likely to be motivated by collusion 
than altruism. 
47 Eriksson et al.’s finding that feedback tends to reduce the quality of the low-performers’ work is however 
evocative of the greater risks taken by agents who find themselves running behind, discussed earlier in this 
section.   
48 In Gill and Prowse’s context (where the agents select their outputs sequentially, and the interim feedback 
consists of informing the second agent about the first agent’s performance), being ‘behind’ simply 
corresponds to a high level of performance by the first agent.     32
 
Using field data from over 60,000 basketball games, however, Berger and Pope 
(2009) find the opposite: being slightly behind at halftime leads to a discontinuous 
increase in a team’s winning percentage; this apparent psychological effect is roughly 
half the size of the home-team advantage. This field data is corroborated with 
experimental evidence; the experiment sheds important additional light on the field data 
by helping to rule out alternative explanations.  The contrasting results of these three 
studies on feedback suggest there is much we still do not understand about the effects of 
providing interim performance feedback on effort decisions.
49  
 
In sum, laboratory tests of the tournament models have identified the following 
empirical regularities:   
 
a) A properly-designed tournament can replicate the results of an efficient piece rate in 
expectation, but generally yields greater variance in mean output across agent groups 
(Bull, Schotter and Weigelt, 1987).   
 
b) Handicaps, or ‘affirmative action’ tend to improve the performance of tournaments 
between unequal agents.  Part of this effect, however, is due to non-Nash choices by less-
able agents in the absence of handicaps (sometimes working too hard, sometimes 
dropping out completely) (Schotter and Weigelt 1992).   
 
c) Under some conditions, decisions to enter into tournaments are surprisingly close to 
optimal levels (Rapaport 1995).  For certain populations, however, entry can be excessive 
due in part to overconfidence.  See Camerer and Lovallo (1989) for MBAs and Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007) for men.  Allowing risk-averse agents to self-select out of 
tournaments reduces the between-group variance in output (Eriksson, Teyssier and 
Villeval 2009).   
 
d) Tournaments can increase risk-taking (Vandegrift and Brown 2003); this effect is not 
necessarily confined to agents with a low probability of winning (Nieken and Sliwka 
2008).   
 
e) Increases in tournament prize spreads can raise sabotage as well as effort; this effect 
can be strong enough to reduce total output (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2005, Carpenter et 
al forthcoming).  Agents do not always ‘target’ their sabotage in the expected direction 
(Irlenbusch et al. 2007).   
 
f) Collusion is rare in anonymous tournaments with more than two contestants (Harbring 
and Irlenbusch 2008).   
                                                 
49  An additional question concerning interim feedback involves the principal’s ex post incentives to reveal 
this information honestly; for example, it may be in the principal’s interest to report that the race is closer 
than it really is.  Both Gürtler and Harbring (2007) and Ederer and Fehr (2007) consider this question; they 
do find evidence that the gap is underreported, though the level of underreporting is lower than predicted 
by a model without aversion to lying.   
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g) The effects of interim performance information on agents’ subsequent efforts remain 
poorly understood.  Recent studies have found intriguing effects in opposite directions, 
with Gill and Prowse (2009) finding that being behind reduces effort (when standard 
preferences predict no effect) and Berger and Pope (2009) finding the opposite.   
 
We conclude this section by noting one aspect of tournaments that has so far 
received relatively little attention in the lab.  This is the use and effectiveness of 
tournaments as a tool, not for eliciting efficient amounts of effort, but for identifying the 
more able player.  (A recent exception in the field is Calsamiglia et al., 2009).  If –as 
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) argue-- it is efficient for organizations to promote abler 
persons into higher-level positions, then the almost-exclusive focus of the experimental 
literature on tournaments’ consequences for effort levels (as opposed to efficient 
inference of the agents’ underlying abilities) may be missing a key function of relative 
performance evaluation schemes in real organizations.   
 
3. Teams  
a) Holmstrom’s Model 
 
In the classic model of agency in teams (Holmstrom 1982), a group’s output, x, is 
a differentiable function of the effort levels of its n members, ei.  The principal’s problem 
is to design a set of compensation functions, wi(x), that depend only on the group’s total  
output and induce efficient effort choices by all agents.  Holmstrom’s well known result 
is that such a function cannot exist if wi(x) takes the form of a ‘sharing rule’.  A group 
compensation function is a sharing rule it satisfies  x x x w
n
i




, i.e. it balances the 
budget for all possible group output levels, not just the group’s equilibrium output.  Thus, 
free riding is inevitable unless the principal can commit to paying agents as a group more 
than their combined output for some out-of-equilibrium effort choices, and less in others.   
 
   To our knowledge, the first economists to study team production in the lab were 
Nalbantian and Schotter (1997).
50  In their experiments, Nalbantian and Schotter create 






i x x  , where ε is a uniformly distributed random variable.  Four compensation 
schemes are compared:  revenue sharing (where each worker is paid 1/6 of the group’s 
output), ‘forcing’ contracts or targets (where revenue is shared if group output exceeds a 
target; otherwise all agents receive a low payoff),  “gainsharing” (where the target is a 
function of the team’s past performance in the experiment), and a tournament between 
the firm’s two teams (where all members of the team with the higher output receive a 
prize).  Consistent with the ‘classic’ model’s predictions, effort levels under the revenue 
                                                 
50 The team production problem is, however, closely related to the problem of voluntary contributions to a 
public good, which has a longer experimental history.     34
sharing scheme converge towards individually rational levels, which entail a high degree 
of free riding (though they start out considerably higher in early rounds).  Forcing 
contracts (including gainsharing) perform poorly, perhaps because of the multiple 
equilibria that are theoretically associated with the induced game among agents.  
Competition between teams generates the highest level of efficiency among all these 
treatments, at least for Nalbantian and Schotter’s parameterization, which sets a prize 
high enough to (theoretically) induce efficient effort levels.
51   
 
More recently, Meidinger, Rulliere, and Villeval (2003) have introduced ‘active’ 
principals in to Nalbantian and Schotter’s protocol:  here, a subject in the role of the 
principal first makes an offer to two prospective team members; the offer is the share of 
the team’s output that the team gets to keep— either one half or two thirds.  Agents then 
decide independently on effort levels.  In addition to the usual cooperation versus free-
riding considerations, agents’ effort decisions in this context also appear to be affected by 
a desire to reciprocate generous ‘share’ offers from the principal. 
 
b) Team production and the voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM)  
 
A second branch of the ‘team production’ literature traces its origins not to the 
principal-agent literature but to that on public goods.  Team production in these studies is 
defined as contributors’ behavior in a voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) (see 
Isaac and Walker 1988 for an early example; Ledyard 1995 for a review of the 
experimental literature, and Chaudhury 2007 for a more recent review of specific issues).  
In the standard VCM, each member of a group, i, voluntarily contributes mi ‘tokens’ out 
of his endowment, wi to a common account.  Each member’s payoff is then just 
N m a m w
i
i i i / ) (    , where N is group size and a is the efficiency gain from public 
provision.  Thus, in the ‘classic’ VCM, the reward schedule for the agents is 
predetermined to be a sharing rule, with equal shares accruing to all agents.  The typical 
experimental result for the basic VCM is that individual contributions start out above the 
individually-rational (but socially inefficient) level but converge to that level as agents 
gain experience with the game.  Work within this tradition has examined the impact of 
factors like group size, communication, and group heterogeneity on voluntary 
contribution levels; see Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra (2006) for a recent example. 
Recent summaries of results in the VCM literature are available in chapters 82-90 of Plott 
and Smith (2008).    
 
Beginning in the 1990s, some experimenters interested in team production in the 
workplace studied effort decisions using a VCM framework.  The key modification to the 
VCM framework that was introduced by these researchers is reward schedules that do 
                                                 
51 Nalbantian and Schotter also implement a scheme where the principal can observe an individual’s effort 
at a cost.  Not surprisingly, they find that “monitoring works, but is costly”.  Van Dijk, Sonnemans and van 
Winden (2001) implement individual, team, and tournament based compensation in a real-effort 
experiment.  While some free riding occurred in teams, overall effort levels were the same under individual 
and team payment, since free-riding was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case 
of individual pay.    35
depend in some way on the effort contributions of individual team members.
52  Since we 
know (at least theoretically) that either individual piece rates or tournaments can induce 
efficient effort levels in this case, the main questions concern the efficacy of particular 
types of reward schedules in raising individual contributions toward efficient levels.  
Examples of this approach include Dickinson and Isaac (1998) who introduce prizes for 
the highest individual contribution into a standard VCM environment; not surprisingly, 
these prizes raise contribution levels.  (Of course, to be effective, such prizes must be 
committed to regardless of the level of output that is attained by the group; thus they 
constitutes precisely the kind of ‘budget-breaking’ that Holmstrom (1982) showed is 
necessary to attain efficiency in a team production environment.)  Other papers who have 
introduced different types of relative rewards into VCMs are Dickinson (2001), which 
considers monetary fines on the lowest contributors, and Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008).   
 
c) Complementarities in Production 
 
An ironic feature of most models of team production that have been implemented 
in the lab (including the basic VCM) is that the assumed production technology –in 
which all agents’ efforts are perfect substitutes for each other-- rules out one of the main 
reasons why teams exist:  production complementarities among the members.  An 
extreme form of complementarity that has, however, been studied in the lab is the 
“minimal effort” or ‘weakest link’ game (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990) where 
group output depends only on the lowest effort supplied among the team members.  
Especially in the absence of communication among agents, deductive methods provide 
little guidance regarding what equilibria to expect in such co-ordination games; Van 
Huyck et al. find massive co-ordination failures in the lab as agents play ‘safe’ strategies 
that leave them relatively invulnerable to the hard-to-predict actions of their co-
workers.
53   
 
More recently, Brandts and Cooper (2007) consider Leontief production in a team 
of four workers.  With no communication or management, Brandts and Cooper show that 
– as in earlier studies-- such games almost always converge on co-ordination failure, with 
all agents supplying low effort levels.  The authors then assign a manager to each such 
team, and give the manager two types of tools:  (a) increasing the (common) rate of pay 
                                                 
52 Eckel and Grossman (2005) consider a classic VCM problem, framed as a team production problem, with 
no modifications to the incentive structure at all.  Instead, they manipulate the amount of anonymity, 
contact and ‘identity’ of team members, for example by having the members perform a cooperative task 
before the experiment.  They find some positive effects of increased contact among team members, though 
the two interventions that yielded the greatest gains also offered extra financial incentives relative to the 
base case (wages for teamwork, and a monetary bonus to the team with the highest total output). 
53 Bornstein, Gneezy and Nagel (2002) find that this co-ordination is somewhat mitigated when intergroup 
competition is introduced—specifically, two groups compete for a prize received by the group with higher 
minimum.  The members of the losing group were paid nothing.  Sutter and Strassmair (2009) introduce 
communication into experimental tournaments between teams.  In their experiment, communication within 
teams increases efforts (by facilitating coordination) while communication between teams reduces effort 
(by facilitating collusion).   
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received by each team member for an extra unit of team output –recall that both the 
manager and the workers see only the team’s total output, which equals the lowest effort 
level chosen by any team member--, or (b) communicating with the workers by sending 
(and in one treatment also receiving) completely unstructured messages to the group.   
 
Brandts and Cooper’s provocative finding in this environment is that increased 
financial incentives are essentially powerless in raising group performance (small 
increases in group output can be achieved, but never enough to compensate the principal 
for the cost of the additional compensation).  Simple messages, however, can be highly 
effective in overcoming co-ordination failures of the type modeled by these authors.  The 
authors supplement their experimental analysis with an interesting econometric analysis 
of the effects of different types of messages exchanged between principals and agents.   
 
Most recently in this context, Georg, Kube and Zultan (2009) test an intriguing 
theoretical result about incentives in teams with production complementarities due to 
Winter (2004).  Winter’s result refers to a group of n identical agents contributing effort 
to a project, each of whom receives a reward of bi , i= 1, …n  if the project succeeds and 
0 otherwise.  The production function is said to exhibit complementarity when p(k+1) -
p(k) increases in k, where k is the number of agents exerting positive effort and p is the 
probability of success.  In this situation, Winter shows that the only reward scheme that 
induces efficient effort as a unique Nash equilibrium when workers’ efforts are 
complementary is fully discriminating, in the sense that no two workers’ rewards, bi, are 
the same.  Thus, efficiency requires inequity, in the sense of treating identical workers 
differently.  Intuitively, it is easier (and cheaper) to make some agents work if they 
‘know’ that working is a dominant strategy for some other (identical) agent because that 
agent will be extremely well rewarded if the entire group succeeds.
54   
 
Of course, given many authors’ arguments that workers’ effort decisions can be 
strongly, and negatively, influenced by ‘unfair’ wage differentials (e.g. Akerlof and 
Yellen 1990), it is not at all obvious that Winter’s proposed mechanism –which requires 
arbitrary wage differentials—would work well in practice.  Perhaps surprisingly, it does:  
When the production technology exhibits complementarity, higher efficiency is achieved 
under a discriminatory reward mechanism than under a cost-equivalent symmetric one.  
Further, despite concerns that fairness considerations might affect workers’ behavior, 
“subjects’ effort choices are highly sensitive to their own reward, but largely 
unresponsive to the rewards of the other …subjects in their group”.  This echoes 
Charness and Kuhn’s (2007) result for individual labor contracts, which also found that 
workers’ effort decisions in a multi-worker firm were insensitive to other workers’ 
wages.  Taken together, these two papers suggest that, in contrast to the role of social 
preferences in exchanges between individual ‘workers’ and ‘firms’, the importance of 
horizontal comparisons (among workers) within firms seems limited in the experimental 
literature.   
                                                 
54 In the opposite case of ‘substitutability’, the only reward scheme that induces efficiency as a unique Nash 
equilibrium is the symmetric one that treats all workers alike.  Thus, Winter’s model provides interesting 
predictions for the relationship between the group’s production technology and the efficient compensation 
policy.     37
 
d) Selection into Teams 
 
  As noted, probably the most common team compensation policy is a sharing 
rule in which all members receive an equal share of the group’s output.  An immediate 
consequence of such a policy –which contrasts starkly with tournament-based 
compensation-- is that team members will prefer to have abler co-workers.  Thus the 
issue of how teams are formed can be an interesting one, especially when 
complementarities exist among team members:  what are the effects of different team 
formation mechanisms on the matches that are formed, and are these matches efficient?   
 
   We are aware of only a handful of laboratory studies of the team-formation 
process. Weber (2006) conducts experiments on the minimum-effort co-ordination game 
that start with small groups –who find it easier to co-ordinate—, then adds entrants who 
are aware of the group’s history.  Using this procedure, coordinated large groups can be 
created, as long as the rate of growth is not too large.  In contrast to Brandts and Cooper 
(2007), no communication is involved.  Charness and Yang (2008) evaluate a specific 
voting mechanism for group formation in a VCM where there are economies of scale.  
Societies of nine people are initially formed randomly into three groups of three people 
who play the game for three periods.  Individuals then learn about the average 
contribution of each individual (by ID number) in their current own group, as well as the 
average contribution in other groups, and can decide whether to exit the group. 
Remaining group members choose whether to exclude any current members from the 
group; the new groups and 'free agents' then choose whether to merge with other existing 
groups and/or other free agents.  A critical element is the role of efficiency in terms of 
group size – the multiplying factor for each token contributed to the group account 
increases with group size.  Groups of nine are common, particularly after a ‘restart’ after 
15 periods.  They find considerable success for the mechanism, as the threat of ostracism 
seems to keep contribution rates quite high and efficiency is a driving force.   
 
In an interesting field experiment, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009b) find 
that, when the incentives facing an entire team are strengthened (in their case by 
introducing a tournament between teams or performance feedback), assortative matching 
into teams by ability is increased.  Further, workers become less likely to form teams 
with those they are socially connected to.  In Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan’s (2003) 
field study of a textile plant, strong assortative matching into teams did not occur.  
Further, equal sharing of production bonuses within teams seems to have stimulated 
cooperation, information sharing, monitoring and even mutual training within teams, 
generating a productivity increase (relative to piece rates) despite the expected free-rider 
problem.   
 
Finally, in addition to complementarity between team members’ effort levels, 
there may also exist complementarity of a different sort—actual gains from 
heterogeneity, for example if different types of group members possess complementary 
skills.  Charness and Villeval (2009) cite some work that suggests this and also finds that   38
there is a preference for mixed ages (and higher efficiency) in a VCM played at two 
French firms’ work sites.   
 
In sum, laboratory tests of the effort decisions in teams have identified the 
following stylized facts:   
 
a)  In the absence of communication and/or repeated interaction, teams in which agents 
are paid equal shares of the team’s output perform poorly, with agents’ efforts converging 
to low, individually rational levels after a few rounds of play (Isaac and Walker 1988; 
Nalbantian and Schotter 1997).   
 
b) The forcing contracts (essentially group bonuses) suggested by Holmstrom (1982) 
typically fail to improve outcomes in these environments due to co-ordination problems 
among agents (Nalbantian and Schotter 1997).     
 
c) Team performance may also be affected by considerations of reciprocity towards the 
principal, if one exists (Meidinger, Rulliere and Villeval 2003).   
 
d) Adding incentives based on the relative contributions of individual members to the 
team’s output can improve teams’ performance, if such measures are available 
(Dickinson and Isaac 1998; Dickinson 2001, Irlenbusch and Ruchala 2008).   
 
e) Adding competition between teams can be more effective than any of the above 
strategies (Nalbantian and Schotter 1997).  Given the tremendous popularity of team 
sports, both to participants and spectators, it is not at all implausible to us that humans are 
naturally attracted to such situations and perform well in them.   
 
f) When there is complement4arity between the efforts of team members, loss of output 
due to co-ordination failures can be severe in the absence of communication among team 
members (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 1990).  Adding communication in such 
situations can generate dramatic improvements, much more so than strengthening 
financial incentives (Brandts and Cooper 2007).  Other mechanisms that have been 
observed to work include asymmetric incentives –that facilitate co-ordination by making 
high effort a dominant strategy for at least one player—(Georg, Kube and Zultan 2009), 
and slowly adding new members to smaller groups, which find it easier to co-ordinate 
(Weber 2005).  
 
We conclude by noting one aspect of team production that, to our knowledge, has 
not been addressed in the lab:  opportunistic behavior by principals.  For example, 
principals who attempt to commit to incentives that ‘break the budget’ at out-of-
equilibrium effort levels may face strong temptations to understate the team’s total output 
(see for example Eswaran and Kotwal 1984).
55       
 
                                                 
55 Note that tournaments do not face this problem, since the principal’s total compensation bill does not 
depend on which worker wins; indeed this has been suggested as a possible advantage of tournament-based 
compensation (Carmichael 1983).   39
 
4.  Multi-task Principal-Agent Problems 
 
Suppose the agent performs multiple tasks the principal cares about, but the 
principal is only able to base the agent’s compensation on a subset of those tasks.  At 
least since Farrell and Shapiro (1989) outlined their “Principle of Negative Protection”, 
and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) introduced the ‘multi-task principal agent problem’, 
economists have recognized that, depending on circumstances, incentive systems based 
on a subset of the tasks performed by the agent may be less efficient than a compensation 
system with no incentives at all.   
 
The first experimental implementation of a multi-task principal-agent model we 
are aware of is Fehr and Schmidt (2004).
56  In their experiment, an agent exerts two types 
of effort, both of which are observed by the principal and agent, but only one of these is 
contractible. The two types of effort are complements in the production of total output 
(specifically, output equals the product of e1 and e2).  Disutility of effort, on the other 
hand, is given by c(e1 + e2), where c is increasing and convex.   Principals can choose 
between two types of contracts:  A “piece rate contract” pays the agent a fixed base wage 
plus a linear piece rate per unit of task one performed.  A “bonus contract” consists of a 
fixed base wage plus an unenforceable announcement that the agent might receive a 
bonus from the principal if his overall performance is “satisfactory”.  Principals and 
agents interact anonymously, and only once.   
 
Absent concerns for reciprocity (in the sense of perceived intentions for offering a 
bonus rather than a fine), it is clear that both the above contracts should perform 
relatively poorly:  the bonus contract should yield zero effort, and the piece rate should 
produce effort only on the first task, which leads to very low output due to the assumed 
complementarity in production.  Allowing for reciprocity, it is not immediately clear 
which contract should perform better, since both contracts allow for principals to make 
generous fixed wage payments that agents could conceivably reciprocate.  Empirically, 
however, --echoing results in Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007)--, bonus contracts perform 
much better than piece rates in this environment: many agents reward high effort levels 
on both tasks with generous bonuses, and agents seem to anticipate this.  (Some apparent 
reciprocation of high fixed pay was evident in both treatments, but was not very effective, 
relative to the possibility of earning a bonus).   
 
In some sense, Fehr and Schmidt’s results support Holmstrom and Milgrom’s 
prediction that powerful incentives may be a mistake when they are based on a strict 
subset of the agents’ actions that affect the principal’s welfare.  Indeed in such situations, 
Fehr and Schmidt’s results suggest that vague and completely and unenforceable 
subjective performance evaluations by the principal can outperform piece rates in this 
case.
57  Of course, the advantages of such ‘bonus’ contracts depend heavily on what Fehr 
                                                 
56 There is, of course, a sense in which tournaments in which agents can allocate their effort between 
productive activities and sabotage are a multi-task situation.  We discuss these in the section on 
tournaments.     
57 See for example Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) for a more explicit argument in favor of subjective 
performance evaluation.     40
and Schmidt interpret as workers’ concerns for fairness vis-à-vis the firm; if workers’ 
perceptions of fairness are manipulable or highly context-dependent, the widespread use 
of vague expectations as a solution to multitask principal-agent problems may not be 
practical.   
 
The only other multitask principal-agent experiment we know of is by 
Oosterbeek, Sloof and Sonnemans (2006).  In contrast to Fehr and Schmidt, rather than 
choosing between two complementary, productive activities, Oosterbeek, Sloof and 
Sonnemans’ agent chooses between a productive and a ‘rent-seeking’ activity.  The latter 
activity is pure social waste, but increases the agent’s bargaining power by improving his 
outside options.  In the ‘classic’ model with no social preferences, effort devoted to rent 
seeking should increase when the experimenters raise the marginal efficacy of effort in 
that activity.  In some behavioral models, however, the opposite could happen, because 
abstaining from rent-seeking activities becomes a more powerful signal of the agent’s 
good intentions the more effective those activities are.  The authors’ experimental results 
are largely in line with the classic model.  
 
In sum, economists are just beginning to study the multitask principal-agent 
problem in the lab.
58  Some key patterns that have been observed to date are: 
 
a) As predicted by the ‘standard’ model (Farrell/Shapiro 1989; Holmstrom/Milgrom 
1991), rewarding the observable task via a piece rate while not rewarding the other yields 
poor outcomes, especially if the tasks are complements (Fehr and Schmidt 2004).    
 
b) Unenforceable promises by the principal to reward ‘satisfactory’ overall performance 
by the agent perform remarkably well (Fehr and Schmidt 2004).  Perhaps this situation is 
familiar to subjects and they act according to norms that are highly effective in the real 
world.   
 
c) When agents can choose to invest in an unproductive rent-diverting activity, raising the 
returns to that activity generates more of it.  Agents seem neither to anticipate, nor to 
receive, increased rewards for refraining from such activity when it becomes more 
tempting for them to undertake it (Sloof and Sonnemans 2006).   
 
 
5. Multi-period Principal-Agent Interactions 
 
a) Ratchet effects 
 
The ‘ratchet effect’ applies to a situation where a principal contracts with an agent 
more than once, the agent has some persistent private information (such as his ability or 
the productivity of the principal’s technology), and binding multi-period contracts are not 
                                                 
58 Field and econometric studies are also rare.  Slade (1996) studies multitasking in contracts between oil 
companies and gasoline stations; more recently Griffith and Neely (2009) consider multitask incentives in a 
U.K. distribution firm.  
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enforceable.  In such situations, actions taken by the agent early in the relationship reveal 
information to the principal, which can be used by the principal later on to the agent’s 
disadvantage.  The classic example in labor economics is in the context of piece rates, 
where an agent’s choice of a high effort level in the first period reveals either that (a) the 
agent’s effort costs are low, or (b) the firm’s technology is more productive than 
expected, either of which leads the firm to reduce the generosity of the agent’s 
compensation package in the future.  Anticipating this, ‘able’ workers (or workers who 
have discovered that the firm’s new technology is highly productive) will choose low 
effort levels (Gibbons 1987; Ickes and Samuelson 1987).  This benefits those workers by 
preventing the firm from extracting their rents later in the relationship, but is socially 
inefficient. 
 
Aside from some early ethnographic studies (see for example Mathewson 1931), 
the only empirical evidence of ratchet effects of which we are aware is experimental in 
nature.
59  Chaudhuri (1998) conducted a laboratory experiment in which principals and 
agents interacted for two periods, and agents were one of two types that were unobserved 
by the principal. There was little evidence of ratcheting: most agents played naively, 
revealing their type in the first period even when an informed principal would use this 
information to the agent’s disadvantage, and principals often did not exploit agents’ type 
revelation. Possible explanations for this result include the relative complexity of the 
game, and the lack of context provided to the subjects that might have impeded the 
learning process. 
 
Cooper, Kagel, Lo and Gu (1999) frame their experiment in a context-rich way, as 
a game between central planners and firm managers, use both students and actual Chinese 
firm managers as subjects, and implement experimental payoffs with high stakes relative 
to the participants’ real-world incomes. They also simplify the interactions between 
principals and agents, focusing the experiment only on the stages of the game where 
information revelation matters: the agent’s effort choice in the first period, and the 
principal’s choice of a payoff schedule in the second.  Cooper et al. do find evidence of 
ratchet effects, though even in their context it took some time for the players to learn the 
consequences of type revelation.  
 
Finally, Charness, Kuhn and Villeval (2008) experimentally test a prediction of 
Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992) that ex post competition for agents can eliminate ratchet 
effects and lead to first-best outcomes in equilibrium.  Importantly, this prediction holds 
even when outside firms cannot observe the past performance of the agent.  They also 
extend Kanemoto and MacLeod’s theoretical analysis to show that ex post competition 
for principals has the same effect.  They impose three conditions in their experiment:  no 
ex post competition, competition with an excess supply of principals, or with an excess 
supply of agents.  As predicted, both types of competition virtually eliminate ratchet 
effects, though of course their effects on the utilities of the agent differ dramatically. 
 
                                                 
59 Carmichael and MacLeod (2000) interpret some historical evidence in light of the ratchet effect.    42
b) Career Concerns: 
 
In ratchet effects models, high-ability agents exert low effort in early interactions 
to convince principals they have low ability; this prevents principals from reducing the 
agents’ compensation in the future.  In ‘career concerns’ models, such as Holmstrom 
(1982/99) agents exert high effort in early interactions, in order to convince principals 
they have high ability, and thereby high wage offers in the future.  The key reasons for 
these dramatic differences are different assumptions about information and competition:  
In ratchet models, the principal and agent are in a bilateral monopoly situation, and the 
agent’s performance is typically not seen by other firms; thus high effort by the agent 
signals that he has a high level of rents that can be extracted in the future.  In career 
concerns models, there is a competitive market for agents in all periods and the agent’s 
output is seen by other firms; thus the wage the agent can command in future periods 
increases with the market’s assessment of his ability.  In the literature, ratchet models 
have been used to describe long-term worker-firm interactions, or interactions between 
managers and planners in non-market economies.  Career-concerns models have been 
applied mostly to the compensation of CEOs and other senior executives, beginning with 
Fama (1980).   
 
We are aware of two experimental papers on career concerns; the more recent 
(Koch, Morgenstern and Raab 2009) is actually the simpler one.  Consider a world with a 
finite number of agents and principals. In the first period, no agent’s ability is known to 
anyone, and all principals and agents share the same prior for agents’ abilities.  In this 
period, an agent chooses an effort level e at a private cost, c(e), which is common to all 
agents.  Once effort has been chosen, the worker’s output is publicly revealed to be y = a 
+ e, where a is realized worker ability.  A worker’s ability is a permanent characteristic, 
thus in this simple version of the model a worker completely learns his ability at the end 
of the first period.  At the end of period 1, all firms see every worker’s first-period 
performance y, and will rationally attempt to infer each worker’s ability from this 
information.   
 
In period two, agents exert no effort but produce an output equal to their ability, a.  
Knowing this, principals engage in (Bertrand) competition for agents at the start of this 
period.  (Specifically, four firms bid for three agents; a principal can employ more than 
one agent; principals simply offer lump-sum wages that agents accept or not.)  In a 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, firms will therefore offer wages equal to agents’ abilities in 
the second period; this gives agents incentives to take period-one actions that convince 
firms they have higher abilities.  Subject to certain restrictions on out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs, Koch et al identify a unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all agents 
choose the same, strictly positive effort level in period one.  In consequence, first-period 
outputs perfectly reveal agents’ abilities, and agents are paid their abilities in period two.  
While all agents would be better off choosing zero effort in period one, the logic of 
‘signal-jamming’ equilibria such as these compels them all to work harder, to prevent 
being misidentified as a lower-ability type.   
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In their experiment, Koch et al compare the above model it to a ‘public ability’ 
treatment, which is identical except that both the worker’s output and effort (and 
therefore ability) are publicly revealed at the end of the first period.  In this treatment 
agents have no reason to expend effort in the first period, so equilibrium effort is 
predicted to be zero.  By and large, Koch et al’s findings are consistent with the 
predictions of the career concerns model:  effort is higher in the hidden-ability treatment, 
and subjects’ first and second-order beliefs (which are elicited by the experimenters) are 
quite consistent with the model.  That said, decision errors were high in early rounds (it 
apparently took some time for subjects to understand the game), and principals’ offers 
were subject to a mild winner’s curse.   
 
Irlenbusch and Sliwka’s (2006) model of career concerns is identical to Koch et 
al.’s, except that it contains two key features.  First, firms bid for workers at the start of 
the first period as well as the second.  Second, agents choose effort in the second period 
as well as the first.  Since all workers are ex ante identical (so there is no reason to offer 
them different wages in the first period), and since all workers’ privately optimal second-
period effort is zero, neither of these differences changes the PBE of the game.   
Interestingly, however, the experimental outcome is dramatically different:  now, 
contrary to predictions, first-period effort is much higher in the public ability treatment, 
precisely where there is no signal-jamming reason to exert effort.  According to both 
Irlenbusch and Sliwka and Koch et al., the most likely reason is that Irlenbusch and 
Sliwka’s model introduces opportunities for signaling of a different kind (that is not 
formally modeled in either paper):  because effort is now revealed before period-two 
wage offers are made, agents now have an opportunity to signal that they are “high-
effort” (or “reciprocal”, or “fair”) types by choosing high effort in the first period.  Since 
effort is not directly observed in the hidden-ability treatment, such signaling is less 
effective there.  It is noteworthy, however, that this apparent signaling behavior occurs 
even though, by construction, all agents have the same cost of effort function in the 
experiment.  The effort costs, or ‘willingness to work’ that agents are apparently 
signaling, is some personal characteristic that is not induced by the experimental design.  
(Though it is clearly consistent with heterogeneous social preferences).    
 
Of course, which of the two above designs is more representative of any particular 
‘real world’ labor market is unclear.  While it is clear that both bidding for workers and 
effort decisions are made at multiple points in any worker’s career, Koch et al. argue that, 
to the extent that agents’ actions in Irlenbusch and Sliwka’s experiment are driven by 
reciprocity or fairness concerns, they may be irrelevant to the market for CEOs.  On the 
other hand, if these actions are meant to signal a low cost of effort, or a high level of 
determination, drive and ambition, they may indeed be very relevant to the CEO 
market.
60   
                                                 
60 Akerlof (1976) presents a signaling model in which agents signal a low cost of effort by working harder; 
separating equilibria in which (almost) all workers provide socially excessive effort exist.  For a more 
recent career concerns model with similar properties, see Acemoglu, Kremer,and Mian (2008).  It may also 
be worth noting that labor economists have developed a variety of models in which workers’ abilities are 
gradually revealed to markets over time (see for example Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993, and Altonji and 
Pierret 2001); we focus on career concerns models here because they are the only such models we are 
aware of that involve an effort choice by workers.   44
c) Investments and Hold-Up  
The “hold-up” problem pertains to any multi-period relationship involving 
specific investments, where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable.  An early 
formal statement was in the context of a unionized firm’s investments in plant and 
equipment, where market frictions create a gap between capital’s purchase price and its 
resale value (Grout 1984).  Grout showed that the firm, in general under-invests when 
union-firm bargaining occurs after the capital is in place, since the firm pays the full cost 
of the investment but (due to ex post surplus sharing) it only reaps a fraction of the 
returns.   
 
Most applications of the hold-up problem in labor economics, however, refer to 
the problem of workers’ investments in firm-specific skills.  Long ago, Becker (1965) 
proposed that sharing both the costs and returns to firm-specific investments should 
achieve (presumably constrained) efficiency in separation decisions after the investment 
is made, though the precise efficiency properties of this arrangement were not specified, 
nor were its implications for the initial investment decision analyzed.  Since then, 
Hashimoto and Yu (1980), Hall and Lazear (1984) and others have studied the problem 
more formally, and some ingenious institutional solutions (such as rigid wages in 
combination with a ‘triggered’ renegotiation (MacLeod and Malcomson 1993) have been 
proposed.   Other institutional arrangements that have been argued to help solve the firm-
specific training problem (in the sense of inducing both efficient investments and 
efficient ex post separations) include various types of promotion ladders (Carmichael 
1983, Prendergast 1993), and multi-skilling policies (Carmichael and MacLeod 1993).
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We note that a key feature of all these analyses is that principals (firms) cannot make 
binding commitments, for example to retain a worker if that is ex post unprofitable for the 
firm.  If firms can make credible promises of this nature (perhaps because their 
interactions with previous cohorts of workers can be observed by current workers), the 
holdup problem can be substantially mitigated, or eliminated.   
 
The first experimental study of the hold-up problem of which we are aware is 
Anderhub, Königstein and Kübler (2003).  They consider a two-period worker-firm 
interaction in which workers choose whether to make a firm-specific investment that 
reduces their effort costs in the first period; the investment is profitable to the worker 
only if he is employed by the same principal in both periods.  In perfect equilibrium, 
workers should make the investment whether or not firms cannot commit to do this; 
perhaps unsurprisingly, Anderhub et al however find that contractual form does matter, 
with workers being more willing to make specific investments when their re-employment 
is contractually guaranteed.  More recent experimental papers have examined the effects 
on holdup of communication (Ellingson and Johannesson 2004); of which party (worker 
or firm) makes the investment and the nature of ex post wage bargaining (Oosterbeek, 
Sloof and Sonnemans (2007a);  and of firms’ promotion rules (Oosterbeek, Sloof and 
Sonnemans 2007b).   
 
                                                 
61 For a review of the hold-up literature in the context of labor markets, see Malcomson (1997).    45
More specifically, the promotion rules compared in the latter paper, are ‘up or 
stay’ (Prendergast 1993), versus ‘up or out’ (Kahn and Huberman 1988); the setting is 
one in which workers’ specific investments may affect their firm-specific productivity 
not only in their current job, but in an alternative job (in the same firm) to which they 
might be promoted.  Promotion decisions are at the firm’s discretion, and firms cannot 
commit to refrain from opportunism in those decisions (aside from being bound by an up-
or-out or an up-or-stay rule).  Workers’ only incentives to acquire firm-specific skills in 
these models are to win promotions or to keep their jobs.  In this context, up-or-stay 
promotion policies will induce workers to invest only if investments raise their 
productivity more in the job to which they would be promoted than in the current job.  
Thus investment incentives may be too weak, but specific investments are never wasted 
due to separations.  Up-or-out policies can provide better investment incentives, but may 
waste investments. (See Gibbons 1988 for a more in-depth discussion).  Sloof et al. 
implement these policies in the lab and find that workers’ investment decisions are, at 
least on average, in line with theoretical predictions.
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In sum, as for multitask principal-agent problems, experiments on multi-period 
principal-agent problems remain few in number.  Nevertheless a few interesting results 
can be identified.  They are: 
 
a) The early pooling equilibria at low effort levels predicted by ratchet effects models can 
be generated in the lab (Cooper, Kagel and Lo 1999).   
 
b) Consistent with Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the modified game, labor market 
competition essentially eliminates the ratchet effect (Charness, Kuhn and Villeval 2008), 
at least in the case where workers’ private information is about their ability (as opposed 
to the firm’s technology).  To our knowledge, no lab experiments on the latter (“hidden 
technology”) variant of the ratchet effects model exist.       
 
c)  The early signal-jamming equilibria at high effort levels predicted by career-concerns 
models can be generated in the lab (Irlenbusch and Sliwka 2006; Koch, Morgenstern and 
Raub 2009).   
 
d) If agents choose efforts in both periods in a career-concerns game, the effects of 
making effort publicly observable contradict the career concerns model:  Rather than 
reducing first-period effort (because signal jamming is no longer possible), making effort 
public actually raises first-period effort (Irlenbusch and Sliwka 2006).  This suggests that 
agents are attempting to signal some personal characteristic that is outside the model, 
such as ‘honesty’ or a personal willingness to work hard.     
 
                                                 
62 In yet another paper published in 2007, Sloof et al. (2007c) consider the effects of keeping the level of 
one’s specific investment secret on the hold up problem:  the simple theoretical intuition is that if the other 
party does not know how much one has invested, they will be at an informational disadvantage in 
bargaining over the ex post surplus.  The framing (and likely relevance) however seems more appropriate 
non-labor market interactions, however.     46
e) Even in situations where short-term contracts should theoretically guarantee workers 
the same return to firm-specific investments as long-term contracts, enforceable long-
term contracts induce more worker investments in firm-specific skills (Anderhub, 
Konigstein and Kubler 2003).   
 
f) The nature of ex post wage bargaining (threat point versus outside offer), and 
promotion policies (up-or-stay versus up-or-out) affects investments in specific training 
(Oosterbeek, Sloof and Sonnemans 2007a, b).   
 
 
IV: Towards Behavioral Principal-Agent Theory:   
Fairness, Social Preferences and Effort 
 
   Perhaps the main contribution of experiments to principal-agent theory is the 
cascade of papers demonstrating the presence of “social preferences” (where one takes 
into account the payoffs, actions, and/or beliefs of other parties) in the laboratory.  The 
essential content of social preferences is that people will deliberately sacrifice money to 
help other people or hurt other people, or even to keep their promises and thereby avoid 
guilt or a “cost of lying.”  The fact that people do not simply maximize their earnings has 
far-reaching consequences for theory; some efforts have been made in this regard (for 
example, see von Siemens 2004 for a characterization of optimal contracts with social 
preferences and hidden action).   
 
  The earliest experimental paper to convincingly demonstrate the existence of 
social preferences is the article on the ultimatum game in Güth, Schmittberger, and 
Schwarze (1982).  In this bargaining experiment (which has been replicated hundreds if 
not thousands of times), one person is provisionally allocated a sum of money and 
chooses how much to offer a paired participant.  If the offer is accepted, it is 
implemented; if it is rejected, both parties receive nothing.  The main result is that people 
reject lopsided offers, even though it is costly to do so.   
 
This result and many others like it have led to a number of models of utility.  
These can be roughly classified as either distributional or reciprocal, with some hybrid 
models (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002, Falk and Fischbacher 2006).  Distributional 
models presume that one cares about the payoffs of others regardless of the choices and 
perceived intentions of these others.  There are two primary types of distributional 
models:  “Difference-aversion models” (e.g., Loewenstein, Bazerman, and Thompson 
1989, Bolton 1991, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) assume that 
players are motivated to reduce differences between theirs and others’ payoffs, while 
“social-welfare models” (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002) assume that people like to 
increase social surplus, caring especially about helping those (themselves or others) with 
low payoffs.  On the other hand, reciprocity models (e.g. Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 2004) assume that the desire to raise or lower others’ payoffs depends on 
how fairly those others are behaving; in other words, how one perceives the intentions of 
other parties affects one’s behavior. 
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In the field environment, it is difficult to rule out that behavior is driven by 
expectations of future material benefit, since there is typically repeated interaction in the 
field.  In the laboratory, one can isolate social preferences by ruling out the possibility of 
future interaction, either by using a one-shot game or by anonymous re-matching.  Of 
course, one must be concerned that the behavior found in the laboratory is specific to the 
laboratory.  Regarding distributional preferences, charitable giving in the U.S. (a 
notoriously individualistic society) exceeds 2% of GDP, with 90% of people donating; 
thus, most people are willing to contribute materially to the well-being of even 
anonymous strangers in the field.  Regarding negative reciprocity, workers have been 
known to engage in sabotage or increased theft rates after a pay cut or other actions 
perceived to be unfair (see for example Greenberg 1990, Shminki,  Cropanzano, and 
Rupp 2002), particularly when procedural justice in the organization is low (Skarlicki  
and Folger 1997).  And the studies by Krueger and Mas (2004) and Mas (2006, 2008) 
present results that show retribution with real firms and workers.  The case for non-
instrumental positive reciprocity in the field is weaker, but includes cases such as tipping 
when on the road or higher response rates to mailed surveys that include small gifts.   
 
Nevertheless, institutional and contextual factors determine the extent that social 
preferences come into play.  For example, it is conventional wisdom that inexorable 
forces drive out social preference in a market setting.  Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, 
and Zamir (1991) find experimentally that competition essentially completely drives out 
fairness considerations when 10 people can potentially accept a demand (only one of the 
people who accept this demand is selected) for a share of the pie that is made by one 
paired person.  Recent papers such as Gneezy and List (2006) and Fershtman, Gneezy, 
and List (2009) suggest possible limitations for the applicability of social preferences.  
On the other hand, even though a great deal of research (see Holt 1995 for a survey) has 
found a striking degree of convergence to the self-interested competitive equilibrium in 
experimental double auctions, Fehr and Falk (1999) demonstrate the presence of 
downward wage rigidity in an experimental labor market featuring the competitive 
double auction. 
 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) suggest that a key determinant of whether social 
preferences come into play is whether contracts are complete and enforceable.  They 
point out that incomplete contracts typically prevail in the labor market, where (for 
example) wages are often paid without any explicit performance incentives.  They state: 
“In situations where contracts are reasonably complete, the underlying assumption of 
self-interest should continue to be especially important” (p. 178).  However, based on 
evidence from Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007), where an implicit and incomplete 
contract with an unenforceable bonus outperforms a complete contract with contracted 
effort enforced through partial monitoring and the incomplete contract is selected 88% of 
the time, they argue that reciprocal considerations are not only critical with incomplete 
contracts, but also: “The endogenous formation of incomplete contracts through 
reciprocal choices shows that reciprocity may not only cause substantial changes in the 
functioning of given economic institutions but that it also may have a powerful impact on 
the selection and formation of institutions” (p. 178). 
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Given the evidence presented above, it seems clear that there is scope for 
improving the principal-agent models through the incorporation of behavioral 
motivations such as social preferences.  Perhaps the insights into the nature of non-self-
interested behavior gleaned from experiments will eventually be applied to a variety of 
economic settings, including employee response to changes in wages and employment 
practices. 
 
1. Models of Social Preferences 
  
  We begin the discussion of the relevant literature by summarizing some of the 
more prominent models of social preferences.  We proceed historically, rather than by 
publication date.  For detail of the models and their full functional forms, we refer the 
reader to the individual papers.  
 
  Bolton (1991) develops a model in which people care about both their own money 
and their relative position; this model is based on the Ochs and Roth (1989) finding that 
people frequently make disadvantageous counter-offers in a two-round ultimatum 
game.
63  One receives negative utility from receiving less than the other person, but is not 
bothered by receiving more.  There is a trade-off between one’s material payoff and one’s 
relative standing, in that a person might prefer (Own, Other) material payoffs of (3,2) to 
material payoffs of (4,6).  This model is entirely consequential, as intentions or previous 
history does not affect preferences. 
 
  Rabin (1993) was the first to provide a formal game-theoretic model 
incorporating reciprocity preferences.  The central notion is that of kindness, defined in 
terms of the payoff options made available to the other player by one’s own choice, with 
one’s kindness increasing as the best available payoff for the other person increases.  If 
you are unkind, the other person may sacrifice money to hurt you, while if you are kind, 
the other person may sacrifice money to help you.  In the latter case, mutual cooperation 
in the prisoner’s dilemma can be supported as an equilibrium. Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) formally extend this model (still including kindness as the main 
concept) to sequential games, which facilitates application to the more standard 
experimental games with first movers and responders. These models concentrate on 




  The Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) consequential 
models of relative position (or inequity or difference aversion) were developed 
approximately simultaneously.  The heart of these models is that people may (depending 
                                                 
63 In their experiment, if a proposal is rejected there is another round in which the pie is substantially 
reduced; the person who rejected the initial offer can then make a proposal to split the smaller pie.  A 
disadvantageous counter-offer is a proposal that, if accepted, would lead to a smaller material payoff for the 
second-round proposer than he or she had rejected in the initial proposal. 
64 However, there are two models in the appendix of Rabin (1993) that do consider the distribution of 
material payoffs.   49
on parameter values) trade off money to make material payoffs closer together.  The 
Bolton and Ockenfels model is more general and does not provide a specific functional 
form, while the Fehr and Schmidt model provides a simple and quite tractable functional 
form.  The main difference between these models (in the two-player case) is that people 
are more bothered by being behind than by being ahead in the Fehr and Schmidt model, 




  Falk and Fischbacher (2006) combine the Fehr and Schmidt notion of inequity 
aversion with reciprocity considerations in a complex hybrid model where a person is 
less bothered by another’s refusal to come out on the short end of a split than by a refusal 
to share equally.  Importantly, they assume that one does not resent harmful behavior by 
the other player if it seems to come only from the other player’s unwillingness to come 
out behind rather than his or her selfishness when ahead.   In other words, the prevailing 
social norm is one where it is bad form to be selfish when one has more than others, but 
is understandable when one has the short stick. 
 
  Charness and Rabin (2002) also combine distributional preferences with 
reciprocity.
66  The key innovation of this model is that people care about social 
efficiency, or the total payoffs for the reference group.  Absent “misbehavior” 
(determined endogenously), one’s utility is determined by a weighted average of one’s 
material payoff and a social component, which is itself comprised of a weighted average 
of the total payoffs for the reference group and the lowest payoff for anyone in the 
reference group.  With misbehavior, there is negative reciprocity: one withdraws one’s 
willingness to sacrifice to help the miscreant, by diminishing or eliminating the weight 
put on their payoff; one may even be willing to sacrifice to hurt the other person.   
However, in line with considerable experimental evidence (see the discussion below), 
there is no positive reciprocity in this model.
67 
 
Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) present a non-equilibrium approach that 
combines a form of distributional preferences with reciprocity considerations.  In this 
approach, both status (relative position) and reciprocity affect one’s emotional state, 
which in turn affects the choices that are made by a utility-maximizing agent.  They 
introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which one’s emotional 
state determines the marginal rate of substitution between own and others’ payoffs, and 
thus my subsequent choices.  In turn, one’s emotional state responds to relative status and 
to the kindness or unkindness of others’ choices.  They find that structural estimations of 
                                                 
65 In the n-player case, another difference is that Bolton and Ockenfels compare the ratio of one’s material 
payoff to the total material payoffs, while Fehr and Schmidt consider the sum of pairwise comparisons. 
66 Note that the real model is in the appendix of the paper. 
67 One might wonder whether a complex model such as Charness and Rabin (2002) is needed, as the 
substantially more parsimonious and tractable Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model does a reasonably good job 
of organizing much of the observed experimental behavior.  While this topic is still being debated, it seems 
fair to say that there are many papers that provide data that cannot be explained by distributional models 
without considering reciprocity.  These include Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), Blount (1995), 
Charness (2004), Offerman (2002), Brandts and Charness [2003], Andreoni, Brown, and Vesterlund 
(2002), Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003), Charness and Rabin (2002), and Charness and Levine (2007).   50
this model with six existing data sets demonstrate that other-regarding preferences 
depend on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights. 
 
A final model involves a trade-off between one’s material payoff and one’s 
degree of guilt from violating the expectations of another person.  This is called 
“disappointment aversion” in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), but is probably better 
known as “guilt aversion” (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006).  The idea is that the more 
one believes that a party with whom one is paired is expecting a favorable move, the 
more likely it is that one chooses the actual move.  Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find 
support for this notion, as there is a strong positive correlation between a responder’s 
beliefs about the first-mover’s beliefs and the responder’s choice of the favorable action.  
Formal presentations of this concept (“simple guilt”) and a more complex version (“guilt-
from-blame”) in which one feels guilt only to the extent that one believes that the other 




In sum, a number of models of social preferences have been proposed, mainly 
classifiable into distributional models and reciprocity models and hybrids of these two 
approaches.  Other motivations such as guilt aversion (and lying aversion, which has not 
generally been formalized; however, see Charness and Dufwenberg 2009 for one 
approach) are also being considered in recent models. 
 
a) Distributional models posit that people are concerned with the payoffs of others in 
some fashion, with considerations of intention on the part of the others being irrelevant; 
in other words, only the consequences of one’s choice matter.  Bolton (1991) presumes 
that one cares about receiving less than another person in one’s reference group, but 
doesn’t mind receiving more than the other person.  Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) instead 
presume that people care equally about coming out behind or coming out ahead of the 
average amount received by those people in the reference group.  Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) put forward a very tractable model that also presumes that people care about 
coming out behind or coming out ahead of others; however, one cares at least as much 
about coming out behind.  In addition, one makes pairwise comparisons with the material 
payoffs of others, rather than comparing with the average of others (this only matters in 
environments with more than two people). 
 
b) Reciprocity models instead posit that people respond to the intentions of others, with 
perceived kind intentions being met with kind responses and perceived unkind intentions 
being met with unkind responses.  In this way, both mutual cooperation and mutual 
defection are potentially equilibria in a Prisoner’s Dilemma.  These models typically 
abstract away from distributional considerations.  Rabin (1993) is the seminal paper in 
this area, incorporating reciprocity into simultaneous games.  Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) extend this approach to sequential games, typically better-suited to 
the laboratory.   
 
                                                 
68 For another survey of social preferences, see Cooper and Kagel (forthcoming).   51
c) Since both distributional and reciprocity considerations appear to be relevant, some 
recent models have combined these factors.  Falk and Fischbacher (2006) combine 
intentions with Fehr-Schmidt preferences.  Charness and Rabin (2002) put forth the 
notion of social efficiency, whereby people are typically interested in improving the 
payoffs of others, unless said others have behaved badly.  There is negative reciprocity in 
this model, but (based on the experimental evidence in that paper and elsewhere) there is 
no positive reciprocity.  Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) use a non-equilibrium 
approach that does not require knowledge of beliefs and is therefore considerably more 
tractable. 
 
d) Other motivations such as guilt aversion have also been modeled (Battigali and 
Dufwenberg 2007, 2009).  With guilt aversion, one trades off feelings of guilt against 
being selfish.  The more one expects that another person expects her to behave favorably, 
the more likely one is to then behave favorably.  Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) 
provide experimental support for guilt aversion, also finding that promises (statements of 
intent) are particularly useful in achieving optimal social outcomes. 
 
 
2. The Gift-Exchange Game 
 
  Probably no experimental game in the area of labor economics has had as much 
impact as the gift-exchange game, which tests the notion (Akerlof 1982; Akerlof and 
Yellen 1988, 1990) that there is a positive relationship between wages and effort.  This 
game was designed to mimic an employment relationship, in that labor contracts are 
typically incomplete and effort is not (fully) enforceable; thus a wage offer is binding, but 
effort is discretionary.  In its basic form, the experimental participants are divided into 
“firms” and “workers”, who interact anonymously either in some form of labor market or 
in one-to-one pairings; typically, the game is played for a number of periods.  In this 
subsection we report results from the earliest gift-exchange experiments. 
 
  The first paper reporting results from the gift-exchange game is Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993).  They create a competitive labor market using a two-stage 
game.  Workers and firms
69 (with more workers than firms) were separated into two 
rooms, and communication between the two rooms took place via telephone.  The first 
stage was a one-sided oral auction with employers as bidders.  Firms made wage 
proposals, which were posted in the room containing the workers.  Once a worker 
accepted an offered wage, the first stage was concluded for both the firm and the worker.  
A firm could revise its (non-accepted) wage offer upward, so that it was higher than any 
existing posted wage offer.  People who did not contract received zero earnings for the 
period.  In the second stage, workers chose effort and this choice was only revealed to the 
paired firm.  Firms chose wages (restricted to be multiples of five) from the interval [26, 
126], earning (126-wage)*effort.   Workers earned the wage less 26 less the cost of effort, 
shown below: 
 
                                                 
69 The language used in this paper involves buyers and sellers who prices and quality; however, the paper 
emphasizes the labor interpretation, so we adopt the terminology used in almost all subsequent papers.   52
e  0.1 .0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
c(e)  0 1 2 4 6 8  10  12  15  18 
 
  If workers are purely self-interested, the prediction is of course that they will 
choose e = 0.1 regardless of the wage.  Knowing this, firms will choose a wage of 30, the 
lowest wage ensuring participation.  However, the main result is that both wages and 
effort levels far exceed the predictions with self-interested workers, as the average wage 
was 72 and the average effort chosen was 0.4.  In addition, there is a very strong positive 
relationship between effort and wage. 
 
  The second paper in this series is Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter (1998), 
who conduct both a one-sided oral auction treatment and a bilateral-gift-exchange 
treatment using Austrian soldiers to test the robustness of the Fehr et al. (1993) results 
and to determine the relative effect of competition on wages.  An additional treatment 
involves complete contracts, in the sense that the experimenter enforced an effort level of 
1.0 and no effort costs were subtracted from worker’s earnings.  The main finding is that 
gift exchange persists even in the absence of competition, when firms and workers are 
matched on a one-to-one basis; after a few periods wages in this treatment (and the ratio 
of effort to wage) coincide with wages in the one-sided oral auction without effort 
enforcement.  Thus, the qualitative findings of Fehr et al. (1993) are replicated with non-
student participants and even without competition.  Wages were considerably lower when 
effort is enforced, although still substantially above the minimum needed to ensure 
participation (workers could reject offers). 
 
  Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) study the impact of reciprocity on contract 
terms and their enforcement with three experimental treatments involving competitive 
markets and more workers than firms.  In each treatment, the firm specifies a wage, a 
desired effort level, and a fine imposed if the firm detects that the worker has shirked 
(provided less than the contracted level of effort.  In the weak-reciprocity treatment, 
workers who have accepted posted contracts choose effort levels, and a random device 
determines whether shirking is verifiable (and fined at the specified level); the firm then 
learns the chosen effort level.  The no-reciprocity treatment is identical, except that the 
experimenter exogenously fixes the effort level.  Finally, in the strong-reciprocity 
treatment, there is an additional stage in which firms can reward or punish workers at a 
cost.  The results show that firms demand and enforce much higher effort levels in the 
strong-reciprocity treatment than in the weak-reciprocity treatment; there is much less 
shirking in the strong-reciprocity treatment.  In fact, both firms and workers earn more in 
the strong-reciprocity treatment, in large part because the higher effort levels lead to a 
larger pie.  Nevertheless, firms’ contract offers are much higher in the weak-reciprocity 
treatment than in the no-reciprocity treatment, and the offers increase with the desired 
effort level.   
 
In sum, the gift-exchange game has been a very successful approach to modeling 
labor issues in the laboratory.  The main finding is that higher wages lead to higher effort.  
This section reports only the earliest gift-exchange experiments. 
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a) Some early gift-exchange papers used a form of one-sided oral auction to create a 
market environment. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) have more workers than firms, 
simulating unemployment conditions.  Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter (1998) 
find very similar results with Austrian soldiers and a bi-lateral design, where there are 
equal numbers of workers and firms. 
 
b) Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) find that both firms and workers earn more 
when firms can punish or reward workers for their effort choices, since higher effort is 
socially efficient (there is a larger pie to divide).  Even though contract offers are higher 
without this enforcement possibility, there is much more shirking (low effort).  
Nevertheless, offers increase with the desired effort level in both cases.  
 
 
3. Multi-worker gift-exchange experiments 
  
It seems substantially more realistic to consider an environment in which a firm 
has more than one employee.  When there are multiple workers who receive wages and 
who can provide effort that benefits the firm, there is the possibility of dispersed 
responsibility for the firm’s earnings (leading to possible free riding) and there are 
considerations of horizontal fairness (one’s pay compared to the pay of other workers). 
 
Maximiano, Sloof, and Sonnemans (2007) compare a bilateral gift-exchange 
game with one in which each firm has four workers; in the latter case the employer is 
likely to earn much more than any of her workers, thus reducing the need for any 
individual worker to sacrifice to help the relatively high-income firm.  The authors did 
not expect gift exchange to survive in this environment.
70  In fact, effort levels in the 
latter treatment are only marginally lower than in the bilateral game, so that “the gift 
exchange relationship is quite robust to increases in the size of the workforce” (p. 
1026).
71  Their results suggest that intentions-based reciprocity is a driving factor, 
although efficiency preferences (Charness and Rabin 2002) may also play a role in 
inducing this behavior. 
 
  Charness and Kuhn (2007) match two workers (with different productivity levels, 
although the precise levels are unknown to the workers) with one firm to investigate 
whether workers have concerns with pay inequality and whether pay secrecy and pay 
compression is therefore beneficial for a firm; in a within-subjects design, we varied 
                                                 
70 They state on p. 1026: “Frankly, we did not believe that the gift exchange model would survive the more 
realistic multiple workers per employer design. We were wrong.”  
71 We hasten to add that, despite the large number of papers that find a strong positive relationship between 
wage and effort, gift exchange is not robust to all experimental conditions.  Hannan, Kagel, and Moser 
(2002) find little gift exchange with undergraduates; on the other hand, MBA students provide effort 
responses similar to those in most gift-exchange studies.  Charness, Fréchette, and Kagel (2004) find that 
when a complete payoff table is provided in the experimental instructions, workers choose substantially 
less effort compared to a treatment in which participants had only the information needed to compute their 
payoffs. 
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whether a worker was aware of the other worker’s wage. Under fairly general conditions, 
we demonstrated theoretically that workers’ responsiveness to co-workers’ wages should 
lead profit-maximizing firms to compress wages or maintain pay secrecy.  And, as in 
other gift exchange experiments, we observed a strong positive empirical relationship 
between ‘own’ wages and effort.  Surprisingly, however, the effort level provided by a 
worker was unaffected by the wage paid to his or her co-worker.  Furthermore, although 
firms compress wages when the co-workers will know both wages, this did not raise 
profits.  It seems that the relationship between a worker and the firm is much more salient 
than the relationship between the pay of the co-workers.  Overall, our experimental 
evidence “casts doubt on the notion that workers’ concerns with equity might explain pay 
policies such as wage compression or wage secrecy” (p. 693).   
 
  Gächter, Nosenzo and Sefton (2008) perform an experimental analysis of pay-
comparison information and effort-comparison information in an environment in which 
firms are matched with two workers.  While effort is highly sensitive to the worker’s 
wage, co-worker wages per se have no effect.  Further, when the firm pays different 
wages to the workers, the co-worker's effort decision is ignored.  However, worker 
behavior is affected when both pieces of social information are provided: a generous 
wage generates higher effort when one’s co-worker exerts high effort, but is ineffective 
when the co-worker contributes little or no effort.  They suggest that group composition 
is a relevant factor for obtaining beneficial effects from social information.   
 
Abeler, Altmann, Kube, and Wibral (2009) focus on a two-worker-one-firm 
environment in which a worker knows both the ability and effort level of the co-worker.  
However, they reverse the order of play, as workers first choose effort levels and the 
paired firm then chooses wages.  In one treatment firms are constrained to pay equal 
wages, while in a second treatment there is no such constraint.  Perhaps surprisingly, they 
find that there is lower effort when the firm is forced to pay equal wages, as a worker 
who chooses higher effort than the co-worker does not feel it is fair to receive the same 
wage as the co-worker, and subsequently reduces effort.  Thus, it is important to pay 
attention to equity considerations rather than equality per se.
72   
 
In sum, there have been a modest number of gift-exchange experiments with 
multiple workers, a more realistic case than the standard game.  
 
 a) Maximiano, Sloof, and Sonnemans (2007) find that gift exchange is relatively 
undiminished even when each firm has four workers, with their results suggesting that 
intentions-based reciprocity is a driving factor in the effort choices. 
 
b) Some recent papers have examined the effect of pay-comparison information and/or 
effort-comparison information when there are two workers per firm.  Both Charness and 
Kuhn (2004) and Gächter, Nosenzo and Sefton (2008) find that pay-comparison 
information alone has little or no effect on the effort choices of workers.  However, the 
                                                 
72 In a related paper, Meidinger, Rullière, and Villeval (2003) examine team heterogeneity and productivity. 
There is considerable free riding as each agent is greatly influenced by his or her teammate's behavior.  On 
the other hand, workers are better able to cooperate when the team is homogeneous.   55
latter study finds that worker behavior is affected when both pay-comparison information 
and/or effort-comparison information are provided and the co-worker provides high 
effort.    
 
c) Abeler, Altmann, Kube, and Wibral (2009) examine the two-worker-per-firm 
environment in which a worker knows both the ability and effort level of the co-worker, 
with workers first choosing effort and the firm then choosing the wage.  Effort is lower 
when firms are forced to pay the same wage, due to workers who choose higher effort 
objecting to being paid the same as a shirking co-worker  
. 
4. Positive and negative reciprocity 
 
  While the classic gift-exchange experiments provide strong evidence of reciprocal 
behavior, it is less clear that this represents reciprocity in a strict sense.  The reason for 
this is that people may have distributional preferences that could lead to the same 
behavior that is observed in an environment where reciprocity is possible.  Thus, positive 
or negative reciprocity reflect behavior that differs from what a responder would have 
done in the absence of a first-mover action that is perceived to be positive or negative.  
Some experimental games from Charness and Rabin (2002) illustrate this point.  In the 
baseline case, a participant unilaterally chooses between (Other, Own) material payoffs 
of (400, 400) or (750, 375).  Around fifty percent of the population chooses to sacrifice 
25 units to give the other person an additional 350 units, even though this leads to a large 
difference in material payoffs.   
 
In a second case, the other paired participant first faced a choice between payoffs 
of (750, 0) or passing the choice to the second participant, who would once again face a 
choice between (Other, Own) payoffs of (750,375) or (400,400).  Positive reciprocity 
would imply that the rate of (750,375) choices should increase, as the first mover would 
clearly seem to be kind by allowing the responder to receive a positive payoff.  However, 
in fact the rate goes down slightly (to 39%)!  So positive reciprocity doesn’t seem to be 
present here.  In a third case, the other paired participant first faced a choice between 
payoffs of (550, 550) or passing the choice to the second participant, who would once 
again face a choice between (Other, Own) payoffs of (750,375) or (400,400).  Negative 
reciprocity would imply that the rate of (750,375) choices should decrease, as the first 
mover would clearly seem to be unkind by forcing the responder to receive a smaller 
material payoff than was available with the outside option.  In fact, the rate of (750, 375) 
choices does decrease sharply to 11%; thus, negative reciprocity is a factor.
73 
 
  The first experimental paper to carefully test for positive and negative reciprocity 
was Charness (2004).
74  This paper considers gift-exchange in a bilateral setting, varying 
                                                 
73 A further example from Charness and Rabin (2002) provides evidence of negative reciprocity.  In 
ultimatum-game experiments, a high proportion of responders reject offers that would give them only 20% 
of the pie.   However, when we offered 36 participants a choice between (Other, Own) payoffs of (800, 
200) or (0,0), exactly zero chose (0,0).  Thus, distributional considerations are insufficient to explain 
rejections in the ultimatum game, so that negative reciprocity would appear to be the driving force. 
74 Once again, we order papers by the date they were written (in this case, 1996), rather than the publication 
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whether the wage was determined by a self-interested firm or generated by an exogenous 
process (such as a draw from a bingo cage); in all cases, the firm benefits from the 
worker’s chosen effort.  There is a strong positive relationship between wage and effort 
in all treatments.  However, the effort level with low wages is lower when the wage was 
chosen by a self-interested firm than when it was generated exogenously, suggesting the 
presence of negative reciprocity.  On the other hand, there was virtually no difference 
across treatments in the effort level with high wages.  Thus, this paper was the first to 
provide experimental evidence that positive reciprocity seems to be much weaker than 
negative reciprocity, while at the same time clearly identifying the effect of the 
distribution of payoffs per se on behavior. 
 
A subsequent and related paper (in a non-labor setting) is Offerman (2002), who 
studies the effects of random choice mechanisms while allowing for both positive and 
negative reciprocity.  He considers players’ responses to a helpful or hurtful choice, as a 
function of whether the “choice” was made by an interested party or generated at random 
(responders could sacrifice one unit to either increase or decrease the first-mover’s payoff 
by four).   Following the helpful choice, responders never paid to lower the first-mover’s 
payoff, but paid to help first movers more often when the first mover made the choice 
than when the choice was randomly-determined.  This suggests some positive reciprocity 
may be present, although the effect is not significant.  On the other hand, the effect on the 
response to the first-mover’s perceived intentions was dramatic and significant following 
a hurtful choice, again suggesting that hurting hurts more than helping helps (the title of 
the paper). 
 
Brandts and Charness (2003) test for punishment and reward in a cheap-talk game 
and find that intention is a critical issue, finding substantial negative reciprocity and 
limited positive reciprocity.  One player sends a message about her intended play to 
another player; after play takes place, the other player is then given an opportunity to 
punish or reward the first player.  The authors found that the responder was twice as 
likely to punish unfavorable play by the first player if that first player had lied about his 
play than if he had told the truth.  A relatively small number of responders chose to 
reward a favorable play by the first mover. 
 
  On the other hand, Cox (2004) reports significant positive reciprocity in the 
investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995).
75  The triadic design compares 
behavior in the standard game with behavior when the first mover is a dictator and to 
behavior when the experimenter determines the amount received by the responder rather 
than this being determined by a self-interested first mover; this procedure should allow 
one to distinguish distributional preferences per se from reciprocal preferences.  Cox, 
Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2008) finds significant positive reciprocity, but does not find 
significant negative reciprocity in the “moonlighting game”, where the first mover can 
                                                 
75 In the standard version of this game, both a first mover and a responder are endowed with 10 units.  The 
first mover can pass up to 10 units, with the amount passed tripled by the experimenter and then received 
by the responder.  The responder can then pass back any number of units (not tripled). 
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take from the responder as well as pass to the responder.  Finally, Cox and Deck (2005, 
2006) report mixed findings on positive reciprocity; the results depend on whether or not 
the experimenter can observe the actions of the players (double blind or single blind), as 
well as on the sex of the subject.  
 
  In sum, the experimental evidence regarding intention-based positive and negative 
reciprocity is mixed, although the general result is that negative reciprocity is stronger 
than positive reciprocity.  In a sense, this can be seen as reflecting expectations and 
violations thereof, as seen in a self-serving way.  If one expects kind or favorable 
treatment and receives it, there is no strong emotional jolt; on the other hand, if one has 
this expectation and receives unkind or hurtful treatment, the emotional response is much 
stronger. 
 
a) Negative reciprocity is highly pervasive in experiments, much as it is in the field. 
A number of papers, such as Charness (2004), Offerman ( Charness and Rabin (2002) 
find little or no evidence of intentional positive reciprocity, in the sense that responses 
after a kind action do not receive a more favorable response than when no action has been 
taken.  
 
b) On the other hand, a number of papers, such as Charness (2004), Offerman ( Charness 
and Rabin (2002) find little or no evidence of intentional positive reciprocity, in the sense 
that responses after a kind action do not receive a more favorable response than when no 
action has been taken.   
 
c) However, this is not a universal result, as papers such as Cox (2004) and Cox, Sadiraj, 
and Sadiraj (2008) report significant positive reciprocity   Still, Cox and Deck (2005, 
2006) report mixed findings on positive reciprocity.  So this topic remains open. 
 
 
5. Pay regulation 
 
  Governments often consider whether to regulate pay, by means such as mandating 
a minimum wage or a sick-pay rate.  What are the effects of such policies?  In the field, it 
is difficult to ascertain this, as there are many factors present and changing at the same 
time.  Thus, experimental techniques are likely to be useful, as the effects of such policies 
can be successfully isolated. 
 
Brandts and Charness (2004) were the first to study the effect of a minimum wage 
in a gift-exchange format.  They used a more symmetric payoff design.  Each person was 
endowed with 10 units, and the first mover could pass up to 10 units, and the responder 
received five times whatever was passed; the responder could then send back up to 10 
units, with the original first mover receiving five times whatever was passed back.  
Brandts and Charness imposed a minimum wage of five in a condition with an excess 
supply of workers.  The mandated minimum wage was counterproductive in the sense 
that the average effort was 30% lower than without it, even though the average wage was 
5% higher.  In addition, they found that the highest wage was chosen only half as   58
frequently in the minimum-wage condition, with effort also reduced by 30% at this top 
wage. 
 
Fehr, Falk, and Zehnder (2006) test the effect of imposing a minimum wage in an 
environment in which each firm is matched with three workers and must choose the same 
wage for each of the workers.  The workers decide on the minimum wage that they would 
conditionally accept (the strategy method) and the actual assigned wage is then accepted 
or rejected accordingly; however, workers do not choose effort levels, and a firm’s profits 
only depend on the number of workers who accept the wage offer.
76  In some sessions, 
fifteen periods of a mandated minimum wage were followed by 15 periods with no 
minimum wage; the order was reversed in the other sessions.  They find that there are 
lasting consequences of the mandated minimum wage even after it has been removed, in 
that firms must pay higher wages after the removal than before it was imposed.  Thus, the 
authors conclude that policy can affect people’s sense of what is a fair wage. 
 
Owens and Kagel (2009) use a variant of the payoff design in Brants and 
Charness (2004).  They find that the effect of an imposed minimum wage are a reduction 
in effort in the neighborhood of the minimum wage but no systematic effects on effort 
levels for higher wages. The minimum wages leads to improved incomes for both firms 
and workers (particularly the latter).  Since there is little effect at higher wages, it appears 
that the minimum wage requirement is less salient at these higher wages and/or that 
employees recognized that wages set a good deal higher than the minimum represent just 
as large a monetary gift as without it. 
 
Dürsch, Oechssler, and Vadovic (2008) report the results of a form of gift-
exchange game that investigates the issue of sick pay in an experimental labor market. 
The main variation is whether there is one-to-one matching of firms and workers or 
whether there is a market setting in which firms post wage offers and workers select the 
ranking of their preferences regarding the possible offers; in the latter case, a firm may 
end up hiring more or less than one worker.  In all cases, there is a one-third chance 
(chosen at random) that a worker will be “sick” and so be unable to complete his or her 
intended effort.  Firms chose one of five possible contracts, each of which specified a 
wage to be paid in case of zero effort (not showing up for work, either because the 
computer made this choice or because the worker chose zero effort voluntarily; the firm 
cannot tell if the worker is actually sick or simply chose to stay home) and a wage to be 
paid in case of positive effort.  The main findings are that higher wage offers significantly 
increase effort choices (both with respect to sick pay and non-sick pay), firms can attract 
more reciprocal workers by offering sick pay, but firms benefit from offering sick pay 
only in the market setting, where there is competition for workers. 
 
  Bauernschuster, Dürsch, Oechssler, and Vadovic (2009) use a similar design to 
consider the effect of sick pay with heterogeneous workers with different likelihoods of 
being “sick”.  They use a 2x2 experimental design, in which they vary whether there is a 
                                                 
76 In this sense, the game resembles an ultimatum game. a monetary gift as 
without it. 
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minimum sick-pay rate (40% of the wage) and whether workers all have the same 20% 
rate of being sick or whether half of the workers have a 10% chance of being sick and the 
other workers have a 30% chance of being sick.  Issues of interest include the degree of 
moral hazard (pretending to be sick), whether the adverse-selection problem is severe 
enough to lead to a collapse in the market for sick pay), and whether higher levels of sick 
pay lead workers to choose higher effort levels.  The main results are higher-risk workers 
do indeed select into contracts with higher sick pay rates, and they pay for this by getting 
lower wages and an overall worse deal than the low risk workers, higher sick pay leads to 
increased effort, but only in the case where the sick pay rate is freely-chosen, and the 
sick-pay market does not break down due to the adverse-selection problem.  
 
In sum, there are mixed results regarding the effect of imposing a minimum wage.  
Regarding sick pay, it appears it is possible (but perhaps not easy) to design systems 
where this is a useful policy intervention.. 
 
a) Brandts and Charness (2004) find that a mandated minimum wage was counter-
productive in terms of effort provision.  High wages were not offered nearly as frequently 
when this mandated minimum wage is present.   
 
b) On the other hand, Fehr, Falk, and Zehnder (2006) find that a minimum wage is 
potentially beneficial.  They find lasting positive consequences from the mandated 
minimum wage even after it has been removed, as firms higher wages after the removal 
than before it was imposed.  Owens and Kagel (2009) also find some beneficial effects 
from imposing a minimum wage, with Pareto improvements resulting for firms and 
workers  
 
c) Dürsch, Oechssler, and Vadovic (2008) and Bauernschuster, Dürsch, Oechssler, and 
Vadovic (2009) find results that on the whole show some promise for sick pay regulation. 
In the first paper, higher wage offers significantly increase effort choices (both with 
respect to sick pay and non-sick pay), but firms only benefit from offering sick pay when 
there is competition for workers.  In the second paper, workers with a greater likelihood 
of being “sick” select into contracts with higher sick pay rates, but at a cost in terms of 
wages.  Higher sick pay can result in increased effort in some circumstances, and the 
adverse selection problem does not destroy the sick-pay market.  
 
 
6. Do gift-exchange and social preferences map into the field? 
 
  A major question that labor economists might have concerning laboratory gift-
exchange results is the degree to which these mean anything in the field environment 
(external validity).  Two recent papers call into question the degree to which the social 
preferences exhibited in these experiments are robust or in competitive environments.  
On the other hand, a number of studies provide evidence that the social preferences 
identified in the laboratory map well into the real world.  
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  Gneezy and List (2006) investigate whether gift-exchange behavior persists over 
time in two real-effort tasks, one involving work in a library and the other involving 
door-to-door solicitation.  The mechanism for testing for reciprocity consists of the 
experimenters telling people that they will be receiving a certain piece rate for their work, 
but then announcing at the time of the six-hour task that in fact they will be paid a 
substantially higher piece rate.  The results are persuasive, particularly for the fundraising 
task: people do in fact work harder for the surprise pay, but this effect vanishes over the 
course of time.  Thus, these results constitute a cautionary note against applying the 
results of these laboratory experiments to the field environment.  However, one caveat is 
that these experiments only pertain to positive reciprocity, as even the lower advertised 
pay rate is above the alternative wage that the student workers would normally earn.  
Given the relative dearth of positive reciprocity in laboratory experiments, it may not be 
so surprising that positive reciprocity in these field experiments is fleeting.  
 
  Fershtman, Gneezy, and List (2009) present compelling evidence that social 
preferences are subject to framing effects and are not general to all environments.  They 
show that introducing a competitive frame to the environment crowds out social 
preferences in mini-dictator and trust games.  For example, 72.5% of dictators choose an 
(Own, Other) allocation of (8,8) instead of (11,2).  This is followed by a real-effort 
competition between the dictator and the recipient, where the (8,8) outcome is 
implemented if the recipient wins but the (11,2) outcome is implemented otherwise.  If 
the dictator really wanted the (8,8) split, the simple strategy would be to solve no 
problems; however, dictators contribute considerably more effort when solving more 
problems leads to higher own payoffs than when solving more problems doesn’t affect 
these payoffs (in the baseline condition).  Furthermore, in another treatment the (11,2) 
split is implemented if the dictator loses to the recipient, while otherwise the (8,8) split is 
implemented.  In this case, 85% of the dictators do nothing.  This result demonstrates that 
social preferences may not have much effect when competition is salient.   
 
Two other experiments present a different view than Gneezy and List (2006). 
Bellemare and Shearer (2009) conduct a field experiment that investigates worker 
responses to a monetary gift from their tree-planting firm using incentive contracts.  
Workers were told that they would receive a pay raise for one day.  Productivity on the 
day of the gift is compared with productivity on adjacent days, under similar planting 
conditions.  They find direct evidence of a significant and positive effect on daily planter 
productivity on the day of the gift, controlling for a variety of other possible factors.  
Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2006) conduct a field experiment involving a six-hour task 
in which the participants were told that they would presumably receive 15 Euro per hour; 
in three treatments, they were then paid either 10, 15, or 20 Euro per hour.  The main 
result is that there is little difference in performance in the treatments were people are 
paid either 15 or 20 Euro per hour, but that there is a strong, deleterious, and lasting 
effect on performance when people are paid less than the presumptive rate.  These results 
suggest that there is an asymmetry between positive and negative reciprocity in the field,   61
very much in line with the evidence found in laboratory experiments.  However, one 
caveat to these results is that the sample size is quite small.
77 
 
  There are two main threads of evidence suggesting that social preferences are 
linked to the general population and the workforce.  First, there are a number of non-
laboratory experiments in European nations that show that the basic behavioral patterns 
observed in fairness-related experiments with students also prevail in representative 
samples of the general population, with older cohorts generally being more reciprocal 
than younger cohorts.
78  Holm and Nystedt (2004) analyze behavior in the investment 
game, with people selected from a public database in Sweden.  While the average amount 
returned was similar for both cohorts, the proportions dispersed for the older responders, 
suggesting a greater degree of responsiveness to the environment.  Other studies 
conducted with representative surveys in Germany (Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, 
Schupp, and Wagner 2002) and the Netherlands (Bellemare and Kröger 2007) conclude 
that older cohorts are more generous as responders.  Falk and Zehnder (2006) find 
substantial evidence of social preferences in a sequential trust game conducted with 1,000 
residents of Zurich, also finding evidence of discrimination and in-group favoritism.  
Sutter and Kocher (2007) find that the elderly are more reciprocal, in a study with 
participants ranging from 8-year-old children to people in their late sixties.  In their study, 
trust increases from early childhood to early adulthood, but stays constant thereafter.  
Finally, Karlan (2005) finds that the amounts returned in a laboratory investment game 
conducted in Peru predict micro-finance loan payments a year after the experiment. 
 
The second thread involves studies that show a relationship between worker 
productivity and social preferences.  Barr and Serneels (2007) conducted a study with 
Ghanaian manufacturing workers.  They find that a measure of trustworthiness (the ratio 
of the amount returned to the amount sent) has a positive relationship with the wages 
paid, with these wages being used as a proxy for productivity.  This is particularly true 
with respect to the average trustworthiness in the workplace in question, although the 
direction of any causal relationship is unclear – are people more trustworthy because their 
wages are higher or vice versa?  They conclude that behavioral characteristics and 
corporate culture are major determinants of the productivity of the firm and the operation 
of the labor market.  Carpenter and Seki (forthcoming) conducted a series of experiments 
with local shrimp fisherman in Japan.  They used a laboratory public-goods game to 
measure social preferences and also obtained measures of fishing productivity.  The main 
finding is that there is a strong correlation between measured social preferences and 
productivity for the fisherman; a second finding is that social preferences grow with the 
degree to which team production is present in the fishing environment.  
 
                                                 
77 In a related study, Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2008) conduct a controlled field experiment that tests the 
extent to which cash and non-monetary gifts affect workers' productivity. The main result is that a non-
monetary gift leads to a significant and substantial increase in workers' productivity, while a cash gift of the 
same value is ineffective. 
78 Charness and Villeval (2009) also find that students are less cooperative than young workers, older 
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In sum, there is mixed evidence regarding the extent to which social preferences 
manifest in the field.  It is clear that these are not present in all environments, but there 
are a number of papers providing evidence from laboratory and field experiments, as well 
as work environments and surveys, that suggest that social preferences can be a factor in 
the field. 
 
a) Gneezy and List (2008) find positive reciprocity in the first three hours of field 
experiments, but not in the last three hours.  They interpret their results as indicating that 
social preferences are ephemeral. Similarly, Fershtman, Gneezy, and List (2009) use a 
clever design to show that social preferences are crowded out when a competitive game is 
played after an initial choice.  Clearly social preferences are not ubiquitous. 
 
b) However, other studies find rather different results.  Bellemare and Shearer (2009) 
present direct field-experimental evidence of a significant and positive effect on 
productivity on the day when a gift is given, controlling for a variety of other possible 
factors (yet it remains unclear how long such an effect will persist).  Kube, Maréchal, and 
Puppe (2006) use a design in a field experiment that can test for both positive and 
negative reciprocity.  In line with many experimental results, there is little evidence of 
positive reciprocity, but strong evidence of negative reciprocity when the pay rate is 
lower than what was anticipated.  
 
c) Survey evidence indicates that social preferences are linked to the general population 
and the workforce.  Holm and Nystedt (2004), Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, 
Schupp, and Wagner (2002), Bellemare and Kröger (2007), Falk and Zehnder (2006), 
Sutter and Kocher (2007), and Karlan (2005) provide such evidence from surveys in 
several European nations, as well as Peru.  In general, it seems to be that older people are 
more reciprocal than younger people, suggesting that this is a learned trait.  
 
d) There is also direct evidence from the work environment. Barr and Serneels (2007) 
find a relationship between worker productivity and social preferences for Ghanaian 
manufacturing workers.  Carpenter and Seki (forthcoming) observe a definite positive 
relationship between social preferences and productivity for shrimp fishermen in Japan, 
with said social preferences increasing to the extent that team production is present in the 





In this final subsection, we consider how communication can affect behavior in 
principal-agent relationships.  While it is true that other forms of social considerations 
such as distributional preferences and negative reciprocity are likely to lessen the 
applicability of the equilibrium contracts derived from standard theory, some studies 
demonstrate that communication can lead to better social outcomes than can be achieved 
with more standard social preferences.   
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Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) examine experimentally the impact of 
communication on trust and cooperation with hidden-action (moral hazard).  The 
principal has an outside option that (in the main treatment) gives (Principal, Agent) 
payoffs of (5,5); alternatively, the principal can leave matters up the agent, who chooses 
between (Principal, Agent) payoffs of (0, 14) and expected payoffs of (10, 10).
79  With 
standard preferences, the agent would choose (0, 14), so that the principal will choose 
(5,5).  In fact, there are substantial rates of cooperation even in the absence of 
communication, but the likelihood of the (10, 10) expected outcome increases from 20% 
to 50%.  Furthermore, this increase is almost entirely driven by free-form and 
endogenous promises (statements of intent) by the agent to behave cooperatively.  The 
evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid 
guilt.  When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence 
motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs.  Charness and Dufwenberg 
argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in a 
variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language and social norms in 
these contexts. 
 
Brandts and Cooper (2007) study manager-worker interactions in an environment 
where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the lowest effort 
level chosen by any worker determines the overall production.  One treatment 
investigates the effect of increased incentives (the marginal benefit of coordinating on a 
higher effort level increases substantially) on worker behavior, while a second treatment 
allows the manager to communicate via chat with the workers.  It turns out that 
communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for improving 
coordination on high effort levels.  An analysis of the content of communication indicates 
that the most effective communication strategy is to request high effort, pointing out the 
mutual benefits of high effort.  Thus, direct financial incentives have some benefit in 
terms of coordination, but messages are the better strategy if one cannot choose both. 
 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2009) investigate the impact of communication on 
trust and cooperation with hidden-information (adverse selection).  There are two 
possible agent ability levels, with a 1/3 chance that an agent will have high ability.  The 
principal has an outside option or can leave matters up the agent.  There are two main 
cases.  In the first, there are possible Pareto-improvements over the outside option for 
both types of agents.  In the second case, there is no feasible Pareto-improvement for the 
low-ability agent.  While the standard game-theoretic prediction is for the principal to 
choose the outside option in both cases, the authors find a dramatically different effect of 
free-form communication from the agent to the principal in these two cases.  When a 
Pareto-improvement is feasible with a low-ability agent, communication doubles the rate 
at which the low-ability agent sacrifices money to help the principal. However, 
communication has no effect in the alternative case.  The difference is driven by the fact 
that many messages in the first treatment confess that the agent has low ability, but that 
he or she will choose the Pareto-improvement over the selfish option.  Charness and 
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Dufwenberg conclude that is good policy to offer lower-ability workers an opportunity to 
participate in a socially-beneficial outcome, as they are likely to behave cooperatively. 
In sum, while experiments on cheap talk have been conducted for over 20 years, 
some recent work has applied such nonbinding pre-pay communication in clear principal-
agent environments.  This is a very promising area for both future research and policy .   
a) Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises (statements of intent) by the agent 
to behave cooperatively are very effective in achieving optimal social outcomes in a 
hidden-action (moral hazard) setting, where the standard prediction is a total lack of 
cooperation.  The evidence supports the notion of guilt aversion, where people striving to 
avoid guilt stemming from disappointing the expectations of others.  
 
b) Charness and Dufwenberg (2009) also find that promises are effective in a hidden-
information (adverse selection) environment, but only when less-able agents can 
participate in a Pareto-improvement in material payoffs.  A potential policy application is 
to offer lower-ability workers an opportunity to participate in a socially-beneficial 
outcome, as they are likely to behave cooperatively. 
 
c) Brandts and Cooper (2007) find the striking result that coordination on higher effort is 
facilitated more by communication between a manger and the workers than by increased 
incentives.  Communication about the mutual benefits of high effort is particularly 
valuable.  Thus, while direct financial incentives may be somewhat useful, 
communication in a team-production environment is even more so. 
 
V:  More Lab Labor:  Bargaining, Search, Markets, and Discrimination 
1. Bargaining, Strikes and Arbitration 
 
The bilateral bargaining problem --how a surplus is divided between two players-- 
has a long and rich history in economic theory, dating back at least to Nash’s (1950, 
1953) contributions to co-operative and non-cooperative bargaining, and important 
subsequent developments such as Rubinstein (1982).
80  Experimental studies of 
bargaining also have a long history, both in psychology (see for example Deutsch and 
Krauss 1960) and economics (Siegel and Fouraker 1960).  Roth (1995) reviews the 
experimental economics literature on bargaining up to that point, much of which aims to 
test predictions of the Nash, Rubinstein and related models.  As already noted, a well 
known and robust result of these tests is that bargaining outcomes in the lab are not well 
described by perfect equilibria of games between rational, selfish agents; behavior is 
often highly suggestive of social preferences among the bargainers.  
 
Given these early laboratory findings, it is perhaps not surprising that much of the 
more recent experimental bargaining literature has attempted to understand the nature of 
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apparent other-regarding preferences in bargaining situations; this is typically done using 
extremely simple bargaining games (such as the ultimatum and dictator games) where 
there are fewer confounding factors, including strategic considerations, that might also 
affect outcomes.  Recent examples of this approach include Charness and Rabin 2002, 
Andreoni, Castillo and Petrie 2003; and Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003; for reviews 
see Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (2008) and Murnighan (2008).  Other aspects of the 
bargaining problem that have been examined using laboratory experiments since Roth’s 
review include the effects of gender and other demographic differences (Eckel and 
Grossman 1997, Holm and Engseld 2005); of cultural differences (Chen and Tang  2009); 
stakes (Slonim and Roth 1998, Cameron 1999,  Munier and Costin 2002); risk aversion 
and beliefs (Dickinson 2009); deadlines (Sterbenz, Phillips and Owen 2001; Gneezy, 
Haruvy and Roth 2003; Guth, Levati and  Maciejovsky 2005); incomplete information 
(Guth, Huck and Ockenfels 1996); face-to-face interaction (Ockenfels and Selten 2000); 
delegation (Schotter, Zheng and Snyder 2000); “hot” versus “cold” decisionmaking 
(Brosig, Weimann and Yang 2003); communication (Brosig, Weimann and Yang 2004; 
Croson, Boles and Murnighan 2003); self-serving biases (Babcock and Loewenstein 
1997); outside options (Carpenter and Rudisill 2003) and situations involving  bargaining 
among more than two players (Fréchette, Kagel and Morelle 2005; Charness, Corominas-
Bosch and Frechette 2007).     
While the above bargaining models and experiments were motivated and framed 
in a variety of ways (including relatively abstract frames, or as buyer-seller interactions), 
labor economists have found them of primary interest for the light they might shed on 
union-firm negotiations.
81  In particular, labor economists have used formal bargaining 
models and laboratory experiments to shed light on (a) the determination of disputes 
(strikes, lockouts, holdouts) and (b) on mechanisms –in particular, arbitration-- that are 
designed to reduce the costs of such disputes.
82  We consider these two applications of 
bargaining theory and experiments in turn below.   
While economists have been discussing the determinants of strikes since Hicks 
(1932) stated his famous ‘paradox’ (if parties can forecast the bargaining outcome after a 
strike they can always do better to settle on that outcome immediately without a strike), 
theoretical and experimental analysis of strikes by economists did not begin in earnest 
until the advent of asymmetric information models of bargaining, which produced 
disputes such as strikes as equilibrium outcomes.  Early theoretical contributions of this 
nature include Hayes (1984); Kennan (1987) provided an early review of the ‘economics 
of strikes’.  Since then, Sopher’s (1990) laboratory experiment tested the simple “joint 
cost” theory that strikes will be less common when their social cost to the bargainers is 
higher in a shrinking pie bargaining game.  Forsythe, Kennan and Sopher (1991) studied 
‘strikes’ in similar games with one-sided private information.  Consistent with other 
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laboratory bargaining experiments, they found that agents often forgo rewards in order to 
inflict punishments, and engage in other apparently fairness-driven behavior.  In (1991b) 
the same authors describe a symmetric-information experiment.  Kennan and Wilson 
(1993) review the literature on bargaining under asymmetric information up to that point, 
including the contributions of lab experiments. Since then, a few papers have used simple 
models of bargaining and laboratory experiments to address an old question in industrial 
relations: the effects of centralized versus decentralized bargaining on strikes and other 
outcomes (Berninghaus, Güth and Keser, 2001, 2003; Tournadre and Villeval 2004).
83   
 
  The aspect of bargaining on which labor economists and others have conducted 
the largest number of laboratory experiments is not strikes per se, but the effectiveness of 
dispute resolution (i.e. arbitration) mechanisms in encouraging bargaining and reducing 
disputes.  In at least one way this is not surprising, as arbitration is a classic example of 
mechanism design, and a laboratory experiment is a natural way to ‘pre-test’ a 
mechanism under ideal conditions to see if it has a reasonable chance of functioning as 
predicted in the field.
84  In addition, there is of course considerable policy interest in the 
design of arbitration mechanisms that encourage (efficient) settlements and minimize the 
use of the mechanism itself (especially in view of Crawford’s 1979 dictum that the best 
arbitration system is one that is never used).  Thus, the evaluation of arbitration 
mechanisms is one area where laboratory research by labor economists has already been 
successful in influencing economic policy.   
 
  While laboratory experiments testing different arbitration (and other forms of 
third-party intermediation) systems have a long history in psychology (see for example 
Johnson and Tullar 1972), the earliest experiment on arbitration by economists of which 
we are aware (Farber and Bazerman 1986) is noteworthy for its methodology in view of 
current debates in economics about the lab ‘versus’ the field:  Farber and Bazerman 
essentially conduct what is now called an (unpaid) ‘artefactual’ field experiment by 
confronting professional labor arbitrators with hypothetical cases and asking them to 
choose a settlement under different arbitration schemes.  Since then, economists have 
performed a multitude of experiments evaluating different arbitration schemes, most of 
them ‘traditional’ laboratory experiments, such as Ashenfelter, Currie, Farber and Spiegel 
(1992).   
 
  A key question addressed in early experimental studies was the differential effects 
of conventional arbitration (where the arbitrator can impose any settlement he feels is 
‘fair’) versus final-offer arbitration (where the arbitrator is constrained to choose either 
the firm’s or the union’s final offer).  In line with its proponents’ expectations, early 
laboratory experiments (e.g. Notz and Starke 1978, Starke and Notz 1981, Neale and 
Bazerman 1983) tended to find that final-offer arbitration encouraged more pre-
arbitration settlement. These results were strongly rejected by Ashenfelter, Currie, Farber 
                                                 
83 Non-experimental studies of strikes motivated by asymmetric information bargaining models include 
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84 Labor economists have also been active in the use of field data to study the effects of arbitration; see for 
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and Spiegel (1992), who –unlike earlier treatments—provide bargainers with information 
about past arbitrator decisions in the same scenario (in their experiment, a list of random 
draws from the same distribution).  Since then, Ashenfelter et al.’s main experimental 
results have been confirmed by Dickinson (2004, 2005) and Deck and Farmer (2003).  
Deck & Farmer (2007) and Deck, Farmer & Zeng (2007) further show that this result is 
robust to uncertainty over the final value of the quantity bargained over.  Additionally to 
the credit of conventional arbitration, Kritikos (2006) finds that final-offer arbitration 
pushes parties to an equal split of the pie 80% of the time, which he interprets as an 
unnatural distortion of bargaining.   
 
  In addition to conventional versus final-offer arbitration, laboratory experiments 
have been used to study the effects of the following dispute-resolution mechanisms:  tri-
offer arbitration (an amendment to final-offer arbitration where the arbitrator can also 
choose a third option provided by an outside ‘fact finder’); combined arbitration (which 
imposes final offer arbitration when the arbitrator’s ‘fair’ settlement lies between the 
parties’ final offers, and conventional arbitration otherwise); and other schemes known as 
double-offer arbitration, amended-final-offer arbitration, and automated negotiation.  
Providing a full description of these results is beyond the scope of the current paper.  A 
recent review, however, is available in Kuhn (2009).  By pointing the reader towards this 
large literature, we hope instead simply  to provide an example of a ‘success story’ for 
laboratory experiments in labor economics:  The use of the lab as a testing ground for 
dispute-resolution mechanisms in labor markets has yielded results of interest not only to 
readers of Econometrica, but also to policymakers who are faced with the real problem of 
designing dispute-resolution mechanisms, especially in public-sector labor markets where 
strikes are prohibited by law.  This is clearly a case where ‘lab labor’ has already passed 




  Labor economists have been using sequential search models to interpret field data 
on unemployment durations since at least Lippman and McCall’s classic survey (1976a, 
b).  Search theory also plays an important motivational and interpretive role in field 
experiments on the determinants of unemployment, such as those conducted on 
unemployment insurance recipients in Illinois and other states.  These studies randomly 
exposed job searchers to re-employment bonuses and to job search assistance programs, 
and assessed workers’ responses in light of job search theory.  Such field experiments 
have produced useful results regarding the likely effects on workers’ job search behavior 
and other outcomes of making very specific policy changes to existing UI programs.  
Excellent reviews are available in Meyer (1995, 1996).
85   
 
This said, both the field experiments and econometric studies of job search and 
unemployment durations discussed above are probably better suited to evaluating the 
effects of specific policy changes in specific markets than to testing the most basic 
predictions of sequential job-search models; indeed many of the estimated effects of 
policy changes are just as consistent with simple labor-supply models (e.g. Moffitt and 
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Nicholson 1982) as they are with the search paradigm.  The history of laboratory 
experiments on search, however, focuses much more on the decision processes of 
individual searchers, and on assessing whether these are consistent with the rules derived 
from search-theoretic optimization.  Given the significant role still played by search 
models in interpreting microeconomic studies of unemployment and other durations, and 
in general equilibrium and macroeconomic studies of the labor market, laboratory search 
experiments make an important, but distinct contribution to the economics of labor 
market search.  
 
To our knowledge the first economists to conduct laboratory search experiments 
were Schotter and Braunstein (1981, 1982).
86  Subjects engaged in search for a wage 
drawn at random from a known distribution (either rectangular or triangular), where each 
draw from the distribution cost the subject c.  In the baseline treatment, subjects could 
take as many draws as they wished, and could accept any of the offers they had received 
(i.e. there was unlimited recall of past offers).  Optimal search theory has strong and well-
known predictions in this situation –including the fact that the optimal strategy is a 
constant reservation wage-- and the authors were interested in comparing subjects’ actual 
behavior to these predictions.     
 
In many ways, the subjects’ behavior conformed to theory quite closely.  The 
authors elicited reservation wages by asking workers to bid for the right to search; these 
reservation wages were, on average, very close to the theoretical optimum for a risk-
neutral searcher.  Actual search behavior conformed to these elicited reservation wages.  
Subjects responded to increased search costs and to a mean-preserving spread of the 
wage distribution as predicted.  This said, two interesting anomalies were identified.  
First, in violation of the theoretical predictions, reservation wages were not constant over 
time—they fell.  (Since reservation wages were optimal at the start of a search spell, this 
meant that, on average, subjects did not search long enough).  Second, when the subjects 
were asked to describe their search strategy, most subjects reported that their strategy had 
two components:  (a) a reservation wage, and (b) a maximum number of searches they 
would conduct.  It is tempting to conclude that the latter aspect of the subjects’ self-
reported strategies explains the falling reservation wage in Schotter and Braunstein’s 
results.   
 
Hey (1982) conducted search experiments similar to Schotter and Braunstein’s, 
(infinite horizon, full recall, constant cost per offer) though in Hey’s case the context was 
consumer search, and subjects did not know what distribution the offers were drawn from 
(it was normal in practice).  Despite this, over 40% of subjects stopped searching with the 
first price below the theoretically optimal reservation price.  Hey’s study is however most 
interesting for the methodological innovation (in economics) of protocol analysis in 
which the subjects are asked to report their thinking during the session out loud, and their 
words are recorded.  It is interesting to compare these self-reported strategies to the 
predictions of theory.  Interestingly, while only a small minority reported a pure 
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reservation-wage strategy, many of the rule-of-thumb strategies described by the subjects 
performed well, both as (sometimes imperfectly) implemented by the agents themselves 
and as mechanically played by a computer against the price distribution in the 
experiment.  Hey’s paper thus illustrates another potential advantage of laboratory 
experiments—the ability to acquire information about strategies more directly than 
inferring them from choice behavior alone, which can often present serious econometric 
challenges in both the field and the lab.     
 
  During the next decade, a number of laboratory experiments explored the 
predictions of search theory under various scenarios, including a finite horizon (Cox and 
Oaxaca 1989, 1992), variable search intensity (Harrison and Morgan 1990), and search 
from unknown wage distributions (Cox and Oaxaca 2000).  Like most of these studies, 
Sonnemans (1998) finds that, while overall search efficiency is high (subjects stopped 
optimally in more than 60 percent of cases), subjects stop searching too early on average; 
risk aversion cannot fully account for this.  Sonnemans elicits information about subjects’ 
strategies in two ways (apart from their search behavior): one is their use of an electronic 
information board, which gave subjects information about various aspects of their own 
past experience, including the number of draws, the highest bid to date, total costs and 
earnings to date, etc.  It seems reasonable to infer that if a subject consulted this 
information, it was an input into their strategy.  Second, after conducting a sequential 
search, subjects were asked to conduct another search using the strategy method:  they 
chose what explicit instructions to give to the computer, which conducted the search on 
their behalf.
87  Interestingly, only 22% of such strategies were of the pure reservation 
wage form, and a minority of these picked an optimal wage close to the optimal level.  A 
significant share of such strategies had a satisficing property of stopping when total 
earnings exceeded a threshold.   
 
  More recent laboratory experiments on search include Carbone and Hey (2004), 
who study the excess sensitivity of consumption to income often noted in macroeconomic 
data; they find that subjects also over-react when facing similar problems in the lab and 
argue that agents’ limited ability to plan ahead may help explain this phenomenon. 
Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg (2006) explore the ability of a specific model 
of limited rationality --directed cognition—to account for laboratory evidence in search 
problems, finding that the directed cognition model better matches the lab evidence 
whenever its predictions diverge from full rationality.  Schunk (2009) considers instead 
the ability of reference point updating (in a model where subjects are assumed to care 
about the total net earnings –including those that are sunk-- from the search) and loss-
aversion to explain behavior in a laboratory search problem.  As in many previous 
studies, on average Schunk’s subjects end their search too soon; he argues that a model in 
which a subset of agents use suboptimal strategies that depend in part on sunk costs 
accounts well for this phenomenon.  Additional results in Schunk and Winter (2009) 
support the claim that ‘early stopping’ is related to loss aversion, rather than, for 
example, simple risk aversion.   
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  The most recent paper to address the ‘early stopping’/declining reservation wage 
phenomenon in the lab is Brown, Flinn and Schotter (forthcoming).  Like other authors, 
they find sharply declining reservation wages over time.
88  By comparing subjects’ 
behavior in a treatment where offers arrive at a fixed rate but with stochastic cost to one 
where the time between offers is random but there are no search costs, the authors are 
able to distinguish hypotheses (such as Schunk and Winter’s loss-aversion model) in 
which searchers respond to accumulating search costs from a competing scenario in 
which the subjective costs of searching rise sharply over time.  They find that rising 
subjective search costs play a more important role, and argue that the behavioral factors 
they identify in the lab may help explain the phenomenon of declining reservation wages 
and/or increasing re-employment hazards in field data.  Alternatively, laboratory 
subjects’ rapidly rising time costs may simply reflect some students’ short-term 
scheduling commitments outside the economics laboratory that are not relevant to real-
world job searches.   
 
  In sum, laboratory experiments on search have, to date, focused almost 
exclusively on the ‘partial equilibrium’ question of choices by individuals facing an 
exogenously given wage distribution.
89  In doing so, laboratory experiments have 
exploited the strengths of that methodology, which include the ability to compare 
behavior to the exact numerical predictions of a theoretical model, and the ability to study 
the searchers’ strategies in a dynamic choice situation more directly than attempting to 
infer strategies from choice histories alone.  The main findings of the literature are that, 
while (especially early in the search process) many subjects behave as if  they pursued a 
theoretically optimal strategy, subjects tend to search too little overall, with falling 
reservation wages and rising acceptance hazards over time.  In addition, a majority of 
subjects report that their strategies depended on factors other than the highest offer 
received (including total earnings in the search), and indeed selected such strategies when 
required to play the game using the strategy method.  Playing such strategies did not cost 
subjects much in the search situations examined in the lab, but this does not imply that 
such strategies are not costly in other environments, including some that are encountered 
in the real world.  Ongoing research continues to attempt to understand these ‘anomalies’ 
in the light of different behavioral models.  What remains unclear is to what extent these 
anomalies help shed light on job search in real labor markets.  Still, the notion that, even 
under ideal laboratory conditions, subjects systematically choose search strategies that 
are suboptimal in a particular way, raises interesting hypotheses for research using field 
data, and for structural models of job search.    
 
 
3. Labor Markets 
 
It is probably fair to say that the vast majority of existing labor market experiments 
focus on interactions between a single ‘firm’ and ‘worker’, whose payoffs if they choose 
not to interact are exogenously set by the experimenter.  That said, as mentioned in 
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Section II.2, experimenters have sometimes implemented various forms of markets in 
which workers compete for jobs (and/or firms compete for workers) in the lab.  These 
papers fall into two main categories, the first of which –the ‘market design’ papers—
studies the effects of different institutional mechanisms on labor market performance.  
The focus here is typically on thin markets where match quality matters a lot, as in the 
markets for professional workers.  Worker effort decisions are typically not considered.  
The second group of papers is primarily interested in the effects of contractual 
incompleteness regarding worker effort on the functioning of labor markets.   
 
a) Market design:  
 
  One highly successful set of laboratory experiments on labor markets forms part 
of a larger literature that is sometimes referred to as ‘market design’ (for a recent survey 
and assessment, see Roth 2008).  This literature draws on a combination of economic 
theory, market case studies, computation, field experiments and lab experiments to 
compare the performance of different forms of decentralized market mechanisms and 
centralized clearinghouses (the latter often designed by the researcher) for specific goods.  
Markets that have been studied in this literature include airport landing rights (Grether, 
Isaac and Plott 1981; Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin 1982); college admissions (Roth and 
Sotomayor 1989); sorority rushes (Mongell and Roth 1991); macroeconomic risks 
(Shiller 1993); newly privatized firms in transition economies (Svejnar and Singer 1994); 
postseason college football bowls (Roth and Xing 1994); radio spectrum licenses 
(McMillan 1994); space shuttle payload priorities (Ledyard, Porter, and Wessen 2000); 
student housing (Chen and Sonmez 2002);  electric power (Wilson 2002); internet 
auctions (Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth 2005); human kidneys (Roth, Sonmez and Unver 
2007); and admissions to New York City high schools (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth 
2009).  Laboratory experiments play an important role in this literature, both in testing 
hypotheses about particular market mechanisms and in comparing the mechanisms’ 
performance; one lab experiment in this area that may be of particular interest to labor 
economists is Chen and Sonmez’s (2006) study of school choice mechanisms.    
 
  Labor markets that have been studied in the ‘market design’ literature include 
those for American physicians (Roth 1984, 1986; Roth and Peranson 1999); baseball 
players (Nalbantian and Schotter 1995); clinical psychologists (Roth and Xing 1997); 
British physicians (Kagel and Roth 2000); gastroenterologists (Niederle and Roth 2003; 
McKinney, Niederle and Roth, 2005); and law clerks (Haruvy, Roth, and Unver 2006; 
Avery, Jolls, Posner and Roth 2007).  Of these labor market studies, Nalbantian and 
Schotter (1995); Kagel and Roth (2000); McKinney, Niederle and Roth (2005) and 
Haruvy, Roth and Unver (2006) all use laboratory experiments as at least part of their 
research design.
90  Key issues studied in these investigations include the causes of 
‘unraveling’ that is observed in some markets (e.g. for law clerks) where offers are made 
so early that little information is available about candidates, and devices that effectively 
ensure enough market thickness to allow for efficient matching.     
 
                                                 
90 Recent examples of laboratory experiments with applications to two-sided matching markets include 
Niederle and Roth (2009) and Niederle, Roth, and Unver (2009).   72
  Lab experiments play a number of roles in the above studies of labor markets, one 
of which is to isolate the effects of different institutional changes that cannot be identified 
in field data, because they co-vary in the field (for example, Niederle and Roth 2009 use 
the lab to disentangle the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances).  While 
this could in principle be done in a field experiment, the time, expense, and ethical 
barriers involved place strict limits on the amount of experimental manipulation that can 
be done.  In contrast, after cross-validating the lab and field in a baseline case, one can 
quickly and cheaply compare many design permutations in the lab.  Market designers are 
also interested in the robustness of market mechanisms to large potential swings in 
demand and supply (McKinney, Niederle, Muriel and Roth 2005); in most cases these 
cannot be practically (or ethically) manipulated in a field experiment.  A final role of lab 
experiments is simply to provide a level of detail on how individual actions change, for 
example during transition between market regimes, that is unavailable in field data 
(Kagel and Roth 2000).   
 
In sum, the literature on market design, like the arbitration literature, is another 
economics ‘success story’, where economic theory combined with a carefully chosen set 
of research methods including lab experiments has created institutions that improve the 
process of economic exchange in the real world.
91  This includes some labor markets, 
especially for professionals --where markets are thin and match quality is arguably highly 
heterogeneous-- and some allocation problems in education (such as school admissions) 
that are of considerable interest to labor economists.   
 
b)  Contractual Incompleteness and Labor Markets 
 
  While the vast majority of laboratory experiments on principal-agent interactions 
incorporate labor markets in only the most minimal of senses (as noted, the experimenter 
typically fixes the two parties’ outside options, usually at zero), it is noteworthy that one 
of the earliest papers to demonstrate the importance of social preferences in principal-
agent interactions (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993) included an explicit labor market, 
and was explicitly interested in the effect of social preferences on the nature of labor 
market equilibrium.  As already noted, this experiment modeled the labor market as a 
one-sided auction in which firms posted contract offers to all workers in the session.  A 
main result was that these markets failed to clear when effort was not contractible: firms 
posted above-market-clearing wages because these wages elicited more effort than 
market-clearing wages.  Firms that tried to underbid such wages did poorly due to 
workers’ endogenous effort responses; equilibrium unemployment resulted.  This result is 
evocative of Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) well known model of involuntary 
unemployment, though the mechanism (reciprocity by workers) is different from the 
disciplinary dismissals that are central to Shapiro and Stiglitz’s model.   
 
  Since FKR 1993, the most influential paper on the effects of contractual 
incompleteness on the nature of market interactions is probably Brown, Falk and Fehr 
(2004).  This experimental paper is framed as a set of repeated interactions between firms 
and workers and generates, in our view, a set of results that may significantly influence 
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how labor economists conceptualize labor markets.  In BFF’s experiments, ten workers 
interacted with seven firms over fifteen trading periods.  Each trading period had two 
stages:  a market for contracts, followed by the exchange of effort for pay in contracts 
that had been concluded.  In all cases, the market for contracts was, again, a one-sided 
auction:  firms posted offers (consisting of a wage, a desired effort level, and the firm’s 
ID number), which could be accepted or rejected by workers.  Once a firm’s offer was 
accepted by a worker, both the firm and worker were removed from the market for that 
trading period.  Importantly, firms could make both private and public offers:  private 
offers were only conveyed to the worker with whom the firm wanted to trade.   
 
  Under the above conditions, BFF compared two main experimental conditions:  
under complete contracts (C), the firm’s required effort level was automatically 
implemented (by the computer) if a worker accepted a contract.  Under incomplete 
contracts (ICF), this third party enforcement of desired effort levels was absent.
92  In both 
treatments, firms only observe the (current and past) effort levels of their ‘own’ workers.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, BFF find that under complete contracts, markets resemble the 
textbook case: contract offers are public, long-term relations between firms and workers 
are absent, trading parties seem to be indifferent to their partners’ identities, and rent 
sharing is driven toward the competitive equilibrium (where firms retain all the surplus).  
Under incomplete contracts, successful exchange is usually initiated by a generous 
contract offer that a worker reciprocates with a high effort level.  After that, firms 
repeatedly seek out the same worker with a private offer.  Rents are shared in these long-
term bilateral relationships, which are disciplined by the threat of non-renewal.   The 
result, rather than a classically competitive market, is a market where bilateral monopoly 
emerges endogenously once the employment relationship has been established, a change 
described eloquently by Williamson (1985) as the “fundamental transformation”.   
 
In many ways, the labor markets that emerge under BFF’s ICF condition are 
much more familiar to today’s workers than a ‘classical’ labor market:  Workers invest in 
their reputations early in their careers by working hard; this reputation is (rationally) 
rewarded by their employer by continuing employment at a ‘good’ wage; both parties’ 
actions are disciplined by the (rational) fear that their contract will not be renewed if they 
do not continue to cooperate by providing ‘fair’ levels of wages and effort.  For the latter 
reason, BFF’s results are thus more directly supportive (than FKR 1993) of Shapiro and 
Stiglitz’s (1984) model where disciplinary dismissals generate equilibrium 
unemployment.  In sum, BFF (2004) show very elegantly that if contractual 
incompleteness plays an important role in firm-worker interactions, the correct theoretical 
model of labor market equilibrium may not be the competitive one we are used to, nor 
one of the several interesting equilibrium search models that have been developed in the 
past two decades (e.g., Mortensen and Pissaridies 1994), but one in which reciprocity and 
bilateral monopoly play important roles.   
 
                                                 
92 This condition is labeled ICF because workers’ ID numbers were fixed throughout the entire session (as 
they were in the C condition).  This allowed firms to target their offers to specific workers (presumably to a 
worker who had provided high effort in the past), and distinguishes it from an “ICR” treatment where 
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  A number of interesting variations on BFF’s (2004) design have yielded 
additional insights.  Perhaps the most obvious such variation is replacing the excess 
supply of workers by an excess supply of firms (Brown, Falk and Fehr 2008).  
Interestingly, long-term employment relationships still emerge, in which firms pay 
workers above the going market rate and workers reciprocate with higher effort.  Market 
performance remains high, suggesting that unemployment is not required to enforce high 
effort levels, though long-term relationships are less frequent than in the excess-worker 
case.  Falk, Huffman and Macleod (2008) consider the effects of two institutions  -- 
dismissal barriers and bonus pay—in the BFF (2004) model.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given the important disciplining role of contract renewal risk, legislated dismissal 
barriers, lead to large reductions in equilibrium effort and market efficiency.  Giving 
firms the option to reward high effort with bonus pay, however, offsets much of these 
inefficiencies; interestingly, the resulting equilibrium exhibits many fewer long-term 
relationships.
93   
 
  So far, all the papers in this subsection have considered the effects of hidden 
actions (effort choices) on the functioning of labor markets.  We therefore conclude by 
noting a number of papers that have considered the effects of hidden information 
(adverse selection) on market equilibrium in the laboratory as well.  Interestingly, 
experimental studies of signaling and screening models have quite a long history, dating 
back at least to Miller and Plott (1985).  These papers may not be familiar to labor 
economists since they are typically cast in the context of markets for insurance 
(especially in the screening case), or product quality (signaling).  For a recent 
experimental study of both signaling and screening that is cast in a labor market context, 
and that reviews the earlier experimental literature, see Kübler, Müller, and Normann 
(2008).  Other recent experiments that have considered the effects of hidden information 
(about worker ability) in the presence of labor markets are Cabrales, Charness and 
Villeval (2006) and Charness, Kuhn and Villeval (2008).   
 
 
4. Gender, Race and Discrimination:  Insights from the Lab 
 
  The existence of discrimination and its effect on employment and wages is a 
major topic in labor economics.  Discrimination is typically considered with respect to 
gender or ethnic considerations, but may also be relevant in relation to attractiveness.
94  A 
                                                 
93 Two other papers that insert new variations into repeated experimental labor markets similar to 
BFF(2004) are Healy (2007) and Schram, Brandts, and Gerxhani (2007).  Healy considers the ability of 
group reputations to substitute for individual reputations; Schram, Brandts and Gerxhani ask what happens 
when firms can see workers’ past effort levels at other firms when bilateral contracts are negotiated.   
94 Discrimination may be based on bias or due to accurate perceptions about differences in ability or other 
characteristics across groups.  While we do not discuss this at length in this section, there is experimental 
evidence in this regard.  For example, Fryer, Goeree & Holt (2005) have “green” and purple” workers with 
different “investment costs”.  Investment improves chance worker does well on pre-employment test; this is 
observed by firm, who can hire either green (lower cost) or purple.  Green workers were hired substantially 
more often. 
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fundamental issue is how to ameliorate concerns such as the male-female wage gap and 
racial disadvantage.  Can policies such as affirmative action be effective or are these 
likely to be counter-productive?  Once again, it is possible to focus specifically on these 




One of the puzzles in labor economics is the gender-wage gap.  Even though the 
provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority for decades, 
large gender differences prevail in competitive high-ranking positions.  Why do women 
receive less pay than men?  Some of this may stem a difference in a taste for negotiation.  
For example, Babcock and Laschever (2003) suggest that women are more likely to 
shrink from negotiation, potentially costing themselves thousands of dollars in not asking 
for promotions or in choosing career paths that don’t involve negotiation.  Another factor 
may be a difference in risk aversion: Charness and Gneezy (2009) find a very consistent 
result across a number of experimental studies is that women are more financially risk 
averse than men.  Related to this point, Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008) offer 
participants a choice of a hard or an easy task, finding gender differences in seeking 
challenges: Men choose the hard task about 50 percent more frequently than women, 
independent of performance level. 
 
Stereotypical attitudes towards female workers may well be at the heart of 
discriminatory gender-based compensation.   Schwieren (2003) considers the issue of 
why women receive lower pay for comparable work in a gift-exchange experiment in 
which each firm knows whether workers are male or female.  She adapts the double-
auction format from Fehr and Falk (1999), with 4 firms and 6 workers in each session.  
Each group of workers in a session was all-female or all-male, as was each group of firms 
in a session; she varied whether male workers were paired with male or female workers 
and vice versa.  The results are striking, in that female workers receive significantly 
lower wages than male workers, even when women are in the role of the firm.  But this 
doesn’t pay for firms, as a high discrepancy between the wage requested and the wage 
offered leads to low effort.  The results suggest that stereotypes are the driving force, 
rather than statistical discrimination.  Women also learn that they cannot successfully ask 
for high wages and reduce their bids over the course of a session. 
 
The main thrust of experimental research on gender differences in performance is 
based on the notion that women are less inclined to compete. The first experiment to 
demonstrate this point is Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003), who find that women 
appear to be less effective than men in competitive environments, despite the fact that 
their performance is similar to that of males when the environment is competitive.  The 
experimental task was solving mazes, with six people in each session.  In one treatment, 
people were paid two units for each maze solved; in a second treatment, where there were 
three men and three women in a session, the person who solved the most mazes received 
12 units for each solved maze; the final treatment was identical to the second, except that   76
there were either six men or six women in each session.
95  There is a definite 
performance gap across gender in tournaments, even though there is no significant 
difference in performance across gender in the non-competitive treatment.  This is driven 
by an increase in men’s performance in the tournament, as women’s performance does 
not differ across the tournament and piece-rate cases.  Furthermore, the effect is more 
pronounced when women compete against men than when women compete against 
women, as men’s tournament performance does not differ according to gender 
composition, while women’s tournament performance in the same-sex treatment is 
significantly higher than in the piece-rate condition. 
 
This result is confirmed in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), a field experiment with 
school children (aged 9-10) in Israel.  The performance measure was the time needed to 
run 40 meters.  Each child first ran alone; the teacher then matched the students in pairs, 
with the two fastest children paired, then the next two fastest children paired, etc.   The 
children in each pair then ran along side each other.  The times in the first task were very 
similar for boys and girls; however, there were significant gender differences in the 
change in times from the first run to the second.  When girls ran with other girls, the time 
actually increased slightly; however, the opposite effect was observed when boys ran 
with other girls.  In mixed pairs, the reduction in time for boys was much larger than the 
reduction in time for girls.   
 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) provide evidence that women “shy away” from 
competition in a task involving adding up sets of five two-digit numbers.  In stage 1, 
participants performed this task under a non-competitive piece-rate scheme, and then 
performed the task in a four-person tournament in stage 2.  In stage 3, people then chose 
whether they wished to choose the piece-rate scheme or the tournament (in the latter case, 
they competed against the performance of the other group members in stage 2).  There 
are no significant differences in performance across gender, yet men select the 
tournament in stage 3 more than twice as frequently (73% versus 35%) as do women.  
This difference in rates remains significant even when differences in risk attitudes are 
taken into account.  The authors conclude: “…the tournament entry gap is driven by men 
being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a 
competition. The result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it.” 
(p. 1067). 
 
Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2009) perform field experiments (involving tossing a 
tennis ball into a bucket) in Tanzania and India.  People chose whether they wished to be 
paid by a piece-rate scheme or to participate in a two-person tournament.  The Maasai 
society in Tanzania is a patriarchal society while the Khasi society in India is matrilineal.  
The results in the patriarchal society correspond closely to the results in Western cultures, 
as the Maasai men choose to compete about twice as frequently as do the Maasai women.  
However, it is quite interesting that the comparison across gender goes in the opposite 
direction in the matrilineal society.  Their results strongly suggest that it may be 
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differences in culture, rather than inherent genetic traits, that drive the results observed in 
previous experiments.  
 
Two other experiments consider the context of the environment in relation to 
gender differences in risk-taking and in choosing to compete.  Booth and Nolen (2009a) 
conduct an experiment in which participants choose between a risky gamble and a certain 
one, with the expected value of the risky gamble being higher than that of the certain 
outcome.  They vary whether girls attend coed or single-sex schools.  The main finding is 
that girls from single-sex schools are substantially more likely to choose the gamble than 
girls from coed schools; in fact, girls from single-sex schools choose the gamble roughly 
as frequently as do boys.  This indicates that social learning and nurture may well be the 
source of the gender differences found in previous studies.  Booth and Nolen (2009b) 
consider whether girls from single-sex schools differ from girls from coed schools in 
terms of willingness to compete.  They find substantial differences, with girls from 
single-sex schools more likely to choose competition and behaving more like boys with 
respect to competitiveness.   
 
b) Minorities 
  Discrimination occurs not only with respect to gender, but also with respect to 
ethnic background.  As it is considerably more difficult to arrange experiments in which 
ethnic background is systematically varied, there are fewer studies in this area. 
  Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) consider discrimination in Israeli society between 
Ashkenazic Jews and Eastern Jews; the former tend to be wealthier and better educated.  
Three different experimental games were used in their study.  First, in the investment 
(‘trust’) game, three times as much (17.16 versus 5.62) was sent to Ashkenazic male 
responders than to Eastern male responders; this pattern was observed for both male 
Ashkenazic and Eastern first-movers (in fact, this discrimination was only observed for 
males).  However, there was no significant difference in the amounts returned by 
Ashkenazic and Eastern responders. Since first-mover behavior could reflect preferences 
per se rather than trust, a dictator-game control was also conducted, with the amount 
transferred to the recipient tripled, as in the investment game.  Here there is no difference 
(5.6 versus 5.1) in the amounts sent to male Ashkenazic and Eastern recipients by male 
dictators, indicating that there is no per se taste for discrimination, but rather that the 
investment game results were driven by (mistaken) beliefs about the expected returns 
from each ethnic group.  Finally, an ultimatum game was conducted to test for the 
stereotype that Eastern Jews are driven more by a sense of “honor” and so would be more 
likely to reject small proposals.  In fact, Eastern male responders received significantly 
higher proposals (8.4 versus 5.9) than did Ashkenazic male responders, even though 
rejection rates for lopsided proposals were nearly the same for both groups.  Overall, the 
observed discrimination in this paper appears to reflect stereotypes rather than rational 
statistical discrimination. 
Fershtman, Gneezy, and Verboven (2005) attempt to distinguish between 
discrimination against people and “nepotism” in favor of one’s own group.  At issue is   78
the notion of anonymity rules, which forbid disclosure of group affiliation or background.  
Using the investment game, they compare behavior when group identity is fully 
observable and when it is not.  The paper considers two different societies: Belgian 
(Walloons versus Flemish) and Israeli (ultra-orthodox religious versus secular).  Belgian 
society shows evidence of discrimination, as both Walloons and Flemish sent much more 
to the responder when he or she was of the same background as the first mover than when 
the responder was of the other background (1200 versus 745 and 1009 versus 536, 
respectively).  On the other hand, transfers made to anonymous responders were about 
the same as transfers to own-group responders for both Walloon and Flemish first-
movers.  However, a very different pattern was observed in Israeli society.  In this case, 
ultra-orthodox religious Jews favor members of their own group, but send similar 




  Does one’s level of attractiveness matter in terms of hiring practices and behavior 
in the workplace?  Many people feel that good-looking people are highly advantaged and 
in some occupations (e.g., pharmaceutical representatives selling to physicians) looks are 
essential for being hired.  Job applicants are routinely counseled to look their best for job 
interviews.  Some recent experimental studies have tested this issue in the laboratory.  
 
Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) investigate the “beauty premium” in experimental 
labor market in which firms choose wages for workers in a real-effort task involving 
solving mazes.  Physical attractiveness is found to be uncorrelated with skill in this task.  
The experimental design varies the degree of oral and visual interaction between firms 
and workers (and also elicits worker confidence).  In the baseline, the firm only observes 
the “resume” of the worker, which includes the labor-market characteristics of the 
worker; in the visual treatment, the firm also sees a photograph of the worker; in the oral 
treatment, the firm sees the resume and also has a telephone conversation with the 
worker; in the face-to-face treatment, this conversation is face-to-face.  They find a 
substantial beauty premium, which they decompose into three transmission channels: 
Physically attractive workers are more confident and higher confidence increases wages, 
these workers are also (incorrectly) considered to be more capable by firms, and these 
workers also have better oral skills that raise their wages. 
 
Wilson and Eckel (2006) also investigate the beauty premium, using the 
investment game and photographs.  They find a modest beauty premium, in that the 
average amount sent to an “unattractive” (“attractive”) counterpart was $4.64 ($4.98); 
attractive trustees appear to reciprocate this trust.  On the other hand, there is also a 
“beauty penalty” for attractive first movers, as responders return 35% (30%) of the 
amounts sent by “unattractive” (“attractive”) first movers.  It appears that this is driven 
by disappointed expectations, as responders withhold repayment in this case.  
Furthermore, responders expect more from attractive first movers, so their expectations 
are unmet more frequently and so this withholding is exacerbated when the first mover 
who disappointed the responder is attractive.     79
 
   Andreoni and Petrie (2008) study the beauty premium in a public-goods game.  
When people are not told the contributions of others, there is indeed a beauty premium: 
attractive people earn 7% more than people of intermediate attractiveness and 12% more 
than unattractive people, even though attractive people contribute approximately the 
same average amount as others.  In another treatment, participants are told the individual 
contributions of each other player.  In this case, the beauty premium becomes a beauty 
penalty, as it appears (as in Wilson and Eckel) that people expect (hope for?) more from 
attractive people.  As these expectations are more likely to be unmet, attractive people 
seem relatively more selfish, leading to decreased contributions from other participants.  
There are also some gender effects, as men make larger contributions and this appears to 
“lead” other people to contribute more in subsequent periods. 
 
 
d) Affirmative action 
 
  A thorny policy issue is that of affirmative action, whereby some group that is 
considered to be generally disadvantaged is given an immediate advantage.  Emotions 
run high on this topic, and “reverse discrimination” lawsuits are not uncommon.  What 
are the effects of affirmative action?  Clearly this helps disadvantaged people (at least in 
the short run), but it may well be detrimental with respect to overall performance.  Some 
recent laboratory experiments have investigated this issue in controlled settings. 
 
Schotter and Weigelt (1992) find, in a two-person tournament setting, that the 
effects of affirmative action depend on the severity of the cost disadvantage for the non-
minority group.  When the tournament was “unfair”, one of these people had to win by a 
certain amount and/or was assigned a cost function greater than that for the other person.  
Affirmative action is found to discourage disadvantaged agents from “dropping out”, as 
was observed without affirmative action.  Nevertheless, overall the effect of affirmative 
action on output appears to depend on the degree of disadvantage.  When this is large, 
then affirmative-action programs did improve profits for the “tournament 
administrators”; however, this did not occur when the cost disadvantage was less severe. 
 
Corns and Schotter (1999) provide an ‘existence proof’ that there exist parameters 
under which price-preference auctions (often used to promote minority representation in 
government contracting) can increase minority representation while being cost effective; 
however, there is a decrease in cost effectiveness if the degree of price preference is too 
large.  The experimental design involves high-cost firms (simulating minority firms) that 
receive either a 0%, 5%, 10%, or 15% price preference.  There were six participants in 
each session, with costs drawn from a uniform distribution of [100,200] for the four low-
cost firms and [110, 220] for the two high-cost firms.  The frequency of a high-cost firm 
winning the auction increased from 12% in the 0% treatment to 43% in the 15% 
treatment, largely in line with the theoretical predictions.  The average observed price 
was 121.24 in the 0% condition, 119.29 in the 5% condition, 122.84 in the 10% 
condition, and 124.41 in the 15% condition.  There is no significant difference in the 
distribution of drawn costs across any two price-preference treatments.  Nevertheless, the   80
results indicate that it is possible to use price preferences to increase representation of 
“minority” firms without increasing the overall cost or the average observed price. 
 
Niederle, Segal, and Vesterlund (2008) follow up the Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) study by examining how affirmative action affects competitive entry and 
performance.  Given that women shy away from competition, it may be advantageous to 
institute an affirmative-action policy under which women are favored in competitions.  
Participants are formed into groups of six, including three men and three women, and add 
up a series of five two-digit numbers; in one task, they are paid $0.50 for each correct 
answer, while in another task the two best performers are paid $1.50 for each correct 
answer.  In the third task, people choose either the piece-rate or the tournament payment 
scheme.  Next there is an affirmative-action task, in which the two winners in a 
tournament are the highest-performing woman and the highest performer of the other 
people in the group.   The results indicate that when women guaranteed equal 
representation among winners, more women and fewer men enter competitions.  Results 
also suggest that affirmative action need not be costly, but may be sensitive to 
parameters, as in Corns and Schotter (1999).  Measured beliefs about one’s rank and 
attitudes concerning competition are affected by the affirmative-action policy.  While 
affirmative action may result in reverse discrimination towards men, the authors claim: 
“…this need not be the outcome when competitive entry is not payoff maximizing. The 
response in entry implies that it may not be necessary to lower the performance 
requirement for women to achieve a more diverse set of winners.”  Thus, affirmative-
action policies may potentially be beneficial. 
 
Balafoutas and Sutter (2009) investigate three alternative policy interventions that 
shall promote women in competitive environments: Preferential Treatment, Repetition of 
the Tournament, and Affirmative Action.  These environments are compared with respect 
to the willingness of men and women to enter a tournament (addition exercises) and the 
impact on both tournament efficiency (selecting the most qualified people to be the 
winners) and post-tournament efficiency when groups then participate in a minimum-
effort coordination game (the minimum effort translates into the efficiency level).  
Affirmative-action policy interventions lead to significantly higher entrance rates of 
women, expect for in the Repetition treatment. Tournament efficiency does not appear to 
deteriorate when these policies are introduced; in fact, a “small push” (giving women 
credit for one additional solved exercise) leads to the highest efficiency.  Furthermore, 
efficiency in a post-tournament teamwork-task is slightly higher in the treatments with 
successful policy interventions; thus, to the extent that this experimental game serves as a 
proxy for dynamic considerations, cooperation is not harmed by the introduction of 
affirmative action. 
 
Calsamiglia, Franke, and Rey-Biel (2009) consider affirmative action in two-
player tournaments involving solving mini-Sudoku puzzles.  Elementary school children 
at two otherwise-identical private schools in Spain were paired, with the person solving 
more (net) puzzles winning the tournament.  In one of these schools, the students had 
experience with these Sudoku puzzles.  These policies included adding some number of 
points to the disadvantaged students total and multiplying the number of solved puzzles   81
by disadvantaged students by some factor greater than one.  Their results indicate that 
performance was not reduced for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects and that it 
was in fact enhanced.  Additionally, while affirmative action balanced the proportion of 
disadvantaged individuals winning their respective tournament, the average performance 




Laboratory experiments have now been used to study almost every aspect of labor 
economics, ranging from the effects of final-offer arbitration in public sector labor 
disputes to the causes of gender wage differentials.  This vast literature includes a number 
of noteworthy ‘success stories’, including the use of laboratory experiments as testing 
grounds for proposed institutional innovations --in particular, matching mechanisms for 
professional workers, and arbitration systems in public sector union bargaining-- that are 
subsequently used to organize the actual pricing and exchange of labor.  
 
We see laboratory experiments as a useful tool among several at the labor 
economist’s disposal; their key strengths include the ability to control conditions and 
confounding factors affecting a possible causal relationship more tightly than any other 
method, the ability to replicate results quickly and easily with newly collected data, the 
unique ease with which they can test the exact quantitative predictions of simple game-
theoretic models, the ability to cleanly study behavior in situations where precise 
theoretical predictions are absent (as in the case of multiple equilibria), their low cost, the 
ability to more readily study phenomena that are hidden in the field because they are 
illegal or disapproved of (such as sabotage, discrimination, and spite), and the ability to 
elicit data relatively easily on such central game-theoretic concepts as beliefs and 
strategies that are often difficult to infer from observed behavior alone.   
 
Key objections that have been raised to lab experiments in economics include the 
artificiality of the experimental context in general and the labor ‘task’ specifically, low 
stakes, short duration, and the effects of experimenter scrutiny.  All of these are important 
issues, which experimenters should (and typically do) consider seriously.  As we have 
argued in detail in this review, however, none of these concerns –with the possible 
exception of duration-- are insurmountable in the lab, and in general these disadvantages 
need to be weighed against the lab’s potential benefits, enumerated above.  In many cases 
a combination of methods, or a hybrid method --such as the artefactual field experiments 
and framed field experiments described by List (2009)-- may be the best approach.   
 
Perhaps the most widespread concern with lab experiments is the 
representativeness of the laboratory population relative to the field population of interest; 
this concern seems particularly acute when discussing lab results that are hard to explain 
without some recourse to ‘non-standard’ preferences.  As we have noted, this issue can be 
addressed in a number of ways, including conducting lab experiments directly on the 
field population of interest (e.g. Chinese central planners), and studying the selection 
process itself (for example, selection into competitive versus co-operative work 
environments, or into situations where altruism might be expected or not) in the lab.    82
Another important option, of course, is to move the entire experiment into the field, using 
the lab only as a pre-test or not at all.   
 
Greater clarity on ‘representativeness’ can, in our opinion, be also achieved if 
future investigators are more precise about which field environment their experiment is 
intended to represent.  Clearly, if the intended field population is highly specific (for 
example, new registrants for unemployment insurance in Illinois), and the researcher’s 
main interest is in the magnitude of the behavioral response to a contemplated policy 
change affecting this population, the ideal research design is almost certainly what List 
(2009) calls a ‘natural field experiment’ on that population.  However, when searching 
for underlying principles of behavior, derived from a specific theoretical model of 
strategic interaction and/or social preferences that one hopes might apply to a broader 
field population (for example, all college-educated employees, or even all humans), a lab 
experiment on a random sample from a broader group may be more useful.  In all cases, 
the research question should guide the choice of method, and the investigator should 
specify the population on which the experiment is intended to shed light.  
 
Probably the most frequent use of lab experiments in labor economics has been to 
principal-agent interactions between workers and firms.  While many predictions of what 
one might call ‘traditional’ principal-agent theory have been confirmed in the lab --for 
example, in most cases effort increases when marginal work incentives are raised, 
contributions to team production fall with the number of team members, and ratchet 
effects disappear when ex post labor market competition is intensified--, lab experiments 
have also identified a significant number of robust departures from rational, selfish 
behavior in principal-agent interactions.  As already noted, a catch-all phrase for the 
modifications to traditional preference structures that have been proposed to explain these 
‘anomalies’ is “social preferences”; the discovery and mapping of social preferences is 
probably the most important contribution of lab experiments to principal-agent analysis, 
and to labor economics more generally.
96   
 
That said, much remains unknown about social preferences; several competing 
theoretical models exist and little is yet known about which models are most 
representative.  On the theoretical side, one area in which progress is needed is in the 
development of social preference models that apply to large, multi-worker workplaces.  
Most current social preference models have been developed to explain behavior in the 
lab, where (for example) one college student representing an employer gives a ‘gift’ to 
another college student. While inequity aversion might explain behavior in these 
situations, it is hard to see how it (and some other versions of social preferences) applies 
to interactions between workers and large multi-worker firms.  On the empirical side,  
social preferences seem capable of changing their shape and form considerably between 
different contexts, as well as between the lab and the field.  Empirical work that sheds 
                                                 
96 Non-selfish preferences are of course not the only possible explanation of departures from predicted 
equilibria in effort-supply models.  Others include simple limits to human cognition (especially in complex, 
multi-period games), and practical difficulties of coordinating on Nash equlibrium even when a unique one 
exists.   83
light on which social preferences (including, among others, inequity aversion, reciprocity, 
guilt, spite, jealousy and simple altruism) come into play when will be of great value.   
 
  While much remains to be learned about the effects of compensation systems on 
worker behavior within firms, it is perhaps worth gauging our progress by considering the 
state of knowledge on this topic some 15 years ago in the words of some of the main 
contributors (emphasis added):    
 
“There is a large and growing interest in the economic theory of the internal workings of 
firms. However, this literature is based on very little data and limited stylized facts.”  
(Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 1994a.)   
 
“For a time there was considerable excitement about implicit contract theory…  That 
literature soon fell out of favor, but in its place came more refined information economic 
analyses that viewed wage contracts as optimal responses to asymmetries in information 
between employees and firms. With this, the logical possibilities for explaining wage 
behavior grew dramatically. Today's large variety of models and modeling options has 
put theory well ahead of observation.” (Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 1994b). 
 
And finally, from an article titled “Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few 
Facts”:   
“With the advent of information economics and contract theory, models of internal labor 
markets --or at least selected features of these markets-- have begun to emerge.  The 
objective of these theories is to show that internal-labor-market outcomes can be 
construed as second-best solutions to contracting problems under incomplete information.   
… At this point, there is hardly any feature of internal labor markets that cannot be 
given some logical explanation using the right combination of uncertainty, asymmetric 
information and opportunism. (Baker and Holmstrom 1995).   
 
Thus, just 15 years ago, research on incentives in organizations consisted to a 
disappointingly large extent of (a) identifying a ‘paradoxical’ feature of some internal 
labor market (for example, academic tenure, or pay raises based purely on seniority), then 
(b) crafting a theoretical model showing how that feature was in fact an efficient response 
to some contracting problem.  Most analyses stopped there.   
 
Today, thanks both to a laboratory literature that began in the mid-1990s and a 
more recent surge in field experiments, we now face a cornucopia (some might say, an 
unmanageable deluge) of facts about agents’ and principals’ behavior in the above 
models.  Indeed, after reviewing this literature, it is tempting to conclude that we now 
have  “Too Many Facts, Too Few Theories”.  Certainly, an important part of the road 
ahead is the development of models of social preferences (or of other causes of the robust 
departures from the predictions of ‘traditional’ principal-agent models) that account well 
not only for those departures in the lab but apply well to the sorts of employment 
relationships we see most often in the field.  In our view, a variety of empirical tools 
including both lab and field experiments, natural experiments, econometric studies, and 
calibration of structural models will provide the necessary empirical discipline in this 
next phase of research on one of the most basic issues in labor markets:  the exchange of 
effort for pay within firms.    84
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